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ABSTRACT 
Risk-Based Maintenance Planning Model for Oil and Gas Pipelines 
Laya Parvizsedghy, PhD 
Concordia University, 2015 
Oil and gas pipelines are the main means of transporting fossil fuels from the wellheads 
and processing facilities to the distribution centers. The 2013 US infrastructure report 
card assigned a grade of D
+
 to energy pipelines signifying they are in a poor condition. 
More than 10,000 incidents were reported on oil and gas pipelines during the last two 
decades, most of which resulted in considerable consequences. Recent failures and 
ruptures have raised concerns over the risk of failure of such pipes in Canada. The main 
objective of this research is to develop a risk-based maintenance planning model for oil 
and gas pipelines. The research develops a probability of failure (POF) and a 
consequence of failure (COF) prediction model and establishes a risk-based inspection 
and simulation-based rehabilitation planning models.  
The POF model develops a comprehensive index by applying the granular theory of 
uncertainty and the principles of probability theory to forecast the POF of oil and gas 
pipes. The neuro-fuzzy technique is employed to develop a model that forecasts the 
financial consequences of the potential failures of such pipes. An integrated fuzzy risk 
evaluation model is developed with 25 fuzzy rules to assess a pipeline’s risk index. A 
fuzzy expert system is developed to select the inspection tools and determine their run-
frequency according to the failure risk of a pipeline. Regression analysis is applied to 
develop a risk growth profile to forecast the maximum failure risk of various inspection 
scenarios. Scenarios are ranked based on their risk-cost index, which integrates two main 
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indices: 1) maximum risk of failure, and 2) life cycle cost of scenarios, computed by 
applying the Monte-Carlo simulation. Finally, a comprehensive maintenance model 
proposes the optimum maintenance plans with the lowest LCC, developing a third-degree 
risk-based deterioration profile of the pipelines. 
The POF model’s sensitivity results highlight that cathodic protection effectiveness and 
soil resistivity are the leading causes of external corrosion failures, while the depth of 
cover is an important factor of mechanical damages. The COF model attests that 
diameter, as well as the location properties are important factors for estimating the 
financial consequences. The developed risk assessment model is validated using a test 
dataset that proved the models are accurate with about 80% validity. The developed 
models are applied on a case study of a 24-inch pipe. The POF and COF of the pipe are 
computed, and the results suggest that the pipe’s risk index is above medium with an 
average index of 3.5. The study proposes the application of an inspection tool, which 
decreases the risk growth by 50% during the service life of the pipeline. The application 
of the maintenance planning model proposes a combination of recoat, repair, and 
replacement with a medium size of rehabilitation. The net present value of the proposed 
scenario of maintenance is estimated to cost around 1.7 million dollars over the life cycle 
of the pipeline, compared to the last-ranked alternative that costs over three million 
dollars. This research offers a framework to develop a comprehensive index to predict the 
failure risk of pipes using historical data that can be extended to the other infrastructure 
types. It develops a model to plan for the optimal pipeline maintenance, and provides an 
overall image of its service life. The developed models will help the operators predict the 
risk of failure and plan appropriately for the life cycle of their oil and gas pipelines. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem Statement and Research Motivation 
While pipelines are considered to be the safest and most efficient way to transport 
hazardous liquids and natural gas, there is still a probability of failure, with economic, 
safety and damaging ecological consequences. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration (PHMSAa 2014) of the US has gathered and published data on the 
oil and gas pipeline failures since 1970. Over 10,000 failures were recorded from 1993 to 
2013 in the US, which resulted in six billion dollars of property damages and the leakage 
of around 2.3 million barrels of hazardous liquids into the environment. The records also 
indicate that 377 fatalities and 1,489 serious injuries occurred during this period. These 
figures underscore why the assessment of oil and gas pipelines deserves serious attention. 
In addition, owners or operators of such pipelines must develop and implement an 
integrity management program as mandated by Canadian Pipeline regulatory. Whereas 
the Guidelines for Pipeline Integrity Management Programs (Annex N) only provides an 
overall approach to mitigate risk of failures of the pipelines during the operation phase 
(CSA 2003). 
The failure of oil and gas pipelines has been extensively addressed in the literature, 
however the studies conducted to-date suffer from several limitations. These research 
works have either focused on a single type of failure, e.g. corrosion or third-party 
activities, or they have developed subjective models. Physical models rely on analyzing 
inline inspection data, which is very expensive to gather and does not even exist in the 
early stages of a pipeline’s operation. In addition, some pipes are not piggable. The 
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existing statistical models do not consider the specific properties of pipes in forecasting 
the probability and consequences of their failure. Moreover, there is no structured method 
with which to plan for the inspection and rehabilitation of pipes. Therefore, the current 
state-of-the-practice is not mature enough to fully support oil and gas operators in the 
decision-making process.  
This study aims to develop an objective quantitative model on the failure assessment of 
oil and gas pipelines, a model that can also be used to plan maintenance solutions. The 
result of this research will help oil and gas pipeline operators in their decision-making 
process for inspection and maintenance plans.   
1.2 Research Objectives 
The main objective of this research is to develop a risk-based maintenance decision 
support model for oil and gas pipelines during the operation phase. This objective can be 
broken down into the following sub-objectives: 
1. Identify and study the sources of failure and their effects on oil and gas pipelines; 
2. Predict the failure probability of such pipes;  
3. Develop a consequence of failure assessment model; 
4. Develop an integrated risk evaluation model; 
5. Establish a risk-based inspection planning model;  and 
6. Develop a deterioration-based rehabilitation planning model. 
1.3 Research Methodology 
A comprehensive description of the methodology developed in this research is presented 
in chapter 3. A summary of the research methodology is presented in the following steps: 
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Step 1: Literature Review 
The literature is reviewed to find those works  that are most relevent to the risk 
assessment and maintenance of oil and gas pipelines. The literature review also includes 
an evaluation of the techniques that can be used in the model development. 
Step 2: Build a Bow-tie model 
A Bow-tie model is applied to develop the graphical representation of the variables that 
contribute to failure and to show their relationship to the major consequences of the 
failure. This approach includes two main parts; a fault tree and an event tree. Due to the 
complexity of oil and gas pipeline behaviour, this is a useful technique with which to 
elaborate on the causes and after-failure events of pipeline failure. Finally, this step 
provides a comprehensive view of the pipeline failure scenarios. 
Step 3: Probability of Failure Model 
The failure probability is assessed based on the bow-tie model, and the contribution of 
each category of contributing causes is calculated using the historical data from pipeline 
incidents. The model then computes the failure probability based on the causes of 
incidents and measures the probability of the occurrence of each major consequence. The 
model produces all the indices and equations required to compute the absolute probability 
of failure. 
Step 4: Consequences of Failure Model 
This model predicts the monetary consequence level of various pipeline failure scenarios. 
The neuro-fuzzy technique is used to develop this model, utilizing  data gathered from 
the history of pipeline incidents in the US. This technique is a powerful pattern 
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recognition tool,recognising the relationship between the input and output variables. 
Compared to using regression and artificial neural networks it develops a more accurate 
and robust model.  
Step 5: Integrated Fuzzy Risk Evaluation Model 
A fuzzy expert system that integrates the probability of failure with the consequences of 
failure is developed to evaluate the failure risk level. A fuzzy inference system is 
developed; its rules defined based on the existig risk matrices and expert opinions.  
Step 6: Risk-Based Inspection Planning 
The appropriate pipeline inspection techniques are selected and their optimal run 
frequency of running is proposed. This is performed according to the afore-calculated 
probabilities of failure and consequences. Various inspection scenarios are developed 
based on the risk growth prediction profile. The inspection scenarios are ranked based on 
a newly introduced index, theRisk-Cost, which multiplies the maximum risk of failure by 
the life cycle cost.  
Step 7: Maintenance planning 
This step helps oil and gas pipeline operators develop appropriate maintenance scenarios 
for the pipelines in their network. The rehabilitation scenarios are offered via the 
prediction of the deterioration profile, and then the required rehabilitation techniques are 
determined based on the deterioration profile. The Life Cycle Costs (LCCs) of the 
generated scenarios are calculated using Monte Carlo simulation. Accordingly, the 
scenarios with the lowest LCCs indicate the associated optimum pipeline maintenance 
plans. 
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1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is comprised of six chapters, summarised as follows:  
Chapter 1 highlights the problem statement and the research motivation. The research 
objectives and the overall model framework are also presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 2 reviews the previous works on failure and risk assessment of oil and gas 
pipelines. The literature review results are organised and the research gaps identified. In 
addition, the most-suitable techniques for this research are investigated. 
Chapter 3 presents the research methodology in detail. It is composed of two distinctive 
models, a risk assessment model and a maintenance model. The risk assessment model 
contains three main steps: identification, failure probability assessment, and consequence 
evaluation. The maintenance model is composed of inspection planning and rehabilitation 
planning sub-models. 
Chapter 4 explains the historical data gathered to develop the proposed models. It also 
includes an analysis of the historical data, divided into two main categories: (1) the 
frequency of failure sources associated with different variables and (2) monetary 
consequences classification. 
Chapter 5 elaborates the development of the models based on the proposed methodology 
introduced in Chapter 3. It also elaborates on the implementation of the developed model 
for a 24-inch pipe. This chapter continues with an explanation of the semi-automated 
system. 
Finally, Chapter 6 highlights the conclusions and the expected contributions of the 
research and some recommendations for future work. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims at providing a retrospective and comprehensive literature review of the 
risk assessment, maintenance solutions, and decision support models of oil and gas 
pipelines in the operation phase. It starts with an introduction to oil and gas pipelines and 
their types (Section 2.2). Then, a comprehensive review of the risk assessment researches 
including the general risk management methods and those related to the oil and gas 
pipelines is presented (Section 2.3). After that, the existing guidelines on various types of 
operations for the maintenance of such pipelines are introduced (Section 2.4). Finally, 
selected techniques that have the potential to be used in this research are reviewed, and 
the advantages and disadvantages of each are demonstrated (Section 2.5). At last, the 
limitations of the previous studies and overall finding of this review are presented 
(Section 2.6).  
2.2 Oil and Gas Pipelines 
Statistics proves that 24% of US energy consumption is provided by natural gas and 
another 39% from petroleum products. The pipelines network in the US transport almost 
all of the natural gas and around 65% of the hazardous liquid products. Pipelines are 
considered as the most practical and safest way of transporting these products. The 
pipeline network in the US consists of 2.5 million miles and includes three primary types 
according to their function as follows (PHMSAa 2014): 
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 Gas transmission and gathering pipelines: There are approximately 320,000 miles 
of onshore and offshore transmission pipelines in the US. Gathering pipelines 
gather natural gas from wellheads and transmission pipelines carry products in 
large volumes from the processing facilities to the communities, power plants, 
and factories over long distances. These pipelines may range from 2 to 42 inches 
in diameter (PHMSAa 2014). 
 Gas distribution pipelines: There were around 2.1 million miles of distribution 
pipelines in 2001. They carried products from the processing facilities to the 
residential, commercial, and industrial customers. Gas distribution pipelines are 
also divided into two groups of main and service lines. Main lines are larger in 
diameter; while the service lines are from ½ to 2 inches in diameter (PHMSAa 
2014).  
 Hazardous liquid pipelines: These pipelines cover 185,000 miles of the network. 
They carry hazardous liquids from the wellheads to the customers. These 
pipelines are ranged from 2 to 42 inches in diameter. (PHMSAa 2014)  
Figure 2.1 presents a schematic view of the network of oil and gas pipelines. The life 
cycle of these pipeline projects includes three main phases including design, construction, 
and operation. The main steps of pipeline construction are as followed (PHMSAa 2014): 
1- Site Preparation 
2- Pipe Stringing 
3- Trenching 
4- Bending  
5- Welding 
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6- Coating 
7- Lowering and Backfilling 
8- Testing 
9- Site Restoration 
 
Figure 2- 1: Components of Natural Gas Pipelines Network (GAO 2000) 
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2.3 Risk Assessment 
2.3.1 Definition of Risk Assessment 
Failures have happened over the life of oil and gas pipelines; although, they are assumed 
the safest and more economic than the other methods of transporting the petroleum 
products. Risk assessment is a tool that can facilitate maintenance decision-making by 
forecasting the failures of oil and gas pipelines. Risk assessment guidelines have 
provided a definition of risk from various perspectives (Infraguide 2006, Dey 2009, and 
Dey 2010). Infraguide (2006) defined risk as a combination of the probability and the 
consequences of the scenarios that have adverse effects on the operation of different 
infrastructure types. Consequently, risk management aims to decrease the risk of failure 
and details this process in three main phases: Identification, Evaluation, and Mitigation 
planning of the risks.  
DNV (2010) published a report about the recommended practice on risk assessment of 
third party sources of failures. The report defined sources of failure of pipelines as 
accidental events that can lead to the failure of the pipes, which was titled: the end-event. 
Then, it defined risk assessment as the evaluation of the frequency and consequences of 
the end-event. DNV (2009) developed recommendations on the integrity management of 
sub-sea pipelines. This study suggested selecting the activities in the operation phase of 
pipelines based on the risk assessment. Then, it specified the steps of the risk assessment 
process as are followed: 
 Identify risks and types of failures 
 Evaluate failure probabilities (PoF) 
 Evaluate failure consequences (CoF) 
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 Estimate risk of failure level (CoF × PoF) 
2.3.2 Risk-Based Decision Support Models for Oil and Gas Pipelines 
There has been an extensive effort in the previous studies to analyze and assess the risks 
of oil and gas pipelines and develop risk-based decision support systems for oil and gas 
pipes (Han & Weng 2010, Han & Weng 2011, Dey 2003, Dey 2004, Dey et al. 2004). A 
quantitative method was proposed by Han & Weng (2010) to evaluate the individual risks 
of natural gas pipeline networks. This method combined the probability of failures and 
their internal and external consequences. External effects included those of individual and 
societal while internal effects evaluated the monetary consequences. The model applied 
an overall rate of failure to calculate the probability of failure and multiplied it by a 
function of variables. Then, pipelines were classified into external and internal ones. For 
the former group, the individual and social consequences were computed. This part of the 
model focused on the safety related consequences and considered harms of a failure on 
gas pipelines. The coefficient of the pressure of the pipeline with the expected economic 
loss was multiplied by the pressure of the node that was vulnerable to fail to calculate the 
economic consequences. The failure rate was an average rate of incidents that was 
computed based on the historical data that was recorded through the historical data of 
failures on European gas pipeline network (EGIG 1999). The failure rate of all pipelines 
was considered equal unless the correction factor was applied; however, no function was 
developed to calculate this factor.  
Han and Weng (2011) developed a model to compare the risk of failure of urban gas 
pipelines in a network. This model considered the causes of failures of such pipelines and 
calculated their weights based on the historical data. Frequency of the failures was 
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obtained to calculate the weight of importance of the causes of failure applying reliability 
engineering theory. Then, the probability of happening of each cause of failure was 
computed and multiplied by its related weight. The method was implemented on two 
pipelines and was compared with the results of a quantitative method proposed by Han 
and Weng (2010) to prove the validity of the developed model.  
Dey (2003) evaluated the risk of failure of different segments of a cross-country pipeline 
and developed strategies for the selection of the inspection techniques for such pipelines. 
Risk-based decision-making support system was developed by Dey (2004) using Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) technique. This model applied expert opinion to obtain the 
weight of variables that were identified to contribute to the failure of pipelines. Variables 
were categorized as risk factors that included external and internal corrosion, construction 
and material defects, as well as acts of God.  
Later, Dey et al. (2004) developed a risk-based maintenance model for offshore pipelines. 
After introducing likelihood and consequence loops of risks, expert opinion was obtained 
to calculate the relative weights of each factor of the loops applying AHP. Ranges of 
effect values from 1 to 10 were considered for assessing each factor. The model 
calculated the risk score of each pipeline by summing up the effect values multiplied by 
associated weights of the factors. Finally, one of the results was prioritizing assets of a 
network of pipelines. Most of the factors such as corrosion were evaluated subjectively; 
although, the research tried to minimize the subjectivity of the decision-making process 
in this problem. The model did not recognize the severity of different risks of failures. 
Consequently, inspection tools were proposed through an experience-based process, 
which was built upon a set of primary factors. Consequently, the research did not develop 
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a comprehensive model and needed the expertise to analyze and propose the best 
technique. 
2.3.3 Sources of Failure 
The first step in the risk assessment of infrastructures is to identify the risks associated 
with their failure (Infraguide 2006; DNV 2009 & 2010). There are different 
classifications of infrastructure risks. Sources of failures and defects that result in the 
failures of oil and gas pipelines have been the subject of grouping risks of failures 
(Shahriar et al. 2012, Dawotola et al. 2009, Yuhua & Datao 2005, and Muhlbauer 2004). 
This section details how previous works categorized the failures of oil and gas pipelines.  
Muhlbauer (2004) defined the risk of oil and gas pipelines as the loss of integrity and 
product. He also extended the risk definition to the failure of executing the intended 
functions by blockage, contamination or equipment failure. It was mentioned that leakage 
in most urban pipelines such as water, sewer, and urban gas distribution can tolerate some 
amount of leakage and would not be considered failed. However, the case was different 
for the transmission pipelines, and any amount of leakage was defined as failure. Failures 
cause interruptions in the function of transmission pipelines. This research classified 
failures from the viewpoint of the sources in four categories: third party, corrosion, 
design, and incorrect operations. Parvizsedghy and Zayed (2013) classified risks of oil 
and gas pipelines based on their sources of failure. Failures were recognized as happening 
because of physical, external or operational sources. Although, there may seem different 
categorization of the failures of oil and gas pipelines, most of the identified risk factors or 
failure types are similar. Table 2-1 presents the types of failures each study has identified. 
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The identification was based on the frequency of the failures of oil and gas pipelines with 
respect to their sources. 




















* * * * * * 
Internal 
Corrosion 
* * * * * * 
Construction and 
Material Defects 
* * * * * * 
Incorrect 
Operation 
* * * * * * 
Bad Design * * * * NA NA 
Third Party * NA * * * * 
Natural Hazards * NA * * * * 
 
2.3.4 Probability of Failure 
Failure probability is one of the required parameters to assess the risk of failure in 
infrastructures. Different guidelines tried to provide a definition of the probability of 
failure and a scale of evaluation for infrastructures (Infraguide 2006, and DNV 2010). 
Infraguide (2006) defined probability as the frequency of happening of a hazard. The 
study proposed Table 2-2 to assess the probability of failure of infrastructures. The 
probability of failure assessment for oil and gas pipelines has been the subject of several 
researches. The probability of failure scale should be adapted to the nature of the 
infrastructure type. Some types of infrastructures are more dangerous to the human and 
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environment. DNV (2009) developed failure probability scale for offshore gas pipelines. 
Table 2-3 presents categories of probability assessment and their description. 
Table 2- 2: Probability Assessment Scale (Infraguide 2006) 
Probability level Likelihood 
10 Will occur more than 4 times over next 2 to 5 years Frequent 
8 Will occur 2 to 4 times over next 2 to 5 years Likely 
6 Will occur once over next 2 to 5 years Occasional 
3 May occur once over next 2 to 5 years Seldom 
1 Unlikely to occur over next 2 to 5 years Unlikely 
 
Table 2- 3: Failure Probability Scale of Assessment (DNV 2010) 
Category Annual Frequency Description 
1 <10
-5











Event individually not expected to happen, but when 
summarized over a large number of pipelines have the 






Event individually may be expected to occur during the 




Event individually may be expected to occur more than 
once during the lifetime. 
 
Inline inspection data was widely used by previous researchers to develop a model to 
estimate the POF (Caleyo et al. 2009, Sinha 2002, and Ahammed 1998, and Sinha and 
Pandey 2002). Caleyo et al. (2009) developed probability distribution functions of 
corrosion depth and rate of growth applying Monte Carlo simulation. Different curves 
were proposed for underground pipelines considering the properties of various soil types. 
Sinha (2002) and Ahammed (1998) developed probabilistic models due to the 
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uncertainties of pipeline parameters. Both obtained data from Inline inspection tools to 
predict the failure probability of oil and gas pipelines under corrosion. These tools were 
used to gather data on the condition of oil and gas pipelines. The models required data on 
defects’ depth and length from inline inspection tools. Sinha and Pandey (2002) applied 
ANN to develop a model to predict the probability of failure of oil and gas pipelines. This 
model used the metal loss to forecast the burst pressure of such pipelines based on the 
model developed by Kiefner et al. (1973). The estimated pressure was used to forecast 
the remaining strength of the pipelines. Noor et al. (2011) proposed a probabilistic 
method to forecast the remaining strength of offshore pipelines obtaining data from inline 
inspection tools. This method was developed based on the assessment rules of DNV’s 
Recommended Practice for Corroded Pipelines (Veritas 2010) considering the standard 
deviation of inspection tools in determining the size of defects. 
Qualitative researches on POF evaluation model applied expert opinion to develop a POF 
assessment model (Al-Khalil et al. 2005, Zeng and Ma 2009, Dawotola et al. 2009, Dey 
2003, and Dey 2004). Al-Khalil et al. (2005), ranked a group of cross-country pipelines 
applying AHP. They classified risks of failure in seven groups: corrosion, mid wall 
defects, external interference, structural defects, operation problems, and loss of ground 
support. Then, experts scored the probability and cost of failure for each pipeline against 
the identified risk factors to calculate the overall expected cost of failure for each 
pipeline. These scores were later used to prioritize pipelines with respect to the budget. 
This Research tried to offer a “systematic risk-based approach” to prioritize a group of 
pipelines; although, it lacked the objectivity and did not develop a comprehensive model. 
Zeng and Ma (2009) developed a risk model for underground pipelines. The model 
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applied two sets of variables, general, and inspection and correlated them with six major 
types of failure titled: shape, seam, and structural failures, pipe alignment, and blockage. 
Then, it considered the consequences of failure, cost, performance, interruption, and 
safety, and finally offered a max-average method to maximize the effect of severe 
consequences in assessing the risk level. As the author described, this model did not 
develop any rating index to calculate the probability of failure. It only proposes an 
ordinal table of scales for different consequences; the absence of objectivity was apparent 
in this model.  
Dey (2003) evaluated the risk of failure of various segments of a cross-country pipeline. 
The probability of failure of segments of a pipeline was assessed based on the judgment 
of experts comparing various sources of failure in each segment against the other sources. 
The calculated weights for each source of failure were considered as the likelihood of 
failure for each segment. These weights were then used to prioritize different segment to 
be inspected. Also, the inspection tool was selected based on the relative likelihood of 
failure of segments versus each other. Dey (2004) applied a similar method to calculate 
the probability of failure on oil and gas pipelines. Several experts judged the importance 
of different sources of pipeline failures applying AHP. The relative importance of the 
identified sources of failure was evaluated based on the calculated weights. Finally, the 
expert opinion was applied to rate the probability of failure of pipelines against each type 
of failure. This score multiplied by the calculated weights resulted in the calculation of 
failure probability.   
Dawotola et al. (2009) proposed a model to calculate the failure probability of different 
causes of pipeline incidents. The model was designed with the combination of AHP and 
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Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). In fact, the model aimed to rank the causes responsible for 
pipeline failures based on the expert opinion. The model did not consider properties of 
the pipelines and only evaluated the relative importance of each failure cause. 
Some of the previous studies used the artificial neural networks to develop a model on 
the probability of failure of pipes due to corrosion or third party activities. Bersani et al. 
(2010) proposed a model to predict the probability of failures with respect to different 
causes, applying Artificial Neural Networks. For each cause of failure, a set of factors 
was proposed as independent variables. Preliminary results were presented to predict the 
third party failures; however, results did not prove the importance of the proposed factors 
and neither the soundness of the model. Ren et al. (2012) applied back propagation neural 
networks in a model to predict the maximum corrosion rate of natural gas pipelines. Input 
variables included pipeline length, the difference of elevation between different sections, 
pipe inclination, and pressure. The model also considered the Reynolds number as an 
important factor in predicting the corrosion rate of various sections of gas pipelines. 
Menon (2005) defined the Reynolds number as an important factor in classifying the flow 
of natural gas pipelines. The study developed a function of average gas velocity, inside 
diameter of pipe, gas density and velocity as input parameters to compute the Reynolds 
number. 
An extensive effort has been performed over the past years to model the reliability of the 
pipes subject to corrosion. Feng et al. (2011) developed a physical model for oil and gas 
pipelines. This research studied the effect of several factors on pipelines’ reliability. Data 
was obtained through “field measurement and physical and mechanical tests.” Sensitivity 
analysis proved the importance of the effect of Yield Strength, internal pressure and wall 
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thickness of the pipelines. Teixeira et al. (2008) developed a model to assess the 
reliability of pipelines with corrosion defects. The model computed the probability of 
pipelines’ failure based on the calculation of their burst pressure. It applied the numerical 
computations of reliability of the pipes. Sensitivity analysis proved the importance of 
corrosion depth and internal operational pressure on the burst failure of pipelines. The 
model was developed based on limited data from some field tests. 
Forecasting the cause of failure for oil and gas pipes has been the subject of study for 
many researchers. Bertolini et al. (2006) developed a decision support system (DSS) to 
forecast the spillage class in the cross-country oil and gas pipelines. Classification and 
Regression technique was applied to develop a decision tree that was aimed at forecasting 
the cause of leakage in such pipelines. The objective of the research was to select the 
most appropriate inspection tool of oil and gas pipelines. Regression technique was 
applied to develop this model. Developed model was aimed to recognize pipelines with 
potential third party failures from those prone to the natural hazards failures. The model 
used variables such as pipe diameter, service type, location type, the age of failure, the 
environment, and the equipment used for detecting the leakage. Data was collected from 
Concawe (Davis et al. 2010) to forecast the cause of failure.  
Senouci et al. (2013a) predicted possible failure sources for oil and gas pipelines applying 
regression and ANN models. The models considered forecasting failure types besides 
corrosion, such as mechanical, third party, natural hazard, and operational failures. The 
models obtained historical data on the failures of pipelines in Europe that was prepared 
by Concawe (Davis et al. 2010). The accuracy of the model was acceptable; however, it 
applied only five variables for all failure types. These variables included the type of 
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product, pipe location, pipe age, land use, and pipe diameter. Except the age, variables 
remained constant over the life of a pipeline and consequently did not represent the 
changes that may happen in the environment and pipe itself. Also, as the author 
mentioned, the model applied a limited number of factors that can be developed to 
forecast the failure rate of other types. These limitations were mostly due to the model’s 
reliance on the Concawe database. 
Most of the developed models were either subjective and were dependent on the expert 
judgment (Dey et al. 2004 and Dey 2003) or only addressed one source of failure of 
pipelines such as corrosion (Liao et al. 2012; Ren et al. 2012; Sinha and Pandey 2002; 
and Ahammed 1998). Consequently, they were not comprehensive. They also lacked the 
objectivity in estimating various sources of failures in oil and gas pipelines. 
Several researchers tried to develop models to cover these limitations. They attempted to 
develop models that could predict other sources of failures besides corrosion. Senouci et 
al. (2013b) applied fuzzy logic technique to develop a model in order to predict the failure 
type of oil and gas pipelines and compared the results with those of Senouci et al. 
(2013a). The comparison results proved that the developed fuzzy-based model 
outperformed the regression and ANN models with respect to the model validity. Despite 
the attempts made to predict the failure type of oil pipelines considering causes other than 
corrosion developed pipeline condition assessment models did not apply other factors 
besides corrosion. In other words, they mainly addressed factors that cause failures due to 
corrosion or third party damages only. In addition to that, the important issues of 
“interdependency” between different factors’ relations and “uncertainty” of factors’ 
severity weights were not addressed simultaneously. Consequently, El-Abbasy et al. 
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(2014a) developed a model to evaluate the condition of oil and gas pipelines applying a 
number of factors comprising corrosion. The model applied Analytic Network Process 
(ANP) and Monte Carlo simulation. Interdependency of factors was considered through 
ANP, and the suggested decisions took the uncertainty into consideration (using 
simulation). The implementation of the model on an existing offshore gas pipeline in 
Qatar was successful. The results of the model were compared with the actual pipeline 
condition.  
The simulation model built by El-Abbasy et al. (2014a) was considered as a first phase to 
evaluate or assess the condition of offshore oil and gas pipelines. El-Abbasy et al. (2014b) 
developed the second phase of the model the objective of which was to predict the 
current and future condition of offshore oil and gas pipelines. The model was developed 
based on the historical inspection data that was collected in Qatar. The developed model 
used the regression analysis technique to predict the pipeline condition and when 
compared with the actual condition yielded an average validity percentage above 96%. 
El-Abbasy et al. (2014c) applied ANN technique to develop another model with the same 
objective. The ANN model outperformed the regression model with respect to the 
validity results. These models applied several factors in predicting the condition of 
pipelines with considerably high accuracy. However, they could not develop a model to 
predict the sources of failures or their consequences. Also, the models designed in these 
studies were dependent on inline inspection data, which is expensive to gather frequently. 
They did not consider the specification of the location of pipes in developing the models.  
Shahriar et al. (2012) developed a comprehensive model to assess the risk of failure on 
oil and gas pipelines applying Bow-tie analysis. Bow-tie analysis is a new approach that 
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takes advantage of graphical techniques to analyze different scenarios of pipeline failures. 
This technique combines Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) with Event Tree Analysis (ETA). 
The model used the fault tree developed by Dawotola et al. (2009) and Yuhua and Datao 
(2005) with some modifications. Figures 2-2, 2-3 and 2-4 present the FT that was applied 
in this model. The Bow-tie diagram for the natural gas pipeline was centered over the gas 
release of the pipeline that was the top event for the fault tree. Sources of failure such as 
third party activities, corrosion, incorrect operation, unreasonable design, and geological 
hazards were the first level of expanding the causes of failure. In the lower levels, the 
variables that were in charge of different failure types were identified and considered as 
the basic events. Expert opinion was used to assess the fuzzy likelihood of basic risk 
events.  
An 11-grade fuzzy scale was used to assess the probability of failure, which was 
developed by Sadiq et al. (2004). Triangular fuzzy membership functions were applied to 
develop the granular scale to evaluate the likelihood of failure. The scale translated the 
linguistic terms into fuzzy numbers evaluating the probability of failure from absolutely 
low to absolutely high level. The probability of the occurrence of final event was 
calculated by multiplying the probabilities attributed to the basic events. Finally, 
sensitivity analysis proved the importance of bad installation and construction defects. As 
mentioned before, the expert opinion was used to analyze the failure probability of gas 
pipelines. However, it was very hard for the experts to analyze the effect of 40 basic 
events on the failure probability of the final event (Shahriar et al. 2012). The limitations 
of the model can be minimized by applying the historical data in developing the model.  
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Some researchers tried to develop models to forecast the probability of failure as 
mentioned before (Shahriar et al. 2012; Dawotola et al. 2009; Yuhua & Datao 2005; 
Muhlbauer 2004; Kiefner 1997). In Tables 2-5, 2-6 and 2-7, the variables that were 
considered when developing the aforementioned models to estimate the probability of 
failure are summarized for each type of failure.  
 
Figure 2- 2: Oil and Gas Pipelines Fault Tree (Shahriar et al. 2012) 
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Figure 2- 3: Oil and Gas Pipelines Fault Tree; part A (Shahriar et al. 2012) 
 
Figure 2- 4: Oil and Gas Pipelines Fault Tree; part B (Shahriar et al. 2012) 
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Table 2- 4: Summary of the variables affecting the probability of corrosion failures 
Failure Types Sources Variables 
External 
Corrosion 
Shahriar et al. 
2012 
Failure of CP 
Failure of Coating 
Soil corrosion (High temperature, low resistance, 
high water ratio, high salt, bacteria, low pH, 
electrical interference) 




Failure of coating 
Yuhua & Datao 
2005 
Failure of CP 





soil corrosivity (resistivity, pH, moisture, 
carbonates) 
Mechanical corrosion (stress level, stress cycling, 
temperature, coating, CP, pH) 
CP effectiveness 
Interference potential (DC & AC related, shielding 
potential) 
Coating (type, age, visual inspection age, other 
inspection age) 
Kiefner 1997 






Shahriar et al. 
2012 
Failure of inhibitor 
Failure of coating 
Debonding 
Dawotola et al. 
2009 
Failure of inhibitor 
Failure of coating 
Interfacial debonding 
Corrosive medium 
Yuhua & Datao 
2005 
Anti-corrosion 
Failure of inhibitor 
Failure of coating 
Bad clear pipe 




Flow stream characteristics (solid and water related) 
Preventions  
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Table 2- 5: Summary of the variables affecting the probability of operational 
failures  




Shahriar et al. 
2012 

















Hydrostatic test pressure  
Age factor 
Seam factor 
Girth weld factor 
Incorrect 
Operation 
Shahriar et al. 
2012 
The same as Yuhua & Datao 2005 
Yuhua & 
Datao 2005 










Mechanical error preventers 
Bad Design 
Shahriar et al. 
2012 







Safety factor (MOP, OP, material strength, th., external 
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Shahriar et al. 
2012 




Yuhua & Datao 
2005 





Minimum depth of cover (soil cover, type of soil, 
pavement type, warning tape or mesh, water depth) 
Activity level (population density, stability of the 
area, one-call, other buried utilities, anchoring) 
Aboveground facilities (vulnerability, threats such 
as traffic) 
One-call system (mandated, response by owner, 
well-known and user) 
Public evacuation (methods such as door to door, 
mail, advertisement, frequency) 
Right of way condition (signs, markers, overgrowth, 
undergrowth) 
Patrol (Ground and air patrol frequency, Ground and 
air patrol effectiveness) 
Natural 
Hazards 





[The same as Yuhua & Datao (2005)] 






Land movements (seismic shaking, fault movement 
subsidence, landslide, water bank erosion) 
CP: Cathodic Protection; MAOP: Maximum allowable pressure; HTTP: Hydrostatic 
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2.3.5 Consequences of Failure 
There has been an extensive effort during the past decades to model the consequences of 
the failure of oil and gas pipelines. Some of the guidelines provided a qualitative scale of 
assessment for this parameter of risk assessment from various points of view. DNV 
(2010) considered the consequences of failures of oil and gas pipeline with respect to 
safety (personal), environmental and economic hazards. Economic consequences 
accounted for the possible pipelines’ production delay, whereas the safety consequences 
were proposed to be measured with respect to the personnel. The cost of repairing 
damages to the pipeline was ignored in evaluating the economic consequences as it was 
deemed negligible. The proposed method was based on the experts’ judgment and hence 
was subjective. Table 2-8 presents the scores that were defined in different levels of 
safety consequences.  
Table 2- 7: Safety consequences scale (Adapted from: DNV 2010) 
Category Description 
1(low) No person(s) are injured. 
2 (not used) 
3(medium) Serious injury, one fatality (working accident) 
4 (not used) 
5(high) More than one fatality (gas cloud ignition) 
  
DNV (2010) defined the environmental consequences as the effects of the product release 
with respect to the eco-system. As a result, the amount of the product spillage was used to 
rank the environmental consequences of a pipeline failure as shown in Table 2-9. 
Different levels of economic consequences and their attributed delay of production are 
shown in Table 2-10. The method developed in this guideline is a subjective method and 
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needs experts’ opinion. However, the experts are not known of the risks of oil and gas 
pipelines that are mostly underground or are laid offshore. 





None, small or insignificant on the environment. Either due to 
no release of internal medium or only insignificant release. 
~ 0 
2 
Minor release of polluting media. The released media will 
decompose or be neutralized rapidly. 
<1,000 tones 
3(medium) 
Moderate release of the polluting medium. The released media 




Large release of the polluting medium which can be removed, or 
will after some time decompose or be neutralized. 
<100,000 tones 
5(high) 
Large release of high polluting medium which cannot be 
removed and will use long time to decompose or be neutralized. 
> 100,000 tones 





1(low) Insignificant effect on operation, small or insignificant cost of repair 0 days 
2 





Failure causes extended unscheduled loss of facility or system and 
significant repair costs. Rectification requires unscheduled underwater 
operation with prequalified repair system before further production. 
1-3 months 
4 
Failure causes indefinite shutdown and significant facility or system 
failure costs. Rectification requires unscheduled underwater operation 
without pre-qualified repair system before further production. 
Or 
Failures resulting in shorter periods of shutdown of major parts of (or 




Total loss of pipeline and possible also loss of other structural parts of 
the platform. Large cost of repair including long time of shut down of 
production. 
Or Failures resulting in shutdown of the total hydrocarbon production 
for a longer period. 
1-3 years 
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Some researchers tried to develop numerical models to estimate the consequences of the 
pipelines’ failure. Resterpo et al. (2009) developed logistic regression models to predict 
the monetary consequences of pipeline failures. The models obtained data from the office 
of pipeline safety (OPS) a section of the US Department of Transportation (DOT). Data 
on the incidents of the hazardous liquid pipelines from 2002-2005 was obtained to 
develop this model. First, the probability of occurrence of non-zero consequences was 
assessed through logistic regression models. The models were trained embedding data on 
several parameters from the database. The parameters included the system part involved 
in the accident, location of the pipeline (offshore versus onshore), occurrence in a high 
consequence area (HCA versus non-HCA), as well as the binary factors representing the 
occurrence of ignition, explosion and/or product loss. For non-zero consequence 
incidents, other models were developed. The inputs of these models included 
characteristics of the incidents such as the occurrence of ignition and/or explosion, the 
amount of the product loss, the location specifications (i.e., offshore versus onshore, and 
HCA versus non-HCA), the system part involved, and the cause of the accident. These 
models could be used to analyze different scenarios of accidents on such pipelines. 
However, there were some limitations in their application to predict the consequence of 
failures. First, the amount of the product loss and the part of the system involved in the 
incident is very hard to predict and is not known before the happening of an accident. 
Besides, the models were not validated, and their accuracy in the prediction of monetary 
consequences was not tested.  
Simonoff et al. (2010) developed models to evaluate different scenarios of pipeline 
failures. This study obtained historical data recorded from 2002-2009 and 2004-2009 on 
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the failures of transmission and distribution pipelines respectively. Similar to Resterpo et 
al. (2009) this study developed a two-step model. In the first step, the probability of the 
occurrence of a non-zero cost consequence was evaluated through logistic regression 
models. These models included binary variables on the incident characteristics of 
pipelines failure. In the second step, the magnitude of a cost consequence was measured 
applying least square regression models. These models used variables presenting the 
causes of incidents and incident types. Results of the models were the scenarios of 
pipelines’ failure. One of the scenarios was the failure of an onshore transmission 
pipeline as a result of internal corrosion in a non-HCA with rupture. This scenario was 
assumed not to be involved with an ignition or explosion. The computed cost of failure 
was predicted to be in the interval of 17,093 to 281,815 the average of which was 
calculated as 71,093 US$. The analyzed scenarios did not consider the characteristics of 
the pipeline such as diameter, wall thickness or age. As a result, the models developed in 
this study cannot be applied to assess the consequences of failure risk of a specific 
pipeline. 
Event Tree (ET) was used by some of the researchers to model the consequence of 
failures of oil and gas pipes. Brito et al. (2009) developed an event tree to analyze the 
accidental failures of natural gas pipelines. The main factors that were considered in 
developing this event tree were failure mode (rupture versus puncture), delay in the 
possible ignition, as well as the “degree of space confinement” of released gas. 
Consequences of the product release were identified as: detonation, Jet fire, Confined 
Vapor Cloud Explosion (CVCE), Flash Fire and gas dispersion. An additive function of 
human, environmental, and financial consequences was considered to calculate the 
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consequence probabilities. Each pipeline was divided into sections covering tens of 
meters. The probability of consequences for each section was computed obtaining the 
experts’ opinion through probabilistic judgments. However, it had been very hard for the 
experts to estimate the probability distribution function of the consequences’ happening. 
As a result, the average pipeline failure rate was used as the failure probability that was 
calculated based on the EGIG reports (2009). This average value was used as the basic 
failure probability in gas pipelines that was equal to 0.00041/km. per year. Some 
adjusting factors including land use and soil, third party activities, distance from 
residential areas were used. The experts estimated the value of the adjusting factors in 
different sections of the pipeline. Consequently, the sections were ranked according to 
their risk of failure. Although, the model benefited from the historical data, it was 
subjective and depended on the experts’ opinion. Besides, the experts needed to be highly 
experienced as the model needed detailed data on the estimation of the adjusting factors.  
As mentioned before, Shahriar et al. (2012) developed a “Bow-tie” analysis model that 
considered the post-failure events of gas pipelines to estimate the consequences of 
failure. Figure 2-5 depicts the event tree developed by this model. This model adapted the 
ET developed by Sklavounos and Rigas (2006). The main factors that were considered in 
developing the ET were mentioned as the delay in the ignition of the released gas due to 
the pipe failure and the degree of space confinement. The events after a gas release were 
identified as Detonation, Fireball, Confined Vapor Cloud (CVC) explosion, Flash Fire, 
and material loss. The probability of the occurrence of each post-failure event was 
assessed by multiplying the probability of gas release by the probability of happening of 
the two primary factors (i.e. ignition delay and space confinement). The calculation 
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resulted in analyzing the probability of happening of each scenario of failure. Then the 
triple bottom line sustainability criteria were used to evaluate the social, environmental, 
and economic consequences of failures. Social consequences included the assessment of 
casualty, society response and evacuation requirement. Environmental consequences 
required the evaluation of consequences with respect to the air, endangered habitats, 
vegetation, soil, and water. Finally, economic evaluation of the consequences included 
the effects of failure on supply interruption, repair, material loss, and property and third 
party damages. The granular fuzzy scale was applied to assess the consequences of each 
failure scenario by experts’ opinion (Shahriar et al. 2012). Applying expert elicitation 
decreased the objectivity of the model and made it difficult for the experts to judge the 
probability of occurrence of each scenario and estimating several factors to estimate the 
consequences of a pipeline failure.  
 
Figure 2- 5: Event Tree Diagram of Natural Gas Pipelines (Shahriar et al. 2012) 
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2.4 Oil and Gas Pipelines’ Operation Phase 
Operation phase of oil and gas pipelines is comprised of different activities including 
inspection and maintenance. Parvizsedghy et al. (2014) classified the activities of the 
operation phase of such pipelines in five categories as shown in Table 2-11. The research 
classified activities in regular maintenance, inspection, remedial actions, repair, and 
replacement, as the major categories of the operation. According to this research, these 
activities were defined as follows:  
1) Regular maintenance: This operation type includes the activities that should 
regularly be repeated, which contains the office setup, monitoring systems, annual 
corrosion inspection and cathodic protection survey as well as the Right of Way 
Extension.  
2) Due to the fact that various failure types are threatening oil and gas pipelines, they 
should regularly be inspected. There is not any specific recommendation for the 
selection of inspection technique. The research by Parvizsedghy et al. (2014) has 
considered an Inline inspection with a regular frequency of seven years.  
3) Remedial action is envisaged to repair the coating of the pipes.  
4) Repair types have been extensively studied in the study by Parvizsedghy et al. 
(2014) to find the most suitable and generic types of repair as it is not possible to 
forecast various defect types. Table 2-12 presents different repair types that are 
recommended for different defect types.  
5) Replacement: Replacing the pipe is usually possible; although, it may not be the 
most economical solution.  
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Table 2- 10: Different operation elements (Parvizsedghy et al. 2014) 
 
2.4.1 Inspection Methods 
Different types of Inspections are developed to monitor the condition of the pipelines and 
assess their risks of failure. Each inspection is suitable for detecting a type of failure and 
would not be efficient to be used for the other purposes. Moreover, running the Inline 
inspections frequently could be too expensive, and the risks of failure should be 
considered while selecting the inline inspection and its frequency to run. Hopkins et al. 
(2013) recommended assessing the risk of failure and selecting the inspection method 
that suits the purpose. Table 2-13 summarizes various inspection types that are suitable 
for different sources of failures. For example, aerial/ ground patrols are recommended for 
the failures the sources of which are the third party activities.  
No. Operation Type Details 
1 Regular Maintenance  Including office costs and regular annual operations 
2 Inspection Inline Inspection (ILI), Hydrostatic Testing 
3 Remedial Actions Recoat 
4 Repair Sleeve Type B, Bolt-on Clamps 
5 Replace Hot Tapping (Small sizes), Replace Pipe 
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Table 2- 11: Recommended Types of Rehabilitation for Different Types of Defects (Parvizsedghy et al. 2014) 
 
(1) Hot tapping can be applied only to defects that are small enough to be removed by the hot tap. 
(2) For internal defect or corrosion make sure that it does not continue to grow beyond acceptable limits. 
(3) Not proper for defects in or near ERW seam. 
BP = British Petroleum Guideline (BP, 2006),  
PRM =  Pipelines Repair Manual prepared by USA Pipeline Research Council (Jaske et al. 2006)  
API =  American Petroleum Institute the recommendations of which on the rehabilitation techniques are summarized by Palmer-Jones et al. (2005). 
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Table 2- 12: Major categories of inspection to monitor various failure types 
(Hopkins et al. 2000) 
Defects /  
Damages 
Monitoring/ Inspection Method 
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Cracks 
 R     R 




 R     R 
Ground 
Movement 
    R   
Leakage R P  R   R 
Sabotage/ 
Pilferage 
P       
 
Thompson (2000) divided major inspection methods other than patrolling into three main 
items. Table 2-14 presents the classification that includes inline inspection, hydrostatic 
testing, and direct assessment. Each inspection method has flaws that should be taken 
into consideration while choosing the inspection method. Also, the piggability of the 
pipeline should be evaluated as some of the pipelines in the US and other countries 
especially the older ones cannot accommodate the intelligent pigs.  
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Table 2- 13: Major Assessment Methods (Adapted from: Thompson 2000) 
Method Strength  Weakness 
Inline Inspection 
Measures and maps the 
remaining wall thickness. 
Single run does not identify active 
corrosion and the accuracy of 
multiple run predictions is uncertain. 
Resolution of tools varies. 
Hydrostatic Testing 
Causes a controlled 
hydrostatic rupture of 
near-critical flaws. 
Does not identify the presence or 
severity of flaws other than critical 
axial flaws that fail at the pressure 
tested. 
Direct Assessment 
Identifies areas of high 
probability of active 
corrosion. 
Verifies accuracy through digging 
does not provide 100% direct 
assessment of the pipeline. 
There are different techniques for the inline inspections (ILI) the characteristics of each 
should be studied for an efficient selection. Thompson (2000) stated that there are two 
main types of ILI tools: magnetic flux leakage (MFL) tools and ultrasonic tools (UT). 
The resolution level of various types of these two main ILI types makes them different in 
their capability to detect defects especially to distinguish between external and internal 
corrosion. Hopkins et al. (2013) mentioned MFL as the most commonly used method of 
ILI. MFL is not able to detect the axial defects and cracks; however, they are suitable for 
the circumferential defects.  
The cost of operation of different ILI tools varies according to their capabilities. The 
preparation cost of the pipelines for an inline inspection should be estimated for the 
pipelines that cannot receive the Inline inspection tools. Cost elements of pipe 
preparation are presented in Table 2-15. Cost data is gathered from Thompson (2000). 
The costs are discounted with historical inflation rates of the US to be converted into 
2013 US dollars.  
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Table 2- 14: Cost elements of Pipeline Preparation for ILI (Adapted from: 
Thompson 2000) 
 
The overall cost of converting a pipeline to be able to accommodate ILI tools is estimated 
to be 8,000 to 17,000 US$ per kilometer (2013 dollars). The cost of preparation for gas 
pipelines with multiple defects and bends can be over 35,000 US$ per kilometer 
(Thompson 2000). Different inspection tools can be applied for detection of various 
failure sources. Table 2-16 summarizes the application of various inspection tools and the 
sources from which this data is gathered.  
2.4.2 Life Cycle Cost Assessment 
Life cycle cost (LCC) assessment models are applied to analyze the equivalent economic 
value of the service life of infrastructures. LCC is used to compare different alternatives 
from an economic point of view. The method considers the cost of maintenance for 
various alternatives of operations during the whole life of the projects. Life cycle cost 
analysis models have been developed to analyze different scenarios of repair and 
replacement of various infrastructure types. Frangopol et al. (2001) estimated the net 
present worth of the life cycle operations of bridges based on the reliability assessment. 
Hegazy et al. (2004) developed a condition-based life cycle cost model for the 









Modify capability to receive and launch pigs    150,000   190,000 US$ (One time)
Caliper tools
Identify the restrictions and bend the radius of pipe and 
ensure pipe is free from defects to stuck the pigs
      1,200      1,500 US$ per Km.
Clearing bend & 
other restrictions
Digging and exchanging the valves or sections of pipe 
that reduce opeaning of the pipe
     94,000   470,000 
US$ per pipe 
section or valve.
Gas         585 US$ per km.
Oil      2,923 US$ per km.
Required before running MFL and UT while Ut 
requires a cleaner pipe 
Cleaning the pipeline
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the model and optimize the required budget of this infrastructure type in the project and 
network level. The research applied Markovian approach to predict the condition of 
bridge decks. A scale assessment was developed to help in the selection of appropriate 
repair type. Ammar et al. (2013) proposed a fuzzy-based model to estimate the life cycle 
cost of different scenarios. A fixed interval between different operation types was 
considered to develop the scenarios.  
Table 2- 15: Summary of application of inspection tools (INGAA 2007; NACE 2002) 
Inspection tool Threat to be assessed Source 
MFL Standard 
Resolution 
Internal & External Corrosion (No internal or external 
diameter discrimination) 
1, 2 
MFL High Resolution 





Internal & External Corrosion, Narrow Axial External 
Corrosion, Cracks, Lamination 
1, 2 
UT (Shear wave) 
Internal & External Corrosion, Narrow Axial External 
Corrosion, Cracks, Circumferential Cracking, Dents, 
Sharp Dents, Wrinkle Bends, Buckle, Lamination 
1,2 
Transverse Flux 
Internal & External Corrosion, Narrow Axial External 








Dents, Sharp Dents, Wrinkle Bends, Buckle, Bends, 








Internal & External Corrosion, Manufacturing, 
Construction, SCC, Excavation Damage 
1 
ECDA External Corrosion 1 
ICDA Internal Corrosion 1 
SCCDA SCC 1 
1: INGAA (2007), 2: NACE (2002) 
Several models were suggested to analyze the LCC of water pipelines. Shahata and 
Zayed (2012) developed a simulation-based model to evaluate the LCC of various 
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scenarios. The scenarios were developed based on the prediction of the time of the five 
first breaks of pipelines according to the historical data of the pipe failures. The 
maintenance actions were estimated according to the breaks’ estimated time and their 
order. The model optimized the maintenance LCC based on the annual worth of the 
developed scenarios. Condition-based LCC assessment model was developed by 
Parvizsedghy et al. (2014) to analyze various scenarios of repair/replacement considering 
the uncertainty of the economic parameters. The method developed a defect size scale 
that is used to estimate the condition of the pipeline after rehabilitation. The condition 
scale that was developed by El-Abbasy et al. (2014b) was applied to estimate the required 
action of intervention based on the condition of the pipeline.  
Average deterioration rate was estimated based on the deterioration profile that was 
developed by El-Abbasy et al. (2014b) according to the historical inspection data of 
pipelines in Qatar. The research also gathered some cost data on various sizes and types 
of interventions that were estimated to be performed during the service life of the 
pipelines. The research has developed a robust method on the LCC assessment of oil and 
gas pipelines. However, it did not propose any specific method to select the inspection 
method. It suggested two main plans namely; risky and conservative to choose the 
intervention action based on the condition estimation of the pipeline. The model does not 
offer a method to select between these two plans. It needs an assessment of the risk of 
failure to distinguish between the pipelines with high, medium, and low risk of failure. 
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2.5 Selected Research Techniques 
In this research, a variety of techniques will be utilized to achieve its main objectives. 
Such techniques include but are not limited to Bow-Tie analysis, Probability Theory, 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Regression Analysis (RA), Neuro-Fuzzy technique, 
Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS), and Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS).  
2.5.1 Bow-Tie analysis 
Risk analysis of oil and gas pipelines is a difficult task as a result of the complexity of the 
factors leading to the failure. The uncertainty of the behavior of these products in case of 
failure of the pipeline adds to the complexity of risk models of such infrastructures. Bow-
tie analysis is a new technique for the risk assessment of industrial systems especially the 
safety analysis of the industrial processes. This technique combines the Fault Tree (FT) 
with Event Tree (ET) models, which allows the analysis of different scenarios and the 
estimation of the probability and consequence of failures. Top event of the FT becomes 
the starting event of an ET.  
Figure 2-6 presents a schematic view of the Bow-tie diagrams. The technique has been 
proved to be advantageous as it simplifies the complicated mechanism of industrial 
process failures. Combination of Bow-tie with the other techniques such as fuzzy set 
theory or statistical analysis (Parvizsedghy and Zayed 2015a; and Shahriar et al. 2012) 
can lead to the estimation of the probability of failure and may provide an image of the 
possible scenarios of failure.   
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Figure 2- 6: Generic Bow-tie Model (adapted from Dianous & Fievez 2006) 
The FT explores the potential causes of the top event or the risk factor of a system. 
Causes of the top event are expanded at different levels based on the existence of data. 
Basic events are the lowest level of the causes that can lead to the failure of the system 
and their estimation is possible according to the existing data. Detailed causes are 
connected with logical relationships (i.e. AND/OR) (Mokhtari et al. 2011). ET models 
the major hazards, which are controlled by the safety barriers. The barriers are 
demonstrated on the bow-ties, and their performance indicates the probability of 
happening of each major hazard (Dianous and Fievez 2006). As a result, different 
scenarios of a failure are identified and analyzed. Different scenarios indicate the success 
or failure of each safety barrier. The probability of the success or failure is multiplied by 
the probability of the occurrence of the top event to compute the occurrence frequency of 
each scenario of failure. Bow-ties are graphical diagrams of presenting the logical 
relationships between various factors responsible for the failure and the major 
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consequences of a failure. Figure 2-7 depicts the key symbols of a fault tree each of 
which indicates a logical relationship.  
 
Figure 2- 7: Elements of a Bow-tie model (adapted from Ferdous et al. 2012) 
BE-Basic Event; IE-Intermediate Events; CE- Critical Event; OE-Outcome Events 
ARAMIS project developed structure of risk assessment through Bow-tie analysis; 
however, in the implementation phase they encountered several problems. One of the 
problems was mentioned as defining the frequency of occurrence of dangerous events, as 
well as the leading causes. In the previous works, a generic form of probability 
distributions was used, and the safety systems were not identified very clearly (Dianous 
and Fi´evez 2006). The shapes of various components of the Bow-tie diagrams follow a 
standard set of rules. A summary description of the components of fault tree and the 
defined shapes are depicted in Table 2-17. Traditional Fault-tree models analyzed the 
probability of failure of the top event of the fault tree by assigning crisp values to the 
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basic events. Then, in the analysis phase, the logical relation of the basic events with the 
top event was considered, and the computation of the failure probability was performed.  
Table 2- 16: Description and shapes of Graphical symbols used in Fault tree models 
(adapted from Ferdous 2006) 













Applied for representing Intermediate event or 
top-event. 
 Circle Represents the basic event 
 Diamond Undeveloped Event 
 
Oval 
Conditional event use for representing any 
conditions 














AND gates combine the input events, all of 
which has to occur simultaneously for the 
output event to occur. 
 
OR Gate 
OR gates combine the output event that occurs 
if at least one of the input events occurs. 
 
INHABIT Gate 
Input event produces output event when a 
conditional event occurs. 
 
TRANSFER Gate 
Transferring gate information or event 
information under a sub-tree. 
 
Yuhua and Datao (2005) described the process of quantitative analysis as follows: 
1) Probability of occurrence of each basic event should be obtained from experts or 
the historical data; 
2) All of the minimal cut-sets of the diagram should be identified; 
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3) Finally, the probabilities are calculated multiplying probabilities of occurrence of 
all included basic events in each minimal cut-set. 
The computation would be performed in a reasonable time if the fault tree were not huge; 
however, the problems would arise if the tree is enormous, and the number of cut sets is 
too much. In that case, Equation 2-2 might be used to calculate the probability of 
occurrence of the top event.  
P(T)=P (⋃ Kjnj=1 )= ∑ P(Ki)
n
i=1 - ∑ P(KiKj)
n





P(K1K2…Kn)P(Kj)= ∏ Fi(t)i∈Kj    (2-1) 
Where: 
K1, K2,..Kn: the minimum cut-sets,  
N: the total number of cut-sets  
Fi(t): the probability of the basic event Xi. 
2.5.2 Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) 
There are several predictive supervised learning approaches, which can be employed to 
recognize the existing pattern among the input and output variables. Neural network 
points to several learning techniques; the most popular one is the back-propagation 
approach, which is very useful in the construction management research. Christodoulou 
(2004) applied neural networks for optimum markup calculation, Hegazy (1993) applied 
neural network for bid preparation, Siqueira (1999) for cost estimating. Attalla and 
Hegazy (2003) applied ANN for “Predicting Cost Deviation in Reconstruction Projects,” 
and Al-Barqawi and Zayed (2006) in condition rating of water mains and Zayed & 
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Halpin (2005) to develop a model to estimate the productivity of pile construction. Achim 
et al. (2007) predicted the remaining life of water pipes, applying neural networks. 
Parvizsedghy and Zayed (2013) applied ANN to develop a model for the prediction of the 
consequences of the failure of oil and gas pipes.  
The neural network trains itself through data entries and finds the relationship between 
the input and output data. ANN imitates the function of a human brain, and it is very 
“fault tolerant” and, it is able to generalize; hence, these properties make it suitable for 
construction management issues. This technique provides a suitable platform for risk 
management research since construction problems carry much uncertainty. Zayed and 
Halpin (2005) mentioned that ANN is composed of two phases namely: learning or 
training and recalling. The function to find the relationship between variables through the 
neural network is called the learning phase, which is controlled based on the error of the 
produced network. The second function is called recalling that inserts the inputs to the 
trained network and creates predictive responses. Moreover, if the the output is available 
within the entry data of the training phase, it is called supervised otherwise it is entitled 
unsupervised.  
Artificial neural networks have different layers, there are several processing elements 
(PE) in each layer, which mimic the act of neurons, and thus it is called “neural network”. 
Figure 2-8 shows a Typical Artificial Neural Network that includes one hidden layer. It is 
very important to design the architecture of the network and define the learning elements 
including the transfer function, the learning rate, and the number of epochs. The simplest 
network would have one input, one hidden and one output layer, the number of hidden 
layers may increase according to the complexity of the problem. Neurons of each layer 
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are connected to the neurons of the next layer through the connection lines each of which 
has a weight that is used to be multiplied by the inputs transferred from the previous 
layers. In the end, they are summed up with bias value to represent the neuron “NET” 
(Moselhi et al. 1991). The transfer or activation function is used to create non-linear 
relationships between inputs and outputs. Sigmoid (logistic), hyperbolic tangent (tanh), 
the sine or cosine and linear function are the most frequently used transfer functions. The 


















Figure 2- 8: Typical Artificial Neural Network (Parvizsedghy and Zayed 2013) 
The performance of a network will be enhanced if the learning process is stopped sooner. 
Therefore, the network checks the pattern at the stopping points called epochs, to stop 
training at the point that the error starts to increase. Hegazy et al. (1994) reviewed the 
literature on backpropagation ANN and identified their problems. A summary of the 
challenges have been introduced as followed: 
1) The representation of the knowledge and the structure of the problem is not well-
defined; 
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2) Speed of the training is slow, and the performance is highly sensitive to the initial 
weights of the components; 
3) Optimum design is not very well-guided; and 
4)  The black box nature of the method prohibits interpretation of the weights of the 
produced network. 
5) Hegazy et al. (1994) tried to find some solutions and developed guidance to 
address these problems. For the first problem, in case of having more than one 
output the study suggests to construct and design smaller networks as it needs less 
computing time. However, it is mentioned that in case of having only one network 
the efficiency of the network would be higher due to a large number of 
interconnections and PEs. This research also defined the parameters of the 
network that should be determined by the user. These parameters are depicted in 
Table 2-18. 
Table 2- 17: Parameters of back-propagation method (Hegazy et al. 1994) 
1. Type of inputs and outputs 
2. Transfer function 
3. Number of hidden layers  
4. Number of PEs in hidden layers 
5. Connectivity 
6. Learning algorithm 
7. Learning rate (η) 
8. Momentum coefficient (α) 
9. Number of training cycles 
10. Halting conditions (acceptable error) 
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Zhang et al. (1998) proposed to standardize data of each set before training since non-
linear transfer functions restrict data to a limited range. Moreover, for the number of 
neurons in two hidden layer networks, Khaw et al. (1995) proposed to have (2n+1) 
neurons in the first hidden layer and (2n+1)/3 in the second one. 
2.5.3 Fuzzy Set Theory 
Historical data on the failures of different infrastructure is imperfect. Sources of 
imperfection are uncertainty and imprecision. Uncertainty arises where the confidence 
associated with data is less than one and imprecision is related to the vague and 
ambiguous data (Smets 1997). One of the approaches to deal with the vagueness of data 
is fuzzy sets. Zadeh (1965) introduced the fuzzy set theory that assigns a membership 
function to the imprecise components to deal with their vagueness. The functions define 
the degree of membership of each object to a set of pairs. Different type of membership 
functions can be assigned to the set of objects such as triangular, trapezoidal, Gaussian 
and Sigmoid (Ammar et al. 2013). Triangular membership functions are the most 
commonly used functions on account of the absence of enough information. Fuzzification 
and defuzzification are the two primary parts of the fuzzy models. Fuzzification is the 
process of transforming linguistic terms or numerical values into fuzzy membership 
functions. Fuzzy inference system is composed of a set of fuzzy rules that maps the 
inputs to the outputs. Rules are all defined by fuzzy membership functions. This process 
includes five main steps as described below (Mathworks 2013): 
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Step 1: Fuzzification of inputs 
The first step is to obtain the inputs and transform into a set of fuzzy numbers. These 
fuzzy numbers determine the degree of membership of the input to the appropriate fuzzy 
sets (Mathworks 2013). 
Step 2: Apply fuzzy operator 
In this step, the membership functions attributed to the input parameters in addition to the 
related fuzzy operations define a set of fuzzy If-Then rules (Mathworks 2013). 
Step 3: Weighting the rules 
In this step, the proper weights are assigned to each rule. Weights are defined as a 
number between zero and one (Mathworks 2013). 
Step 4: Aggregation of the Outputs 
In step four, all pre-defined rules are aggregated to provide the final fuzzy set. The input 
of this step is the result of implication application as is defined in the previous step 
(Mathworks 2013). 
Step 5: Defuzzification 
The input of this step is the aggregation step’s output, and the output is a crisp value that 
is computed through different defuzzification methods. These methods include centroid, 
bisector, middle of maximum (the average of the maximum value of the output set), 
largest of maximum, and smallest of maximum (Mathworks 2013). The centroid is 
considered to be the most prevailing and naturally attractive method used in the 
defuzzification process of fuzzy inference systems (Pappis and Siettos 2005). 
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2.7.3 General Theory of Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is an unavoidable character of information. Uncertainty is traditionally 
noticed as the probability in science. The General Theory of Uncertainty (GTU) broke 
this notion with viewing the uncertainty in a broader context (Zadeh 2005). This theory 
combined the probability and fuzzy logic in a platform to overcome the limitations of 
each. In fact, this method helped to summarize the probability distribution functions in 
granular intervals. Figure 2-9 presents an application of the granular theory to a 
distribution function (Zadeh 2008). The probability distribution function is divided into 
equal intervals, and attributed probabilities are assigned to each interval.  
 
Figure 2- 9: Application of granular theory to a distribution function  
Pi is granular value of pi, i=1,.., n 
(Pi, Mi), i=1,.., n  
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2.5.4 Neuro-fuzzy  
ANN and fuzzy logic are two powerful techniques each of which has advantages and 
disadvantages. Disadvantages of ANN can be covered by fuzzy logic and the vice versa. 
The combination of two methods results in the neuro-fuzzy technique, which was used in 
resolving different research problems in construction management. Parvizsedghy and 
Zayed (2015b) applied Neuro-Fuzzy to develop a Consequence of Failure prediction 
model for oil and gas pipes. Zayed and Mahmoud (2014) employed the Neuro-Fuzzy 
technique for productivity estimation of horizontal drilling activities. Hsiao et al. (2012) 
developed a neuro-fuzzy model to estimate the cost of semiconductor hookup 
construction. Jin (2011) developed a model to allocate the risk between various parties of 
public-private partnerships applying the neuro-fuzzy technique. Sinha and Fieguth (2006) 
developed a neuro-fuzzy model to classify the defects of the pipes. 
 In the training process of Neuro-Fuzzy, the membership functions of variables are fine-
tuned to obtain better results. A version of neuro-fuzzy was titled ANFIS that was first 
introduced by Jang (1993). ANFIS aimed at developing a method that can best transform 
human knowledge or experience into a set of fuzzy rules while fine-tuning the 
membership functions of fuzzy sets. ANFIS applies Takagi and Sugeno method in the 
fuzzy modeling step due to the advantages of this system. Jang (1996) illustrated ANFIS 
function in a graphically presented example as is presented in Figure 2-10 and Figure 2-
11. The example demonstrates the most simple inference mechanism in a first order 
Sugeno type that contains two fuzzy rules namely; rule1 and rule 2.  
 Rule 1: If X is M1 and Y is N1 then (f1=p1x+q1y+r1) 
 Rule 2: If X is M2 and Y is N2 then (f2=p2x+q2y+r2) 
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Figure 2-10 presents the inference system to compute output as a result of two inputs 
(i.e., x and y) to the system. ANFIS facilitates the process of inference system shown in 
Figure 2-11. 
 
Figure 2- 10: First Order Sugeno fuzzy model  
 
Figure 2- 11: ANFIS architecture  
ANFIS has five layers and the nodes of each layer implement similar functions as are 
described below: 
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Layer1: The nodes in this layer obtain the linguistic terms as the inputs and produce the 
corresponding membership grades. Jang (1993) suggested applying the bell-shaped 
membership function in the range of zero to one. Equation 2-2 shows the result of this 
layer (Jang 1996).   
𝑂𝑖
1 = 𝜇𝐴𝑖(𝑥)           (2-2) 
Where: 𝑂𝑖
1 is the membership function of linguistic input, 𝐴𝑖is the linguistic term to the 
model and x represents the input to the ith node of the model (Jang 1996).   
Layer2: Nodes in this layer specify the “firing strength” of the rules through Equation 2-
3 (Jang 1996):   
𝑂𝑖
2 = 𝑤𝑖 = 𝜇𝐴𝑖(𝑥) × 𝜇𝐵𝑖(𝑥), i=1,2       (2-3) 
Layer3: In this layer, the ratio of the firing strength of ith rule is computed with respect to 
total firing strengths as shown in Equation 2-4 (Jang 1996). 
𝑂𝑖
3 = 𝑤𝑖 =
𝑤𝑖
𝑤1+𝑤2
 , i=1,2        (2-4) 
Layer4: Contribution of ith rule toward the final output is calculated in this layer in node 
“i". Equation 2-5 describes the computation components of each node in this layer (Jang 
1996).   
𝑂𝑖
4 = 𝑤𝑖 ∗ 𝑓𝑖= 𝑤𝑖 × (𝑝𝑖𝑥 + 𝑞𝑖𝑦 + 𝑟𝑖)      (2-5) 
Where; the 𝑤𝑖 is the output of previous layer and fi represents the function applied on a 
set of parameters {pi, qi, ri}. 
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Layer5: In this rule, the results of the previous layer are summed up in a single node in 
order to compute the final output of the model (Jang 1993). Equation 2-6 presents the 
output and inputs of this layer. 
𝑂𝑖
5 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑖 × 𝑓𝑖=
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑖 ×𝑓𝑖
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑖
        (2-6) 
Data is loaded into a neuro-fuzzy machine in three sets including training, testing, and 
checking datasets. Training dataset is part of data that is used to recognize the existing 
pattern among the inputs and outputs. Generalization capability of the model is checked 
using the testing dataset. The checking dataset is used to look for the over-fitting in the 
training process. The trained rules are utilized in the checking process to compute the 
predicted outputs. Forecasted outputs are compared with the actual outputs, and the error 
is computed via this comparison. The error of the model should be decreased during the 
training process. However, after certain points the error starts increasing. Consequently, 
continuing the training process results in over-fitting in the points called epochs 
(Mathworks 2013). 
2.5.5 Monte Carlo Simulation  
Monte Carlo simulation is a very powerful technique that can consider the uncertainties 
that exist in construction management problems. Considering the uncertainty of 
economic data and cost of operations traditional methods are not enough to calculate the 
life cycle cost of operations. The situation becomes clearer when it is about forecasting 
the future of infrastructures’ life cycle. The Monte Carlo simulation model includes the 
relationship between input variable with known uncertainty. Instead of assuming a crisp 
value for the variables, a range of value is considered. The target or output variable is 
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defined, and the model becomes iterated for a certain number of times. The output is 
computed for the specified times, and the probability distribution function is calculated. 
Consequently, the mean, maximum, and minimum values of output are calculated. This 
technique was applied in the life cycle cost assessment models to support the 
maintenance decision process of water mains (Shahata and Zayed 2008; 2012; and 2013).  
2.6 Findings, Limitations, and Research Gap 
There has been extensive effort to address the risk, and failure assessment of oil and gas 
pipelines and some researchers have tried to develop risk-based inspection planning 
models. However, literature review attests that the existing research works neither 
developed an integrated objective model for the risk assessment of such pipes nor a 
comprehensive maintenance planning method. Most of the previous studies concentrated 
on one of the aspects of the risk assessment of such pipes. Some considered one of the 
failure types of oil and gas pipelines such as corrosion. The others have concentrated on 
only the probability of failure. The existing comprehensive models lacked objectivity or 
developed physical models. While the models that obtain expert opinion are criticized by 
the subjectivity, implementation of the physical models is time-consuming and 
expensive. Modeling the consequences of failures was the subject of some other studies. 
Similarly, the existing models on the consequences of failure were either subjective, 
which needed the expert opinion, or needed data on the post-failure events such as the 
amount of product that is released to the environment. Consequently, current models 
were limited in their applications and could not predict the financial consequences of the 
pipe failures.  
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Moreover, physical models obtained data from inline inspection tools that is very 
expensive and is not possible to be frequently performed. Besides, at the beginning of the 
project or even before construction when there is a need for a model to assess the risk of 
failure in such pipelines none of the previous studies is helpful. Some of the pipes are not 
piggable, and it is not possible to apply inline inspection tools to measure the metal loss 
or deterioration growth. As a result, there is a certain need for an integrated risk 
assessment model that applies statistical analysis methods obtaining the available 
historical data on oil and gas pipeline properties and the surrounding environment.  
In the literature review, several powerful techniques were found that can well suit the risk 
assessment of such pipes. For example, it was found that Bow-tie analysis is a strong 
graphical method that can be applied for the failure probability assessment. This method 
would be more powerful when it is combined with another analytical method. The 
historical data of the failures of oil and gas pipelines can be used to develop an objective 
model of the failure probability assessment. Also, Neuro-Fuzzy was found an effective 
pattern recognition method that can be applied to evaluate the failure consequences. This 
technique can be used in recognizing the existing pattern among the input and output 
variables and generates rules to forecast the failures of similar pipelines in analogous 
situations.   
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 CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Overall Research Methodology 
The overall flow of the research process for this study is shown in Figure 3.1. The 
research starts with a comprehensive literature review on the available studies on the risk 
and failure models of oil and gas pipelines. It continues with an overview of the 
maintenance and inspection options that were suggested for different situations and under 
specific circumstances. The appropriate techniques for the development of the proposed 
model are then identified and studied. Upon the completion of the literature review, the 
required historical data is gathered, to be used for the development of the models 
proposed in this study. The Risk-based maintenance planning model for oil and gas 
pipelines developed in this research is designed to overcome the shortcomings and 
limitations of the previous studies. Additionally, it is organized to build a structured 
platform for the maintenance planning of oil and gas pipelines.  
This research comprises the development of several sub-models, each addressing specific 
research sub-objectives, as explained in the first chapter. First, different types of failures 
and the contributory variables are identified, and the main hazards and consequences of 
failures are detected. Separate models are then developed for the assessment of failure 
probability and the prediction of each failure’s consequences. An integrated fuzzy risk 
index evaluates the risk of failure based on the calculated probability and consequence of 
failure for such pipes. The available inspection tools that can be used to inspect pipelines 
for different sources of failures are identified. The tools are selected based on the risk of  
failure. Their accuracy and detection capability indices are then used to introduce a new 
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index called the risk reduction index. The risk-based inspection plans are developed and 
ranked based on their Risk-cost indices. Finally, the deterioration profile of the pipeline’s 
service life is predicted and developed based on a risk growth profile. This profile is used 
to forecast the required rehabilitation actions during a pipeline’s service life. Various 
rehabilitation scenarios are developed and ranked based on their life cycle cost, 
calculated using a Monte-Carlo simulation.  
 
Figure 3- 1: Overall Model Flowchart 
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3.2 Risk Assessment Model 
The development of the risk assessment model includes several stages. It starts with the 
identification of the main failure sources and the contributing variables. In this step, the 
sources of failure are categorized so that their assessment helps in the inspection and 
maintenance planning of oil and gas pipelines. Post-failure events are identified, and a 
model is developed to assess the probability of failure based on the identified 
contributing factors. The model also estimates the probability of post-failure events and 
evaluates their probability of occurrence. Another model is developed to assess the 
consequences of the risks. This model takes into account the preliminary identified 
factors and optimizes them based on the analysis results.  
3.2.1 Identification of Failure Sources and Contributing Variables 
Figure 3.2 shows the overall flow of this section. The methodology developed to identify 
the risk factors and related variables, as well as the hazards associated with the failure of 
oil and gas pipelines are described in this section. 
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In the literature review, various studies that developed a model to forecast the POF in oil 
and gas pipelines were summarized in several tables, in Section 2.3.4. The risk factors or 
failure types that were used most frequently in the literature are identified in this section. 
The frequency of failures due to the identified types is checked using the historical data. 
The historical data on the failures of oil and gas pipes in the US is applied to perform this 
analysis. 
The most frequently-cited risk factors, as shown in Tables 2-5~2-7, are external 
corrosion, internal corrosion, material and construction defect, third party actions, 
incorrect operation, natural hazards and poor design.  All of the above-mentioned factors 
have been reported as the causes of failure, although there have been occasional 
variations in the applied terminologies and categorizations by different researchers.  
This research considers the sources of failures as an important factor in their 
classification, as different sources of failure affect oil and gas pipelines in different ways. 
Overall, the probability of post-failure events varies with respect to different identified 
failure sources. Finally, the vulnerability to different sources of failure should be taken 
into account when planning the maintenance and inspection of such pipelines. With this 
background and based on the study of the most important and most frequently reported 
sources of failures, a flowchart is developed, as shown in Figure 3.3. Risk factors are 
classified into physical and environmental categories, where the former refers to the 
sources of failure whose probability of occurrence increase with time, and the latter 
comprises those sources of failure whose probability of occurrence is not dependent on 
time or on a pipeline’s age, but rather are related to the environment of the pipe and its 
    62 













Figure 3- 3: Classifications of Identified Risk Factors 
1. External corrosion: This type of risk is due to the oxidization of irons when the 
external surface of a pipeline is exposed to the environment, and can eventually 
lead to structural disintegration. Cathodic protection and pipeline coating are 
protective measures that can reduce the probability of this type of risk (PHMSAa 
2014).  
2. Internal corrosion: Internal corrosion occurs as a result of the chemical reaction 
of a pipe’s material with corrosive products, whether water or other chemicals, 
leading to the loss of pipe material from the inside. There are a number of 
mitigation actions that can be taken to prevent this type of risk, such as the 
injection of inhibitors and the application of internal coatings (PHMSAa 2014). 
3. Material and weld defects: Although modern steel production has made many 
advances, some impurities remain in pipes and may lead to pipe defects that could 
lead to failure. Consequently, the younger the pipeline, the more reliable it should 
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be. Nevertheless, inconsistencies persist in the materials and welds applied to 
connect pipes together. 
The second group of risks covers the environmental sources of failure. These risks may 
happen as a result of excavation, incorrect operation, or natural forces, and consists of the 
following risks: 
1. Mechanical damages: Failures caused by excavation vehicles or motor vehicle 
accidents are grouped under the category of mechanical damage in this research. 
These damages may occur as a result of the activities of a third party or on the 
part of the operators’ employees. 
2. Incorrect operation: Improper operations and activities by the operator’s or the 
contractor’s personnel may lead to a failure that is categorized under incorrect 
operation. 
3. Natural hazards: Heavy rains, flooding, lightning, extreme temperatures, and 
high winds fall within this classification as causes of environmental failure. 
After defining the risks, the variables that contribute to the occurrence of each failure 
type are identified. Similar to the identification of risks, the most frequent parameters in 
the literature are studied. Then, they are checked with the historical data to find the exact 
or similar factors that can help build a model to forecast the probability of failure of such 
pipes. Table 3-1 shows the variables identified from the reviewed studies. For example, 
cathodic protection effectiveness, coating type, and soil corrosivity are identified as 
factors that contribute to external corrosion failures. Soil corrosion itself is affected by 
soil resistivity, pH, and redox potential. For internal corrosion failures, the application of 
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an inhibitor, the product’s corrosivity, and the inspection frequency are variables that 
contribute to the failure probability.  
Table 3- 1: Common variables identified in previous studies 
Failure type Variables 
External Corrosion 
CP effectiveness, Coating (type, age, visual inspection) 
Soil corrosion (soil resistivity, pH, redox potential) pipe 
wall thickness 
Internal Corrosion Inhibitor application, Product corrosivity, Inspection 
Material and weld defect  
Maximum operating pressure, Hydrostatic testing 
pressure, pipe age, seam factor, weld 
Third party  
Depth of cover, activity level, one call system, Right of 
Way, Patrol frequency 
Incorrect operation 
SCADA effectiveness, Drug testing, safety program, 
equipment malfunction 
Natural hazards Earthquake, Flood, Subsidence 
 
In the next step, the historical data of pipeline failures is studied to (1) identify the similar 
and measurable factors, and (2) evaluate the effects of these factors on the probability of 
occurrence of each failure type. Figure 3-4 illustrates the selected factors based on the 
study of the historical data of pipeline failures. External corrosion is affected by the soil 
properties including the acidity (pH), resistivity, and the Redox potential. The 
effectiveness of the cathodic protection used to reduce the impact of soil corrosion on the 
pipe has a direct implication on the external corrosion. The coating type and its efficiency 
also has an influence on the failures in this group.   
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Figure 3- 4: Identified factors affecting each failure type
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3.2.2 Probability of Failure Model 
The probability of failure is one of the two main parameters of risk assessment. Figure 3-
5 depicts the process of developing the failure probability model in this research. As 
shown in the figure, the development of this model includes three main steps: (1) 
Building the Bow-tie model, (2) Data analysis of the fault tree, and (3) Data analysis of 
the event tree. Due to the complexity of the behavior of oil and gas products and the 
existence of different pipeline failure scenarios, the Bow-tie model is recognized a 
suitable tool for the development of a failure probability model. Bow-tie models are the 
graphical representations of the possible scenarios of failure that start from the basic 
events leading to different causes of failures. The failure causes in this research are the 
sources of failures, such as external corrosion. The failure sources are then connected to 
the top event of the Bow-tie model or the product release.  
The release is classified into different types based on the size of the hole that is formed in 
a pipe. Next, the top event is connected to the post-failure events. The Bow-tie model can 
be presented in two parts: the Fault Tree (FT) and the Event Tree (ET). The fault-tree 
model includes all of the basic causes, the failure sources and the top event of the tree. 
The event tree starts from the failure of the pipe and ends in the post-failure events.  
Phase 1: The Bow-tie model is constructed based on the literature review results. All the 
factors and the failure sources identified in the previous section are used. The identified 
factors and failure sources are compared to the existing historical data from the Pipeline 
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration of the US (PHMSAa 2014) database.  
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Figure 3- 5: Flowchart to develop the probability of failure model 
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The objective of this part of the study was to study the availability of historical data on 
the identified variables. First, a statistical analysis is performed to identify the most 
important failure sources. The variables associated various sources with the available 
historical data are selected. The fault tree part of the model is developed based on the 
results of this study. The Bow-tie model connects the identified variables that have an 
effect on different sources of pipeline failure, to their respective sources. In addition, the 
major after-failure events are identified from the history of the pipelines’ failures. These 
events constitute the major elements of the event tree. The central point is the top event 
of the fault tree, which can be the failure of a pipeline or the release of the product that is 
being transported by the pipeline. The major pre-failure events are connected to the 
central point, or, in other words, to the pipeline failure.  
This research proposes some modifications in the fault tree as presented in Figure 3-6 to 
extract the existing patterns and knowledge on the failure probabilities from the historical 
data. The changes are implemented at the basic events level, as well as on an additional, 
new level, which tracks the effect of the basic parameters of pipelines on the probability 
of failure. At the basic level, the basic variables are clustered based on the available data. 
These clusters include the specific properties of the pipelines with respect to related 
variables. In the new layer, this study proposes an investigation of the effect of the 
general properties of the pipelines on the failure probability. The result will be the 
calculation of the probability of failure with respect to each failure source.  
Phase 2: The second phase of the model development analyzes the historical data on the 
failures of oil and gas pipelines in order to provide a comprehensive index for the 
assessment of their probability of failure. The analysis phase on the fault tree part is 
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categorized into two main steps: 1) develop an index to calculate the relative probability 
of failure; and 2) obtain the conversion factors to compute the absolute probability of 
failure. 
Pipeline Properties
Index of Relative POF (S1)
Failure source S1
I1 I2
V 1 V n…
D. Inst. Year












Figure 3- 6: Modified sample fault tree 
Step 1-layer one: In the first step, the identified variables are divided into a number of 
categories. For quantitative variables, first the historical data on the failed pipes is fitted 
to the best probability distribution function, which is then divided into equal distances. 
For the qualitative variables, a study is performed to categorize them based on the 
available classifications. For some of these variables, the pipeline’s installation period is 
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used to identify the classification of the categories. After classifying the ranges of data 
for each variable, the number of pipes that failed in each year of the reporting period is 
calculated. In each category of each variable, the proportion of the failed pipes to the total 
number of failed pipes under each failure source is computed. Then, the distribution 
function that best fits the calculated data is determined for each category of the basic 
events with respect to each failure source. Data is preprocessed before the analysis. In 
this process, the incomplete data points, i.e. data points with missing data on the required 
variables, are removed, and the accuracy of data is investigated. The distribution function 
that best fits the remaining data is then determined. @RISK 6 (Palisade 2013) is applied 
to determine the function that best fits the historical data. In each of the categories, the 
number of failed pipes in each year of the reporting period is counted, and a table is 
formed based on these values. Equation 3.1 is applied to calculate the contribution of the 








                (3.1) 
where; "𝐶𝑘−𝑖𝑗" is the contribution of the “i” th category of basic cause “𝑆𝑘” in year “j” to 
the failure of pipes with respect to failure source “k”, n is the number of years in the 
reporting period applied for analysis, and m is the number of categories determined for 
the classification of basic cause “k”. 
The software reports the results through six goodness-of-fit statistical tests, the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), Chi-Squared, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS), Anderson-Darling (AD), and Root-Mean Squared Error 
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(RMSErr). Each of these statistical fit tests indicates how well a distribution function fits 
the data. The smaller the value of these statistics, the better the fit is. Some of these fit 
tests are applied to limited types of data: RMSErr is only used for cumulative and density 
data; AD and KS are only applicable to continuous data; and the others can be used for 
both continuous and discrete data. In this research, the selection of the best fit for most of 
the selected functions is based on the first rank of the sorted distributions based on the 
Anderson-Darling (AD) test. This test does not need to specify the number of bins, as 
opposed to the “Chi-Squared” test. Also, it considers the properties of the tail of the input 
data, whereas the KS test concentrates on the middle point of the inputs. As a result, the 
AD test can consider the effects of the maximum and minimum data on the best fit.  
The selection of the best-fit distribution function is performed through the comparison of 
the results of the AD test. If there are distributions with close fit results, then the best fit 
with the most commonly used distributions is selected. The 99% range of the confidence 
interval is found in the reported results of the selected distribution function. The 
confidence level determines the maximum and minimum of the range within which the 
data is selected for future analysis. This methodology is developed based on the 
application of the granular theory to a distribution function, as explained in the literature 
review. 
Step 1-layer two: In the second layer of this step, the effect of the main general pipe 
properties that can be effective on estimating the failure probability are analyzed. A 
process to that of layer one is repeated. All of the indices that are calculated through this 
step serve to build the stochastic index with which to assess the relative probability of 
failure unique to a pipe’s properties. The specific properties of each pipe are taken  into 
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account, i.e., diameter, location and the installation year, in order to develop the indices 
to forecast the unique probability of failure.  
The existing categories in the mileage reports are used to calculate the effects of the 
pipe’s diameter and installation year. The contribution of each category of diameter in 
each year of the reporting period is calculated according to Equation 3.2. The calculated 
values are applied to determine the PDF best-fitted to the corresponding diameter 
category. The unit of the calculated values is the number of failures/year-mile. The 
contribution of the installation year of the pipes in each category of the installation year is 
calculated from Equation 3.3. The coefficient of each category of the installation year is 
computed from Equation 3.4. The second equation assigns a value of one to the minimum 
calculated amount of the contribution, and computes the remaining amount compared to 
the actual value of that category’s contribution. According to the reports for transmission 






                      (3.2) 
where 𝐷𝑘−𝑖𝑗 is the contribution of the “i
th” diameter category in year “j" of the database 
with respect to failure source “k”, 𝑀𝑑−𝑖𝑗 is the mileage of the related diameter category in 






)/𝑛            (3.3) 
𝐼𝑌𝑘−𝑖 =  
𝑦𝑘−𝑖
min{𝑦𝑘−1,…,𝑦𝑘−𝑛}
             (3.4) 
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where; 𝑦𝑘−𝑖𝑗 is the contribution of the “i
th” diameter category in year “j" of the database 
with respect to failure source “k”, 𝑀𝑦−𝑖𝑗 is the mileage of the related category of 
installation decade in year “j”, and “n” is the number of years in the reporting period, 
𝐼𝑌𝑘−𝑖 is the coefficient determining the contribution of the “i” th category of the 
installation year of the pipe with respect to failure source “k”. 
Step 2: This step determines the conversion factors for each category that convert the 
relative probability of failure to the absolute probability of failure. All the possible pipes 
are simulated, and their relative probability of failure indices are computed to calculate 
these conversion factors. The calculated amounts are compared with the maximum and 
average annual probability of failure values for each diameter category. The coefficient 
of conversion is calculated via this comparison, and this factor is recorded for each 
diameter category.  
Phase 3: This is the data analysis part of the event tree. First, various potential hole sizes 
and post-failure events are identified. Applying the probability and the Bayesian 
inference theory, an index is developed for each of the failure sources. This index 
provides the contribution of each failure source to the pre-defined hole sizes. Then, 
another index is used to calculate the contribution of each hole size to the occurrence of 
post-failure events such as ignition. Three hole sizes are forecasted to develop after the 
pipeline failure, small, medium, and large. Small hole sizes are the equivalent of 
pinholes, medium holes result in the puncture of a pipeline, and large-sized holes produce 
ruptures. The most determinant factor in the risk of different types of ignition post-pipe 
failure is identified as the hole size and the failure source. An index is developed to 
calculate the probability of occurrence of different hole sizes after each type of failure 
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source, as shown in Equation 3.5. Equation 3.6 is then applied to develop an index that 
determines the probability of each ignition type in the case of happening of each type of 





                      (3.5) 
where 𝑃(𝐻𝑗|𝑆𝑘) is the probability of hole size “j” developing in association with failure 
source “k”, 𝑁𝐻𝑗𝑘
is the number of pipes failed under failure source “k” with hole size 
category of “j”, and 𝑁𝑆𝑘is the total number of pipes failed under failure source “k”.  
𝑃(𝐼𝑔𝑛𝑖|𝐻𝑗) =  
𝑁𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝐻𝑗𝑘
                            (3.6) 
𝑃𝑆𝑒𝑛.𝑖𝑗𝑘= 𝑃𝑆𝑘 × 𝑃(𝐻𝑗|𝑆𝑘) × 𝑃(𝐼𝑔𝑛𝑖|𝐻𝑗)                   (3.7) 
where 𝑃(𝐼𝑔𝑛𝑖|𝐻𝑗) is the probability of ignition type “i” happening when  hole size type 
“j” occurs with failure source “k”, 𝑁𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑗
is the number of pipes failed under failure source 
“k” with a hole size category  “j” and ignition type “i", and 𝑁𝐻𝑗𝑘
is the total number of 
pipes failed within failure source “k” with hole size “j”. 
Once all of the indices are developed and the related coefficients are computed, the 
equations developed in this section can be used to calculate the POF of each pipe. To 
compute the POF with respect to each failure source, Equations 3.8~3.11 are applied. 
Equation 3.8 computes the contribution of the basic events under an intermediate event 
with respect to each failure source. If two intermediate events exist under a single failure 
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source, Equation 3.9 determines the maximum value and obtains it as the relative POF 
without applying the effect of the general properties of the pipe. Equation 3.10 is used to 
calculate the effect of the installation year and of the pipe diameter on the relative POF. 
Equation 3.11 calculates the absolute POF by applying an adjustment factor. The unit of 
the absolute POF is the number of failures/year-mile. 
𝑅𝑃𝐼𝑚








̃ }                                 (3.9) 
𝑅𝑃𝑆𝑘
̃ =  𝑅𝑃(𝐼1,𝐼2)
̃ × 𝑃𝐷𝑎  
̃ × 𝐶𝐼𝑌𝑏                       (3.10) 
𝑃𝑆𝑘
̃ = 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛{𝑅𝑃𝑆𝑘
̃ × 𝐴𝑓𝑆𝑘(𝐷𝑎)}                     (3.11) 
where; 𝑅𝑃𝐼𝑚
̃  is the distribution function of the relative probability of failure with respect 
to an intermediate event, 𝑃𝑥𝑖
̃  is the distribution function of the basic events’ contribution 
with respect to the intermediate event, 𝑅𝑃(𝐼1,𝐼2)
̃  determines the maximum distribution 
function correlated with two intermediate events under a failure source determined by 
comparing the mean values of the two, 𝑅𝑃𝐸𝑐  is the distribution function of the relative 
probability of failure with respect to the external corrosion, 𝑃𝐷𝑎  is the distribution 
function of the contribution of the diameter category on the failure probability under a 
failure source, 𝐼𝑌𝑘−𝑖  is the coefficient determining the contribution of the “I”th category 
of the installation year of the pipe with respect to the failure source “k”, 𝑃𝑓(𝐸𝑐) is the 
distribution function of the absolute probability of failure with respect to the external 
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corrosion failure source, and 𝐴𝑓𝐸𝑐(𝐷𝑎)
̃  is the adjustment factor with respect to the external 
corrosion in the correlated diameter category of the pipe. 
3.2.3 Consequence of Failure Model 
The other parameter that is required for risk assessment is the consequence of failure, 
which can be estimated from various perspectives including individual, social, 
environmental, and physical damages to properties. All damages result in financial 
consequences that are difficult to estimate because of the sensitivity of failures’ severity 
to their type and source. The lack of data about underground pipelines pre-failure adds to 
the complexity of the estimation. This research develops a failure consequence estimation 
model that can forecast the consequence level without the application of inspection or 
subjective data. The model development process is shown in Figure 3-7. According to 
this figure, the major consequences of a failure, as well as the primary variables that 
affect the failures’ severity are identified. The pre-identified failure sources and post-
failure events are used to define the failure scenarios. 
The components of failure scenarios (i.e. FS) are extracted from the Bow-tie model, and 
include the failure sources, release type, and post-failure events. The components of the 
failures are combined through the application of Equation 3.12 to compute the value of a 
failure scenario that is composed of 63 different scenarios.  
𝐹𝑆𝑖 =  𝑅𝑖 + 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐼𝑖                      (3.12) 
where 𝐹𝑆𝑖 is the failure scenario for data-point “i”, 𝑅𝑖 is the release type of data-point “i”, 
𝐶𝑖 is the cause of failure of data-point “i", and 𝐼𝑖 is the post-failure event, including the 
ignition type of the data-point.  
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Model Development
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* MF: Membership Functions, ** MSE: Minimum Square Error 
Figure 3- 7: Model Development Process 
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The location-related variables are those that are related to the location of the pipe and its 
surrounding environment, which can affect the severity of the failures. This variable 
group includes three variables: its onshore/ offshore location, the class location of the 
pipe, and whether the pipe is located in a high consequence area or not. The combination 
of all these variables is used to form a new variable called the location category (i.e. LC). 
Equation 3.13 is applied to build this variable and calculate the associated values for the 
historical data-points.  
𝐿𝐶𝑖 =  𝑂𝐿𝑖 + 𝐶𝐿𝑖 + 𝐻𝐶𝐴𝑖                        (3.13) 
where 𝐿𝐶𝑖 is the location category of the pipe or data-point “i”, 𝑂𝐿𝑖 is the pipe’s 
onshore/offshore location, 𝐶𝐿𝑖 is the class location of the pipes at data-point “i", and 
𝐻𝐶𝐴𝑖 is a variable that indicates whether the pipe is located in an onshore or offshore 
location.  
The location category and failure scenario are considered as fixed variables and are 
required for the final model; while the combinations of different pipe properties are tested 
to optimize the model error. Various combinations, including two to four variable sets, 
are built to compare their prediction capability. Different neuro-fuzzy networks for each 
combination of the variables are produced. For each combination, a various number of 
and different types of membership functions are tested. Since there is no  previous 
knowledge about the properties of the inputs and outputs, either of the two methods of 
clustering, namely subtractive clustering or grid partitioning can be used. Subtractive 
clustering is a rapid algorithm for clustering data that initiates clusters based on the 
initially-recognized fuzzy clusters. The fuzzy membership functions are then optimized 
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based on the data properties during the training phase, and the best mode is embedded 
into the final model. This method uses the same number of membership functions, as well 
as the same types of membership functions, for all of the variables. However, some of the 
variables in this research do not require a large number of membership functions. 
Consequently, in this research another method, the more-flexible grid partitioning is used. 
The results of this method are more accurate than those of subtractive clustering.  
The grid partitioning method of clustering, which is used in this research, considers all of 
the possible combinations of the clusters of input variables to generate fuzzy if-then rules. 
The number of data points is limited in the historical database, and the missing data adds 
to this shortage. Equation 3.14 presents the number of modifiable parameters for each 
neuro-fuzzy network, which is applied to find the starting number of the membership 
functions. A large number of parameters should be modified in this method, and this 
number must be smaller than the number of data points. Consequently, a large number of 
membership functions cannot be used in this method due to the limitations in the number 
of datapoints in the historical database. 
 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 = ∏ 𝑉𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1          (3.14) 
where 𝑉𝑖is the number of membership functions for each of the input variables, n is the 
number of the input variables and 𝑀𝐹𝑝𝑖is the number of parameters for the selected type 
of membership functions for each of the input variables, which is three for triangular 
membership functions and four for trapezoidal membership functions.  
In order to start the learning phase with an optimized number of membership functions, 
the starting number of the membership functions and their types are determined to 
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develop the model. The error produced in all of the datasets is recorded, and the surface 
view in the generated network is checked. The average error of each network is 
calculated from Equation 3.15.  
𝐴𝐸𝑖 = ∑ 𝑃𝑗 × 𝐸𝑖𝑗
𝑗=3
𝑗=1                  (3.15) 
where 𝐴𝐸𝑖 is the average error in trial number “i”, 𝑃𝑗 is the percentage of data in dataset 
“j”, and 𝐸𝑖𝑗 is the error produced in dataset “j” in trial “i” of the modelling phase.  
After determining the starting number of membership functions, the historical data on the 
failures of pipelines are divided into three sets of training, checking, and testing datasets. 
The training dataset is obtained to train the model and produce the neuro-fuzzy network. 
The error of the produced network is checked versus the checking dataset in steps called 
epochs, and if the error starts to increase, the learning phase stops. The testing dataset is 
used to measure the error of the final network and test the validity of the model. In this 
research, 15% of data is allocated to each of the testing and checking datasets, and the 
remaining is obtained for training.  
The surface view checks the relationship of one or two of the input variables versus the 
output variable. If the produced output is negative in all or most of the surface view of the 
produced network, the produced network is deemed ineffective. The sensitivity of the 
output variable versus all of the input variables is also checked. The networks that result 
in a constant output value versus the changes of one variable in its whole range are also 
removed from the consideration of the final model. Models with the use of various 
membership functions and different combinations of variables are generated, and the 
produced results are recorded. The best network is selected based on the error of the 
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networks in all the datasets and in the surface view checks. Table 3-2 summarizes the 
variables that are used in the numerical models found in the literature. These studies aim 
to develop a model for pipeline failure consequences. However, as mentioned before, 
given that the geometric properties of the pipelines are not considered, the analysis of the 
failures’ consequence in the literature is limited. Moreover, the input variables are not 
known for specific pipelines before failure and could be more suitable for scenario 
analyses.  
Table 3- 2: Variables used in the numerical models developed for the failure 




Occurrence of ignition and/or explosion, amount of product loss, the 
location specifications (i.e. offshore versus onshore, and HCA versus 
non-HCA), the system part involved, and the cause of the accident. 
Simonoff et 
al. (2010)  
Cause of the incidents and incident types. 
In this research, some variables from previous studies by Resterpo et al. (2009) and 
Simonoff et al. (2010) are applied. These include the occurrence of ignition and/or 
explosion and the accident causes. However, the amount of product loss is not used, as it 
is not predictable at this stage before a failure occurs. Some other variables are suggested 
as the primary variables, such as the geometric properties of pipelines, which include the 
pipe diameter and wall thickness. Also, the importance of the Specified Minimum Yield 
Strength (SMYS) of a pipe and its maximum operating pressure (MAOP) are studied in 
the model. The other failure mode that will be examined in analyzing the model’s 
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efficiency is the existence of rupture, puncture or leakage. For this failure mode, only the 
probability is calculated in the event tree of the Bow-tie model.  
The age of the pipeline is considered in the input variables, as it may affect the failure 
consequences. The failure consequences model forecasts the severity of the failures of oil 
and gas pipelines. Various failure consequence types were discussed in the literature 
review. They are classified into three groups of safety, environmental, and economic 
consequences. The amount of property damage includes the economic damages and can 
represent the severity of a pipeline’s failure. 
The primary variables that are used in this research are shown in Table 3-3. As indicated, 
the variables are categorized into three groups. Group one includes the variables that are 
directly related to the properties of the pipe. These properties include the pipe diameter 
(DI), pipe wall thickness (WT), the Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) 
and the Specified Minimum Yield Strength (SMYS). Various combinations of these 
variables are tested to optimize the results of the model. Group two of the variables 
includes those that are related to the scenarios of failure, obtained from the Bow-tie 
model. In addition, databases report values on the parameters including those that 
indicate the location of the pipe with respect to the number of buildings and people 
around the pipe and the existence of ecologically-sensitive environments such as rivers 
and lakes. The former is recognized by a variable known as  class location, and the latter 
is identified with a variable that determines if the pipeline is located in a high 
consequence area or not. All the possible failure sources are extracted from this model.  
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Min. Max. Unit 
Pipe  
Properties 
Pipe Diameter  1 48 Inch 
Pipe Wall Thickness 0.02 1.25 Inch 








Release type 1 4 - 
Failure cause 1 7 - 




Onshore or offshore 0 1 - 
Class location 1 4 - 
Pipe located in high consequence area 




A new variable is constructed, which indicates the failure scenarios. The new variable is 
built by assigning 1000s, 100s, and 10s codes in order to be able to differentiate between 
various scenarios with one variable. Presenting the failure scenarios with one value will 
help to greatly decrease the number of input variables, which will reduce the 
computational time for the neuro-fuzzy system. For this purpose, a thousands’ code is 
allocated to each of the failure sources offered in Table 3-4. The ignition variable obtains 
a hundreds’ value of 100 to 300 based on the possibility of an ignition, an explosion or 
none. Release types are given a value of 10 to 30 based on the possible sizes of the 
leakage, ranging from a small hole to a large rupture.  
3.2.3.1 Neuro-fuzzy model training  
After the variable selection, the second step of the model development is training, 
optimization, and validation. The ANFIS is applied to the development of the model, as it 
is a very powerful pattern recognition technique that also considers the uncertainties of 
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the accuracy of the historical data. ANFIS is a Mamdani fuzzy inference system that 
maps a set of inputs to a set of membership functions and maps the membership functions 
to the rules. The rules are first mapped to a set of output membership functions, which are 
later transformed into a crisp output using de-fuzzification techniques (Mathworks 2013).  
The historical data on the failures of oil and gas pipelines in the US are used to develop 
the model. This database includes enough parameters to develop this model. The database 
is preprocessed, and the related variables are obtained. It is randomly divided into 
training and checking datasets. The checking dataset should be carefully selected as it 
should contain enough features of the whole database. If it does not contain the natural 
features of the historical data, the validation may result in an unacceptable amount of 
error.  
After dividing data into training and checking datasets, the training data is divided into 
two sets; training and testing, and the Fuzzy Inference Structure (FIS) is built. There are 
three methods in ANFIS for generating an FIS. First, the user can build the membership 
functions by using the previous knowledge from the existing data. However, if there is 
not enough knowledge regarding the database and its properties, either of the two 
methods of optimizing the FIS, namely, subtractive clustering or grid partitioning, can be 
used. As mentioned earlier, subtractive clustering is a fast algorithm for clustering data 
and for recognizing the possible membership functions within input and output data. As a 
result, the generated fuzzy membership functions are optimized based on the properties 
of data during the training phase, and the best mode is embedded into the final model. 
This method initiates the construction of the model based on the initially-recognized 
fuzzy clusters.  
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Data points are used as the candidates of the cluster centers in subtractive clustering, 
while in grid partitioning the grid points are considered as the candidates. This makes 
subtractive clustering perform faster in the computation process than grid partitioning, 
although grid partitioning is more accurate. Moreover, the grid partitioning method is 
more flexible as it can assign a different number of membership functions to various 
variables. Equation 3.16 is applied to measure the density of data around each point 
(Hammouda and Karray 1997). The data point with the highest density is chosen as the 
first cluster center. The density value is then revised by applying Equation 3.17. The data 
point with the highest revised density is chosen as the next cluster center, and the process 
continues until a sufficient number of clusters is obtained. 
𝐷𝑖 = ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
‖𝑥𝑖−𝑥𝑗‖
(𝑟𝑎/2)2
]𝑛𝑗=1                       (3.16) 
𝐷𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖 − 𝐷𝑐1𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
‖𝑥𝑖−𝑥𝑐1‖
(𝑟𝑏/2)2
]                     (3.17) 
where: 
 xi: the existing data points 
 ra: a positive constant that presents the radius of a neighborhood 
rb: a positive constant which defines a neighborhood with “measurable reductions in the 
density”.  
Xc1 is the first cluster center, which is the data point with the highest density (Dc1) as 
calculated by Equation 3-6 (Hammouda and Karray 1997). 
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In the training phase, several parameters should be determined, such as the training mode, 
which can be hybrid or back-propagation. The hybrid method of training combines the 
least squares method with back-propagation. These methods are applied to recognize and 
optimize the fuzzy inference system parameters based on the training data. Figure 3-8 
shows the generic Mamdani fuzzy inference system (FIS), the parameters of which are 
optimized in the training phase. Figure 3-9 shows a sample FIS structure with four input 
variables. This structure shows the triangular membership functions assigned to the 
defined inputs to develop the FIS. The efficiency of the training phase is then checked 
against the testing dataset at several data points called epochs. As mentioned in the 
literature review, the error of a model trained by Neural Networks and Neuro-Fuzzy 
systems increases at some points as a result of over-fitting. These points are called 
epochs, and the system verifies the trained network in the checking dataset at each epoch, 
and whenever the error starts increasing, the training is stopped. Continuing the training 
would not help the system’s learning task or its generalization capability.   
 
Figure 3- 8: Mamdani Fuzzy Inference System (Mathworks 2013) 
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Figure 3- 9: Sample FIS structure with four input variables (Mathworks 2013) 
In this research, the number of input variables is optimized based on the error of the 
trained model, which is checked against the validation dataset. For this purpose, different 
combinations (i.e. m of n) of input variables are generated. The model is built for each 
set, and the error of the developed network against the testing dataset is recorded. The 
error is obtained by comparing the neuro-fuzzy-estimated outputs with the actual data. 
The Mean square error (MSE), which applies Equation 3.18, is used to measure the 
average of the squares of the errors in each dataset. Consequently, the models with the 
least amount of error are recognized. If the errors are very close, the validation dataset is 
used to select the best combination of the variables. The validation dataset is embedded 
into the trained system, and the forecasted consequences are predicted via the model. 
Figure 3-10 shows the inputs, output, and fuzzy rules of a sample fuzzy inference 
structure. As shown, different membership functions are assigned to each input and 




∑ (Ei − Ai)
2n
i=1            (3.18) 
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where: n is the number of data points in each dataset, Ei is the estimated output, and Ai is 






Figure 3- 10: Sample fuzzy inference structure and output rules  
(A: Input 1, B: Input 2, C: Input 3, D: Output, E: Rules of the model predicting output) 
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3.2.4 Validation of the POF and COF Models 
In order to validate the probability of failure and the consequence of failure assessment 
models, part of the databases are separated, and the error measuring methods are used to 
evaluate the accuracy of the models. The error measuring methods compare the estimated 
values of the output variables with their actual counterparts. 
Equations 3.19 and 3.20 are used to calculate the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) and 
the Average Invalidity Percentage (AIP), respectively. Equation 3.21 is applied to 
measure the Average Validity Percentage (AVP) of the model. In an accurate prediction, 
the value of the AIP should be closer to zero, while the value of the AVP should be closer 
to one. The Mean Absolute Error (MAE) is presented in Equation 3.22 and, as can be 
predicted, the closer the value of the MAE is to zero, the more accurate the prediction. 
The value of the modified absolute percentage error (Modified APE) is calculated as the 













                       (3.20) 










                       (3.22) 
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|                (3.23) 
where Ci is the actual value of the probability of failure, 
 Ei is the estimated value, and n is the number of data-points in the testing dataset.  
3.2.5 Integrated fuzzy risk evaluation model 
There are two main methods for evaluating the level of risk of failure. The most 
commonly used method is the multiplication of the probability of failure by the 
consequences of failure. However, this method removes the differences of the risks of 
two pipes: one with a high probability of failure and a low consequence of failure, the 
other with a low probability of failure and a high consequence of failure. The risk of 
failure for both is evaluated with a single value. Therefore, this method is not 
recommended for this research. Another method used in many studies is the risk matrix. 
A sample risk matrix is shown in Figure 3-11 (Milazzo et al. 2015).  
Once the probability of failure and consequence of failure is assessed using the pre-
developed models, a scale is needed in this method in order to evaluate the level of risk 
assessment. Different guidelines offer various scales with which to evaluate the level of 
failure risk. The linguistic terms they attribute to the calculated amounts of probability of 
failure and consequences of failure, as well as the risk levels, vary from one set of 
guidelines to another. The calculated rates of failure probability and consequences are 
compared with this matrix to evaluate the level of risk of a pipeline.  
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Figure 3- 11: A Sample Risk matrix 
Table 3-5 presents some of the pre-defined scales of probability of failure evaluation. 
Besides the fuzzy nature of the level of risk evaluation, these scales do not consider the 
probability of failure of the pipes with respect to different sources of failure.   
Table 3- 4: Probability of failure scale of evaluation 





































Due to the fuzziness of the level of risk and complexity of evaluation as a result of the 
existence of various values for different failure sources, this research suggests the 
application of a fuzzy expert system. This fuzzy expert system would evaluate the risk of 
failure with respect to each failure source. First, Equation 3.24 is developed to convert 






Low Medium High Very High
POF
COF
VL L M H VH
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the computed probability of failure values to logarithmic grades, as the level of severity 
of pipeline failure probability is assessed on a logarithmic scale. 
𝐺𝑃𝑆𝑘 = 8 + log(𝑃𝑆𝑘)         (3.24) 
where 𝐺𝑃𝑆𝑘 is the grade of probability of failure with respect to failure source “k”, and 
𝐺𝑃𝑆𝑘  is the absolute probability of failure with respect to failure source “k”. 
Developing the fuzzy expert system that evaluates a pipeline’s risk index is composed of 
three steps, as listed below: 
1- Fuzzification of the inputs: To fuzzify the inputs, 5-grade fuzzy membership 
functions are assigned to evaluate the calculated value of the probability of 
failure. Similarly, the computed consequence of failure and the output are 
fuzzified. The thresholds of the membership functions are mainly defined based 
on the findings from the literature review and experts’ opinions. 
2- Defining the rules: These rules map the relationship between the inputs, here the 
probability and consequence of failure, with the output or the risk index. The rules 
are defined based on the available guidelines and the experts’ opinions. 
3- Defuzzification: The fuzzy inference system developed in this research applies the 
Mamdani model, which is intuitive and suitable for human inputs (Mathworks 
2013). This model aggregates inputs and outputs with the attributed fuzzy rules 
and calculates the defuzzified output, which is the level of risk of failure, using 
the centroid method of defuzzification. 
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3.3 Maintenance Model 
After the risk assessment and the associated determination of the pipeline’s level of risk, 
a maintenance model is developed. In this model, decisions are taken in two steps, at 
inspection and rehabilitation planning, as described in the following sections.  
3.3.1 Inspection Planning 
The failure probability and consequence analysis models help identify the level of risk of 
the pipelines being evaluated. The pipelines’ inspection plans are optimized based on the 
risk of failure. Based on a pipeline’s risk level, the inspection planning model suggests 
the most suitable tools for its inspection and the frequency at which they are to be used. 
Figure 3-12 depicts the process of the fuzzy inspection tool selection model development 
for such pipes. The inspection tools and techniques were studied in Chapter 2. There are 
varieties of inspection techniques that can be used for different purposes. However, a 
comprehensive structured model to recognize the most suitable inspection techniques and 
determine the frequency of running the tools for a specific pipeline could not be located 
within the existing works.  
Choosing an appropriate inspection tool helps to detect the defects and sources of failure 
based on their level of risk. This model aims to recognize the most potential sources of 
failure for pipelines and proposes the optimum inspection technique accordingly. The 
failure probability model analyzes the probability of occurrence of each source of failure 
for the pipelines.  It can also verify which types of failure sources are more severe. The 
level of probability of failure is applied in order to prioritize the most suitable list of 
inspection tools for each failure source. Based on the literature review, a list of inspection 
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techniques is prepared for each failure source. The recommended range of inspection 
frequency for each group is studied via the guidelines and inspection manuals. Table 3-6 
presents a sample of the prepared list of inspection tools, their recommended inspection 
frequency and the cost of running each one. The different techniques of each list are 
ranked based on their average running or operating cost.   
Fuzzy Inspection Tool Selection Expert System
Scale of POF 
evaluation
Scale of COF 
evaluation
Identify the most common inspection tools 
and related cost of operation
Rank inspection 




Fuzzy integrated risk model
Define rules of 
tool selection and 
frequency
Fuzzify Inspection tool 








Figure 3- 12: Inspection planning model 
Table 3- 5: Sample list of inspection techniques and their cost and recommended 
range of operation frequency  
Inspection techniques Frequency of operation Cost of operation 










No. n …. an -bn Cn 
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To be most effective, each inspection technique should be used in a range of frequencies. 
This range is identified from the literature. The range is developed to address the various 
levels of failure probability. Consequently, pipelines with a higher probability of failure 
are inspected more frequently. Consider as an example inspection technique No.1 from 
Table 3-6. This inspection is recommended to be conducted every a1 to b1 units of time. 




           (3.25) 
where I1: the calculated interval frequency 
b1: the upper bound of the recommended frequency, and 
a1: is the lower bound of the recommended frequency. 
A table is then developed for each inspection type to determine the frequency of 
inspection with respect to different levels of the probability of failure. Table 3-7 depicts a 
sample index that will be developed. Next, the calculated frequency number is fuzzified 
to incorporate the uncertainty involved with the accuracy of decisions and the computed 
failure risk.  




Frequency of operation with respect to the level of failure 
probability 
VH H M L VL 
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The inspection tool is selected based on the list of the identified inspection techniques. 
These tools are prioritized based on the pipeline failure consequences. A pipeline with a 
higher consequence of failure is recommended to be inspected with a more expensive 
inspection technique such as a high-resolution Inline inspection. The consequence level 
of a pipeline failure is estimated in the range of 1 to 10, which is divided into five levels 
of severity. The severity levels are titled: Very Low, Low, Medium, High and Very High.  
For the low consequence failures, the lower-cost inspections, such as low resolution 
inline inspections and further distances of digging for direct assessment are assigned. The 
high resolution inspection techniques and extra-high resolution techniques are prescribed 
for the high and very high failure consequences. When the list of the available inspection 
techniques is generated, the next step is to develop the inspection scenarios, which 
constitutes the second part of inspection planning.  
After developing the general rules for selecting inspection techniques, the risk-based 
inspection maintenance expert system is developed. The methodology for developing this 
model is shown in Figure 3-13. This model is developed based on the growth of the 
pipeline risk, and it considers the costs of various inspection scenarios over the life cycle 
of a pipeline. The capability of the detection of the selected inspection tools and their 
accuracy of detection is identified. By combining these two values, the risk reduction 
index of each inspection technique is calculated. After the inspection tools have been 
selected and their optimal run frequency determined, a risk growth profile is developed. 
This profile should forecast how the risk generally grows during the service life of a 
pipeline. In order to develop the cumulative risk growth profile, the individual probability 
of pipeline failure in each year of its life span is calculated using Equation 3.26. The 
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individual probabilities of failure for previous years are then summed to achieve the 
cumulative probability of failure for one year, as indicated in Equation 3.27. The 
cumulative probability of failure growth at year “i” represents the probability of a 
pipeline failure before that age.  





& capabilities of detection
Identify defect types and 
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4-2-1: Risk-based Maintenance Expert System 
(Model Development)
Calculate risk reduction index of 
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Risk profile of 
pipeline
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Figure 3- 13: Risk-based inspection model development  
𝑃𝑜𝐹𝑖 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 "𝑖" 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 number of pipelines failed
       (3.26) 
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Cumulative PoF (i+1) = PoF (i+1) + Cumulative PoF (i)
1
     (3.27) 
where: “i" represents the year in which the probability of failure will be calculated.  
, An after-inspection risk profile is developed for each scenario. The maximum failure 
risk, which is in the last year of the service life, is then determined from the risk profile. 
The pipeline’s inspection cash flow for each scenario is developed after embedding the 
cost data of the inspection operations. The net present value of the developed scenario is 
calculated after defining the economic parameters, including the interest rate(s) and 
inflation. Net present value is more commonly used to compare different scenarios’ 
economic equivalency; however, it cannot be used for alternatives with different service 
lives.  Monte Carlo simulation is applied to consider the uncertainties that exist in the 
cost of running the inspection tools and the economic parameters. The annual worth of 
each scenario is computed from Equations 3.28~ 3.30 (Parvizsedghy et al. 2014) : 




𝑡=1       (3.28) 
𝐸𝑈𝐴?̃? = 𝑁𝑃?̃? (A|P, 𝑖,̃  n)          (3.29) 
(A|P, 𝑖,̃  n)=
?̃?(1+?̃?)𝑛
(1+?̃?)𝑛-1
           (3.30) 
where 𝑁𝑃?̃? is  the probability distribution function of the net present value of the cash 
flow under evaluation;  
𝐶?̃?: The probability distribution function of total cost elements in year t, 
                                                 
1
 Assuming: Cumulative PoF1= PoF1 
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n: The service life of the pipeline in years, 
𝑖̃: The probability distribution function of the forecasted interest rate for the planning 
horizon of the pipeline’s service life, and 
(A|P, 𝑖̃, n): The probability distribution function of conversion factor from present worth 
to equivalent uniform annual worth. 
In order to perform a pipeline’s inspection planning, its risk profile is developed, 
considering the effect of inspection on the risk of failure. After selecting the inspection 
technique or the combination of inspection techniques for a scenario, the risk reduction 
index is calculated for those techniques. The risk reduction index is computed from 








                      (3.31) 
𝑅𝑅𝑖 = 𝐷𝐶𝑖 × 𝐴𝑖                              (3.32) 
where 𝑃𝑗 is the probability of failure with respect to the failure source “j”, 𝐶𝑗𝑖 is the 
fuzzified capability of detecting the failure source “j”, 𝐷𝐶𝑖  determines the detection 
capability of  inspection tool “i”, Ai: the accuracy of that inspection tool, and RRi: 
represents the risk reduction percentage of inspection technique “i".  
The accuracy percentage of each inspection tool is computed using Equation 3.33. This 
variable measures the accuracy of the tool.  
𝐴𝑝.𝑖 = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛. |
𝐷?̃?+𝐴?̃?
𝐷?̃?
− 1|         (3.33) 
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where 𝐴𝑖 is the accuracy percentage of inspection tool “i”, 𝐷?̃?  is the distribution function 
of the defect size  that can be detected with inspection tool “i”, and 𝐴?̃? is the distribution 
function of the accuracy of inspection tool “i”.  
After calculating the inspection life cycle cost and developing the pipeline’s risk profile, 
the most effective inspection scenarios are proposed based on their Risk-Cost index. The 
risk-cost index of each scenario is calculated from Equation 3.34. The lower  the index of 
a scenario the better it is. 
Risk-Cost index (Si) = Max risk- Si ˟ (Mean EUAC-Si)     (3.34) 
where Si is  Scenario “i” of the inspection plan, 
Max Risk Si is the Maximum risk of scenario “i” found in the risk growth profile, and 
Mean EUAC Si is the Average uniform annual cost of scenario “i”.  
3.3.2 Rehabilitation Planning Model   
The overall methodology to develop the rehabilitation planning model is shown in Figure 
3-14. The model development started with a comprehensive review of the rehabilitation 
and maintenance types. The rehabilitation techniques are selected after reviewing the 
maintenance manuals and guidelines for the operation of oil and gas pipelines. The 
maintenance of oil and gas pipelines is categorized based on their type (i.e., regular 
maintenance, inspection, remedial actions, repair, and replacement). They are further 
categorized according to  their sizes. Based on the assumption that there is a direct 
reverse relationship between risk growth and a pipe’s condition during its service life, a 
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risk-based deterioration profile is developed. As a result, the risk growth profile that is 
developed in the inspection planning model is reversed to forecast the deterioration of 
pipes before intervention. This profile is then used to select the required actions of 
rehabilitation during the life cycle of such pipes.  
2- Scenario Development
Define Deterioration Rate 











Develop scenarios  (Operations’ 
type & size)
Operations Cost Estimation 
(Min., Max. & Mean)
Interest Rate Forecast
Define Operations Cost 
and Interest Rates
Rank Scenarios Based on LCC 
Amounts












Define Probability of 
Distribution Functions




Compute Min, Max. and Mean 
of calculated LCCs




Figure 3- 14: Rehabilitation planning model development flowchart 
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The impact of each rehabilitation type and size on the pipe condition after intervention is 
studied and a methodology is developed to calculate pipeline condition after 
rehabilitation. The related cost data is either gathered from previous studies or calculated 
using the available cost estimates of various repair types. Several combinations of 
maintenance operation types are considered in the development of the maintenance 
scenarios. A set of rules are developed to define condition thresholds for the execution of 
maintenance operation types.  
Two types of plans, conservative and regular, are specified. The regular plans impose a 
set of rehabilitation condition thresholds for different operation types (e.g., coating, 
repair, replacement) that are lower than those imposed by the conservative ones. Thus, it 
is the conservative plans that should be used for high-risk pipelines. It is worth noting 
that the maintenance operations in a conservative plan start sooner than those in a regular 
one. Each plan is composed of three groups of scenarios. Each group of scenarios is 
composed of certain types of maintenance operations (i.e., repair and recoat) of various 
sizes. The condition thresholds specify the time and the type of the necessary 
maintenance operations. Three groups of maintenance scenarios are considered in each 
plan. Each scenario group consists of several maintenance scenarios based on the size of 
the defect. Each maintenance scenario is defined by the following parameters: 1) scenario 
group; 2) size of the defect; and 3) repair type (i.e., sleeves or clamps).  
The required maintenance actions are forecasted by considering the condition of a 
pipeline before the rehabilitation action and the set of rules for each scenario group. A 
method is developed to calculate the pipeline condition after each rehabilitation type. The 
size of the repair or replacement not only affects the cost of the maintenance technique, 
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but also the increment of the condition, which is the improvement in the overall pipeline 
condition due to a maintenance action. Equations 3.35--3.37 estimate the condition 
increment of every size of recoat, repair, and replacement, respectively.  
CI recoat = 0.5 × (10-OC) ×
𝑆𝑛
10
                     (3.35)    
CI repair = 0.7 × (10-OC)  ×
𝑆𝑛
10
                                            (3.36) 
CI replacement = (10-OC) ×
𝑆𝑛
10
     (3.37) 
where “CI” = condition increment for the maintenance operation, “OC” = current overall 
condition of a pipeline section, and “Sn” = size of the maintenance operation. The term 
“10 - OC” represents the difference between the current overall condition and the 
maximum condition of a pipeline, namely, “10” (i.e., the condition of a newly 
constructed pipeline). 
Determining the maintenance operations and their execution time over the life cycle of 
the pipeline requires the development of deterioration profiles after the rehabilitation 
interventions for each scenario. Consequently, a profile defines a maintenance scenario 
and determines the time and type of the maintenance operations that need to be carried 
out each year. The collected operations’ costs are then used to forecast the cash flow of 
the pipeline’s maintenance over its life cycle. 
Finally, the cash flows of the maintenance scenarios are calculated using Microsoft Excel 
(Microsoft Group 2010). A Monte Carlo simulation is used to compute the Net Present 
Value (NPV) distribution function of each maintenance scenario. The probability 
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distribution functions of the maintenance operation costs and the interest rates are defined 
using @Risk 6 (PALISADE 2013). The probability distribution functions are used to 
address the uncertainties in the estimation of the maintenance operation costs and the 
future interest rates. The distribution functions are defined as triangular functions. The 
standard parameters of triangular distribution functions are the minimum, maximum, and 
most likely values, which are defined in the model. After defining the distribution 
functions of the maintenance operation costs and interest rates, the NPV of each scenario 
is calculated. For each scenario, the computations on the simulated model are iterated for 
1,000 times. The distribution function that best fits the calculated NPV amounts is 
determined, and the minimum, maximum, and mean values of each scenario are reported. 
This process is repeated for each scenario. The obtained NPV mean values are used to 
rank the scenarios. Finally, the scenarios with the lowest NPV values are selected as the 
optimum maintenance scenarios during the service life of the pipeline.  
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CHAPTER 4: DATA COLLECTION 
Several countries have recorded data of the failures of oil and gas pipelines, and a few 
have published data. Some have reported processed data on the causes and consequences 
of failures periodically, and some have published raw data on each failure. Among 
published databases, authors found the database of the pipeline and hazardous materials 
safety administration (PHMSAa 2014) of the US Department of transportation the most 
complete one. It contains data on various types of pipelines in different classifications. 
This database has divided data according to the classification of pipelines (i.e. gas 
transmission and gathering, gas distribution and hazardous liquid pipelines). It has 
recorded general data of each failed pipeline, location-related data of incidents, and 
information related to the operators. Furthermore, it provides detailed data about each 
failure: the cause of the failure, the cost and the environmental consequences of the 
incident, and the overall inspections that have been done during the pipeline’s operation. 
Installation year of pipelines, date of failure, maximum allowable operating pressure, 
SMYS have been recorded exactly as a numerical value while there are some linguistic or 
binary values for some inspection related parameters.  
Rules of defining failures have been changed through the time. Also, the recorded data 
has been modified over the years. Consequently, the database is divided into several date 
periods each of which reports different parameters of failures and pipelines. Data 
includes date ranges from 1970 to 1984, 1986 to 2001, 2002 to 2009 and 2010 to 2013. 
Each dataset includes different categories of the failed pipelines. For example dataset of 
gas pipelines which has recorded failures from 1970-1984 has data on soil properties. 
This data will be helpful in determining the effect of soil properties on the failures of oil 
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and gas pipelines. Consequently, in each part of the model the parameters that are needed 
are studied to select the most appropriate ones.  Table 4-1 shows sample data existed in 
the dataset of the gas transmission and gathering pipes that is recorded on the failure of 
2010 to 2014. Appendix A shows all existing data variables in the same dataset. 
Table 4- 1: Sample data excel sheet (PHMSAa 2014)  
 
 
OPERATOR_IDOperator NAME IYEARLATITUDELONGITUDECOMMODITY RELEASEFATAL INJUREIGNITE EXPLODE ON_OFF DEPTH_OF_COVERCR SSING
18516 SOUTHERN NATURAL GAS CO 2010 33.11 -89.15 NATURAL GAS 41176 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 60 NO
31711 SOUTHERN STAR CENTRAL GAS PIPELINE, INC2010 37.94 -98.26 NATURAL GAS 91089 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 40 NO
32341 SOUTHEAST SUPPLY HEADER, LLC 2010 31.86 -90.33 NATURAL GAS 239 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 108 NO
1007 KM INTERSTATE GAS TRANSMISSION CO 2010 40.49 -98.55 NATURAL GAS 2535 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 41 NO
12696 CYPRESS GAS PIPELINE COMPANY 2010 29.00 -91.00 NATURAL GAS 4101 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 2 NO
31286 ONEOK GAS TRANSPORTATION, LLC 2010 35.68 -96.95 NATURAL GAS 42800 0 0 YES NO ONSHORE 48 NO
4070 EAST TENNESSEE NATURAL GAS CO 2010 36.48 -82.55 NATURAL GAS 100 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 30 NO
4280 EL PASO NATURAL GAS CO 2010 31.92 -104.43 NATURAL GAS 9 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 30 NO
26330 ENOGEX LLC 2010 35.12 -96.20 NATURAL GAS 6 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 42 NO
19570 WILLIAMS GAS PIPELINE - TRANSCO 2010 27.51 -97.98 NATURAL GAS 4 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 65 NO
3 ACADIAN GAS PIPELINE SYSTEM 2010 29.92 -91.12 NATURAL GAS 6838 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 36 YES
13750 NORTHERN NATURAL GAS CO 2010 44.49 -93.22 NATURAL GAS 1000 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 84 NO
31728 GULF SOUTH PIPELINE COMPANY, LP 2010 29.80 -91.33 NATURAL GAS 188 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 72 NO
405 ANR PIPELINE CO 2010 29.84 -93.05 NATURAL GAS 0.01 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 36 NO
32099 ENERGY TRANSFER COMPANY 2010 29.86 -97.22 NATURAL GAS 208458 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 42 NO
13120 NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CO OF AMERICA (KMI)2010 37.00 -100.48 NATURAL GAS 1 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 30 NO
4070 EAST TENNESSEE NATURAL GAS CO 2010 35.09 -85.21 NATURAL GAS 50 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 30 NO
4070 EAST TENNESSEE NATURAL GAS CO 2010 35.11 -85.17 NATURAL GAS 50 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 30 NO
32513 AMEREN ILLINOIS COMPANY 2010 39.56 -90.65 NATURAL GAS 48299 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 24 NO
31728 GULF SOUTH PIPELINE COMPANY, LP 2010 30.98 -89.22 NATURAL GAS 24320 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 36 NO
405 ANR PIPELINE CO 2010 29.86 -93.07 NATURAL GAS 1000 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 36 NO
22655 WILLISTON BASIN INTERSTATE PIPELINE CO2010 48.52 -102.88 NATURAL GAS 5230 1 0 NO NO ONSHORE 40 NO
2564 COLORADO INTERSTATE GAS CO 2010 38.73 -102.93 NATURAL GAS 313870 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 30 NO
19160 TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE CO (EL PASO) 2010 29.53 -96.14 NATURAL GAS 69908 0 0 NO NO ONSHORE 39 NO







24 0.25 52000 API 5L OR EQUIVALENTDSAW 1952 COAL TAR RUPTURE CLASS 2 LOCATIONNO 399798 750 CORROSION FAILURE
26 0.281 60000 API - 5LX 60LONGITUDINAL ERW - HIGH FREQUENCY1967 COAL TAR R PTURE CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 974110.3 900 MATERIAL FAILURE OF PIPE OR WELD
42 1 70000 API 5L GRADE X70SAW 2007 FUSION BONDED EPOXYLEAK CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 599603.7 1200 MATERIAL FAILURE OF PIPE OR WELD
16 0.25 35000 API 5L - GRADE BOTHER 1929 COAL TAR RUPTURE CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 57002.02 720 MATERIAL FAILURE OF PIPE OR WELD
16 0.344 42000 API 5LX LONGITUDINAL ERW - UNKNOWN FREQUENCY1952 OTHER RUPTURE CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 586480.6 903 CORROSION FAILURE
26 0.25 52000 X-52 FLASH WELDED1950 COAL TAR RUPTURE CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 808915.8 600 CORROSION FAILURE
12.75 0.25 42000 API-5L LONGITUDINAL ERW - LOW FREQUENCY1953 COAL TAR LEAK CLASS 2 LOCATIONNO 127563.5 706 EXCAVATION DAMAGE
26 0.303 52000 API 5L OR EQUIVDSAW 1947 COAL TAR LEAK CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 114330.1 825 CORROSION FAILURE
8.625 0.188 42000 API 5L LONGITUDINAL ERW - HIGH FREQUENCY1981 COAL TAR LEAK CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 12332.68 827 CORROSION FAILURE
24 0.281 52000 TGTC-1A DSAW 1950 COAL TAR LEAK CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 60967.76 878 CORROSION FAILURE
12.75 0.25 42000 API 5LX LONGITUDINAL ERW - HIGH FREQUENCY1964 OTHER LEAK CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 378268.3 909 OTHER INCIDENT CAUSE
30 0.375 75000 API 5L SINGLE SAW2008 FUSION BONDED EPOXYLEAK CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 138410 1000 INCORRECT OPERATION
30 0.5 52000 API 5L FLASH WELDED1951 ASPHALT LEAK CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 365946.5 936 MATERIAL FAILURE OF PIPE OR WELD
6.625 0.28 35000 API OTHER 1955 COAL TAR LEAK CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 54329.23 1090 CORROSION FAILURE
36 0.438 60000 API 5L DSAW 1969 ASPHALT RUPTURE CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 1866432 1050 OTHER INCIDENT CAUSE
26 0.25 52000 AO SMITH SPECIFICATION #2030-COTHER 1948 COAL TAR LEAK CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 158534.5 712 MATERIAL FAILURE OF PIPE OR WELD
12.75 0.25 42000 API-5L X-42LONGITUDINAL ERW - LOW FREQUENCY1950 COMPOSITELEAK CLASS 3 LOCATIONNO 62167.54 823 MATERIAL FAILURE OF PIPE OR WELD
12.75 0.25 42000 API-5L X-42LONGITUDINAL ERW - LOW FREQUENCY1950 COMPOSITELEAK CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 64837.72 823 MATERIAL FAILURE OF PIPE OR WELD
8 0.188 35000 GRADE B LONGITUDINAL ERW - LOW FREQUENCY1966 COAL TAR MECHANICAL PUNCTURECLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 321151.9 400 EXCAVATION DAMAGE
20 0.25 46000 API-5L LONGITUDINAL ERW - LOW FREQUENCY1949 COAL TAR R PTURE CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 178704.9 550 MATERIAL FAILURE OF PIPE OR WELD
8.625 0.25 35000 API OTHER 1956 COAL TAR LEAK CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 73340.06 1090 CORROSION FAILURE
8.625 0.188 42000 API 5L LONGITUDINAL ERW - HIGH FREQUENCY1961 COAL TAR MECHANICAL PUNCTURECLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 42717.19 700 EXCAVATION DAMAGE
20 0.312 41000 API 5L OR EQUIVALENTLONGITUDINAL ERW - UNKNOWN FREQUENCY1947 COAL TAR RUPTURE CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 169221.6 920 MATERIAL FAILURE OF PIPE OR WELD
24 0.5 40000 API 5L OR EQUIVALENTOTHER 1947 COAL TAR RUPTURE CLASS 1 LOCATIONNO 678168.2 750 CORROSION FAILURE
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Figure 4-1 presents distribution of the failure sources in hazardous liquid pipelines  
during 1986-2013. Failures due to the external corrosion have received the first rank of 
the failures by frequency. Third-party failures stand in the second place followed by the 
failures due to the material and weld defect. Also, a considerable number of failures have 
been due to the internal corrosion, while equipment failures have caused the pipeline 
failure by 11%. Incorrect operations and natural forces stand after equipment failures. 
Natural forces, third party non-excavation, and operator excavation are the least likely 
causes of failure.  
 
Figure 4- 1: Distribution of Failure Sources (1986-2013) 
The risk assessment model in this research is developed mainly based on the historical 
data collected on the failures of pipes from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSAa 2014). Historical data is gathered from 1970 until now; the 
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pipelines is reported in four main reporting periods: 1) from 1970 to 1986, 2) from 1986 
to 2001, 3) from 2002 to 2009, and 4) from 2010 until now. Data on gas pipelines is 
classified based on the type of the pipes first including gas transmission and gathering in 
one classification and distribution pipes in another classification. Data on the 
Transmission and gathering pipes is reported in similar reporting periods as HL pipes, 
except the first period that expands from 1970 to 1984. Reported data in each of the 
reporting periods is different, but all includes the basic properties of pipes such as 
diameter and wall thickness. PHMSAa (2014) defines an incident on the failed pipes as an 
event that resulted in the gas leakage and met one or more of the following criteria: 
1) “A death, or personal injury necessitating in-patient hospitalization; or” 
2) “Property damage, including the product loss cost, of 50,000 USD or more”, 
3) “An event that is significant even though if it does not meet the above criteria”. 
(PHMSAa 2014). 
 The second set of data is collected on the mileage reports of the pipes in the US that 
report mileage of data in each year of the reporting period (PHMSAb 2014). Mileage data 
of pipes was reported in each year within different categories of pipe diameter, 
installation year and pre-defined classification of HL and transmission and gathering, as 
well as the distribution pipes. Failure sources are studied in this research and the ones 
with the highest contribution to the incidents are identified. The identified sources 
included External Corrosion (EC), Internal Corrosion (IC), Material and Weld defects 
(MW), Mechanical Damages (MD), Incorrect Operations (IO) and Natural Forces (NF). 
Historical environment data on the NF sources of failures are collected from the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the US Department of Commerce (NOAA 
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2015). Data on the surface temperature, soil moisture and the wind speed in the locations 
that have been subject to the natural hazard failures are extracted. Figure 4-2 shows the 
extracted mean temperature map for North America in the month of January 2011. The 
average temperature in the month that pipe has failed is collected for all of the pipes that 
have failed due to the extreme temperature causes. Related data is located from similar 
figures. 
 
Figure 4- 2: Air temperature map of North America in January 2011 (NOAA 2015) 
There is a possibility to zoom into the states of the US and locate the exact location of the 
incidents in the month of failure happening. The temperature data on the failure locations 
are obtained as a sample map is shown in Figure 4-3 that illustrates the map of Texas 
State in the month of January 2010. Figure 4-4 shows a sample data collection map of 
Texas State in the month of December 2014. Due to the importance of soil moisture on 
the failures after heavy precipitations, this factor is considered in the development of the 
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indices for natural forces failure source. Related data is collected for every pipe that has 
failed due to high precipitation. 
 
Figure 4- 3: Mean air temperature of Texas State in January 2010 (NOAA 2015) 
 
Figure 4- 4: Mean soil moisture content values for Texas State in December 2014 
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A sample wind speed map for the Texas State in the month of December 2014 is shown 
in Figure 4-5. Wind damage failures are the third source of natural force failures. Data on 
the actual wind speed is gathered in each failure location.  
 
Figure 4- 5: Wind speed map for Texas State in December 2014 
4.1 Frequency of Failure Sources versus Various Variables 
In this section, the trend of frequencies for several variables will be studied against 
failure sources. Some variables have been selected as they may affect the failures of 
pipelines. These variables include age, pipe diameter, wall thickness, Maximum 
Operating (MOP) Pressure, Specified Minimum Yield Strength (SMYS) and coating 
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type. Figure 4-6 shows how the frequency of failure sources changes in different age 
classes. From this figure, it is clear that frequency of failures due to external corrosion 
has increased by the age of pipelines. A similar trend happens to the failures due to 
internal corrosion in the first three decades of the pipelines’ lives. Apart from the first age 
class, the number of failures due to the material and weld defects has been increased. 
However, the case is different for the failures with incorrect operation and equipment 
failure sources. The increasing trend for the first four decades of the failures due to third 
party excavation is also clear from the graph. 
 
Figure 4- 6: Frequency of Failure Sources versus Age Classes (1986-2013) 
Figure 4-7 depicts the distribution of failure sources in every pipe diameter class. For 
almost the entire failure sources, diameter class between five and eleven inches is the 
most frequent diameter class. After that, pipelines with a diameter between eleven and 
seventeen have devoted more failures to themselves. Another remarkable point of this 
graph is that the excavation failures have been more effective in smaller diameter classes 
than the larger ones. Whereas, corrosion-related failures have a higher percentage in the 
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Figure 4- 7: Frequency of Failure Sources versus Diameter Classes (1986-2013) 
Figure 4-8 shows the number of failure sources in each pipe wall thickness class. As 
shown in the figure, the overall number of failures decreases with increasing the 
thickness of pipelines.  
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Figure 4-9 presents the changes in the number of failure sources with respect to the 
Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) of pipelines. Failures due to external corrosion, 
material and weld defects, and third party and operator excavation increase significantly 
with increasing the maximum allowable operating pressure of pipelines.  
 
Figure 4- 9: Frequency of Failure Sources versus Pipe Maximum Operating 
Pressure (MOP) Classes (1986-2013) 
Specified minimum yield strength also has a significant effect on the failures frequency 
as is evident from Figure 4-10. The number of failures due to internal corrosion regularly 
reduces  as the SMYS of the pipelines goes up. The last class of SMYS, which is devoted 
to the pipelines with SMYS over 55,000, has the least number of failures in the entire 
failure sources. For the external corrosion, there is not a regular trend while most frequent 
failures happen in the first class of SMYS. However, material and weld failures are 
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Figure 4- 10: Frequency of Failure Sources versus SMYS Classes (1986-2013) 
Figure 4-11 depicts the number of failures for each coating type categorized by the failure 
sources. Cold tape, coal tar, and asphalt have been assigned the largest number of failures 
in almost all of the failure sources. Polyethylene and epoxy type of coating stand in the 
second place by the number of failures. Failures due to the external corrosion decrease 
exceptionally in the pipelines with polyethylene and epoxy coatings as well as “paint”. 
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4.2 Frequency of Failures in Monetary Consequence Classes  
In this section, distributions of failures in three different monetary consequence classes 
are studied against several variables. Figure 4-12 studies the number of failures in 
monetary consequence classes versus the age of failure of pipelines. It can be seen that 
older pipelines result in higher monetary consequences. The number of failures with less 
than 10,000 US dollar consequences decrease for the first five decades of service life 
while it is increased in the last decade of study when the pipelines are older than 50 years 
old. However, except the first five years of pipeline service life the number of failures 
with consequences over 10,000 and 100,000 goes up over time.  
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Figure 4-13 shows the number of failures in each monetary consequence class of failures 
against pipes’ diameter classes. For the smallest diameter pipes, the monetary 
consequence is not huge. Failures result in similar consequence classes when the 
diameter of pipes is between five and eleven. However, the frequency of failures with 
higher consequences goes up for larger pipes while the percentage of the failures with 
small amount of consequences decreases in larger pipes. Figure 4-14 shows the frequency 
of failures in three pre-defined consequence classes versus pipe wall thickness classes. 
Overall, the number of failures with higher monetary consequences increases in pipes 
with thicker walls. The highest percentage of failures with consequences over 100,000 
US dollar happens in the pipelines with a wall thickness between 0.2 and 0.3 inches.  
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Figure 4- 14: Frequency of Wall Thickness Classes versus Monetary Consequence 
Classes (1986-2013) 
Figure 4-15 depicts the number of failures with various consequence classes in different 
classes of the maximum operating pressure of pipelines. Overall, the consequences of 
failures in pipelines with higher pressures increase. Failures with over 100,000 US dollar 
consequences have the largest percentage of failures in pipelines with pressures more 
than 950 psig. This is not true for the pipelines with operating pressure limits. For 
example in the pipelines with pressure less than 250 and between 250 and 600, the 
failures with consequences between 10,000 and 100,000 have the highest percentage. 
Figure 4-16 studies the effect of the specified minimum yield strength on the failure 
consequences. The number of failures with less monetary consequences (i.e. less than 
100,000 is decreasing when the SMYS of the pipes goes up. However, the failures result 
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Figure 4- 15:  Frequency of MOP Classes versus Monetary Consequence Classes 
(1986-2013) 
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Studies present the effect of different variables on the number of failures and their 
monetary consequences. In the model development, the impact of different variables will 
be taken into consideration when the primary variables are needed to be identified.  
4.3 Rehabilitation Cost Data 
An extensive literature review was conducted to gather the data for the development of 
the life cycle cost model of oil and gas pipelines. The data includes the pipeline the 
economic factors during the pipeline service life. Life cycle cost models also require a set 
of economic factors such as maintenance operation costs and the interest and inflation 
rates. Menon (2005) detailed the most probable cost components during the construction 
and operation phases of gas pipelines. The research also detailed typical installation cost 
of pipelines with various diameters. The annual operating costs were estimated for a 
typical gas pipeline. Baker et al. (2008) summarized high and low cost per mile estimates 
of inline inspection for gas and oil pipelines. The costs were discounted using the 
historical inflation data published on the World Bank website (World-Bank, 2013) to 
convert to 2013 US dollars. The type of inspection, pipe diameter, wall thickness, and 
pipeline accessibility may change the cost of inline inspections. Repair cost data was 
gathered from a research conducted by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 
2006). The study compared the repair and replacement cost of a 24” natural gas pipeline. 
The EPA’s research has detailed the repair and replacement costs of 6” and 24” pipeline 
defects. The assumptions and cost data used in the EPA’s research were used herein to 
estimate the cost of the different repair and replacement sizes. Table 4-2 shows the cost 
database that is used to implement the developed model. 
    121 
Table 4- 2: Cost Data for Different Types of Rehabilitation Techniques (US $) 
The costs collected from the literature were discounted using historical inflation rates. 
The uncertainty in the cost estimation was also considered herein. The calculated and 
collected costs were considered in this study as average costs. These average cost values 
Operation Type Minimum Mean Maximum 
Regular Maintenance 
Regular Maintenance 22,500 25,000 28,750 
Inspection 
Inline Inspection 3,500 4,000 4,600 
Remedial Action 
Recoating S1 180,000 200,000 230,000 
Recoating S2 324,000 360,000 414,000 
Recoating S3 576,000 640,000 736,000 
Recoating S4 630,000 700,000 805,000 
Recoating S5 648,000 720,000 828,000 
Recoating S6 720,000 800,000 920,000 
Recoating S7 900,000 1,000,000 1,150,000 
Repair 
Type B Sleeve S1 353,116 392,352 451,204 
Type B Sleeve S2 369,021 410,023 471,526 
Type B Sleeve S3 400,829 445,366 512,171 
Type B Sleeve S4 464,447 516,052 593,460 
Type B Sleeve S5 575,777 639,753 735,715 
Type B Sleeve S6 655,299 728,110 837,327 
Type B Sleeve S7 973,386 1,081,540 1,243,771 
Bolt on Clamp S1 388,428 431,587 496,325 
Bolt on Clamp S2 405,923 451,025 518,679 
Bolt on Clamp S3 440,912 489,903 563,388 
Bolt on Clamp S4 510,891 567,657 652,806 
Bolt on Clamp S5 633,355 703,728 809,287 
Bolt on Clamp S6 720,829 800,921 921,059 
Bolt on Clamp S7 1,070,725 1,189,694 1,368,148 
Replace 
Replace S1 675,000 750,000 862,500 
Replace S2 810,000 900,000 1,035,000 
Replace S3 1,440,000 1,600,000 1,840,000 
Replace S4 1,575,000 1,750,000 2,012,500 
Replace S5 1,620,000 1,800,000 2,070,000 
Replace S6 1,800,000 2,000,000 2,300,000 
Replace S7 2,250,000 2,500,000 2,875,000 
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were then multiplied, respectively, by 0.9 and 1.15 to obtain the minimum and maximum 
operation costs for a 24” gas pipeline. The interest rate is expressed using a distribution 
function based on the interest rates in the USA between the years of 1992 and 2008. The 
function follows a triangular probability distribution with the minimum at 3%, the most 
likely at 4%, and the maximum at 6%.  
 
  
    123 
CHAPTER 5: MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 
In this chapter, the methodology proposed in chapter 3 is applied to develop the model. 
Figure 5-1 shows the overall process of the model development and implementation 
process in the parts that need extensive data analysis or development. As shown, first a 
Bow-tie model is developed based on the identification of the basic events, causes of 
failures, and the after-failure events. Then, historical data is gathered from the Pipeline 
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSAa 2014) of the US department of 
transportation. Data is used to develop the risk assessment model and verify the 
validation of the developed methodology. In the probability of failure prediction model 
the identified variables are categorized, then a comprehensive index is developed that 
along with the developed equations can be used to predict the probability of failure of 
such pipelines.  
For the consequence of failure assessment model, neuro-fuzzy is used to develop several 
Fuzzy Inference Systems (FIS) to minimize the error of the final model in the estimation 
of the financial consequence of failures. The selection of the final model is based on the 
error of the developed models and sensitivity analysis. Risk level is evaluated for each 
failure source developing a fuzzy integrated risk evaluation model. Inspection planning 
model uses the results of risk assessment to select the inspection tool and determine the 
frequency of running them. Various scenarios are developed for each of which an after-
inspection risk growth profile is developed. The risk-cost index is the determining factor 
in ranking the scenarios of inspection. Rehabilitation planning model categorizes various 
rehabilitation techniques and develops different scenarios of rehabilitation considering 
possible defects’ sizes. After-rehabilitation deterioration profile is developed for each 
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scenario, and the life cycle cost is estimated using Monte-Carlo simulation. Top scenarios 
are those that are less expensive during the service life of the pipes. 
  Probability of Failure
Bow-tie model
Categorize basic events 
Contribution of basic events on six failure 
sources
Conditional probability of happening of 
after-failure events
Contribution of diameter and installation 
year to the failures
Equations to compute the probability of 
failure
Adjustment factors to convert relative 
POF to absolute POF
 Consequences of Failure
Identify and combine 
variables
Several Neuro-fuzzy networks for various 
combinations of variables and MFs
Equation to compute starting number of 
MFs
Select best Neuro-fuzzy network
  Inspection planning
Identify inspection tools and 
categorize them
Frequency and tool of inspection 
selection
Accuracy, detection capability and Risk-
reduction index
Before and after-inspection risk growth 
profile
Risk-Cost index
  Rehabilitation planning
Identify rehabilitation types Scenarios of rehabilitation
Predict required actions type and time 
Stochastic Cash flow diagram
Life cycle cost assessment and 
Rank Scenarios
 
Figure 5- 1: Model development and implementation overall process 
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5.1 Bow-Tie  
The identified variables and failure sources in the previous section are used to build the 
Bow-tie model. Fault tree is built with modifications on Dawotola et al. (2009), Yuhua 
and Datao (2005) and Shahriar et al. (2012) that is made by consulting with higher 
experts of oil and gas pipelines. Finally, the fault tree is developed, which is presented in 
Figure 5-2. The primary objective of applying the modifications to the fault tree was to 
increase the objectivity of the model by applying the available historical data on the 
failures of oil and gas pipelines.  
The basic events are aimed to be measurable and hence to increase the objectivity of the 
model in this research depending on the availability of data in the database. Six main 
failure sources are considered to be evaluated in this model. Due to the unavailability of 
data on some variables in the database of oil pipes, computer-based inspection efficiency, 
notification of One-call system and marking of the pipes are excluded from the index of 
such pipes. According to the Bow-tie model, the basic causes of the failures are presented 
in the lowest level of the tree that lead to six main failure sources, which are connected to 
the top event of the tree. External corrosion failures are identified to be affected by the 
soil corrosion and protection measures. Soil corrosion itself is affected by the soil 
properties including soil acidity (pH), soil resistivity, and redox potential of the pipe. 
Each variable is supposed to have a contribution to soil corrosion intermediate event that 
can lead to the external corrosion of the pipe.  
Protection measures are detailed into cathodic protection effectiveness and pipe coating 
types. Types of the product transporting through the pipe, inline inspection and protection 
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measures are identified to affect the Internal Corrosion failures. For material and weld 
defect sources, the seam type of pipes, Specified Minimum Yield Strength (SMYS) and 
the inspection history are identified to have a contribution on the probability of failure. 
The fourth source of failure is identified as mechanical damages leading to the failures of 
pipes. The identified basic causes are identified as the location class, existence of 
computer-based inspection system (SCADA or CPM), existence of highly populated area, 
One-call center being notified before excavation and the accurate marking of the pipes. 
For incorrect operations, the identified variables are SCADA or CPM efficiency, 
qualification of the operator performing the task, operating pressure, and location of the 
pipes.  
Natural forces are identified to happen as a result of heavy rains, extreme temperatures, 
and high winds. Consequently, temperature, precipitation and wind speed are identified to 
affect such failures. Heavy rain or precipitation is measured through the soil moisture in 
the locations that such failures have happened according to the historical database. In the 
next step, the major hazards that were identified in the previous section are used to 
develop the event tree. The event tree model is adopted from Parvizsedghy and Zayed 
(2015b). Figure 5-3 presents the event tree, which presents the after-failure events. The 
center of the tree is the critical event of a pipeline failure that leads to the post-failure 
events containing the explosion, ignition, and leakages. Puncture, leakage, and rupture 
are three pre-failure events that cause the release of oil or gas in pipelines. Puncture is 
considered to be a medium size defect on the pipe, and pinhole represents small size 
defects leading to leakages. A rupture is a large size defect when the pipe is not 
serviceable anymore.  























































































































* CP: Cathodic protection
** SMYS: Specified Minimum Yield Strength
*** HPA: Highly Populated Area
**** CBI: Computer-Based Inspection
Note that for oil pipes under Mechanical Damages D4, 
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Figure 5- 2: Bow-Tie model (Fault tree part) 




















































Figure 5- 3: Event tree part of Bow-tie model 
5.2 Probability of Failure Prediction Model 
The analysis starts after the development of the Bow-tie model. First, the identified variables or 
basic causes are categorized according to their characteristics. For quantitative variables such as 
the causes leading to soil corrosion, first the best PDF that fits the historical data of the failed 
pipes for each variable is determined. Then, the 99% confidence interval is divided into various 
categories. Different numbers of categories are tested to find the best number of categories that 
suits the variable. This is due to the existence of the missing data and errors that exist in the 
database and for some of the variables there is not enough data. Figure 5-4 shows the probability 
distribution function corresponding to the historical data related to the basic causes of soil 
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corrosion for pipes that have failed due to the external corrosion. Part “A”, “B”, and “C” of the 
figure present the PDF related to the soil acidity (i.e. pH), Soil Resistivity (SR), and Redox 
Potential (RP). As shown, the 99% range of soil pH falls within zero to twelve, SR within zero to 







Figure 5- 4: PDFs associated with A: pH, B: SR, and C: RP historical data 
For coating type and some other basic causes that are qualitative, the installation year of the 
pipes that exist in the database is used to determine the categories. Consequently, as shown in 
Table 5-1 coating type is categorized into 4 clusters. The first cluster belongs to the pipes with 
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coal tar, asphalt, and paint coatings. Calculated values for each category of the basic causes are 
used to determine the best PDF that fits the contribution of that basic cause to the failure of the 
pipe. This process is performed applying @Risk 6 software. This process is repeated for each 
category of the basic causes, and the best PDFs are selected to represent the contribution of each 
category of the variables to the failure of pipes. The calculated amounts and PDFs are used to 
compute the relative probability of failures for each pipe in a particular environment and with 
specific properties.  
Table 5- 1: Coating types categories 
Category Average year of Installation Coating Types 
1 1954 Coal Tar, Asphalt, Paint 
2 1970 Cold Applied Tape, Composite 
3 1998 
Field Applied Epoxy, Fusion Bonded Epoxy, 
Extruded Polyethylene 
4 1950 None 
5.2.1 Data Analysis and Model Implementation 
The steps of the probability of failure development model are followed to produce a 
comprehensive index to forecast the probability of failure of pipes specific to their properties. 
Phase 1: Developing Bow-Tie Model 
The fault tree and the event tree that was developed in the previous section build the Bow-tie 
model that is used to develop the POF prediction index. 
Phase 2: Data Analysis of the Fault-Tree 
Data analysis follows the model development process for the analysis of the fault tree part of the 
Bow-tie model, which results in an index to compute the probability of failure for oil and gas 
pipes. First, all of the variables or the basic causes are categorized. Categories of the variables 
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contributing to the identified failure sources are shown in Table 5-2. As shown, the soil 
resistivity is categorized into five categories. Soil acidity is categorized into three categories: 1) 
Acidic soils that have a pH less than four, 2) Neutral soil that have pH between four and eight, 
and 3) Alcaic soils, which have a pH above eight. In addition, the soil around pipes is 
categorized from the point of view of the Redox Potential (RP). Low RP belongs to those soils 
which have RP less than 50 ohm.cm, high RPs belong to the soils with an RP over 100. As for 
the protection measures under external corrosion, there are two basic events, coating types and 
cathodic protection. Coating types is categorized in four categories as was explained before. 
Cathodic protection effectiveness is categorized into four categories increasing the efficiency 
from one to four. The highest efficiency belongs to the pipes with cathodic protection from 
beginning of the installation of the pipes and inspecting its efficiency frequently. As for the 
internal corrosion, the internal inspection is categorized into three categories representing the 
inspection frequency of the pipes. Internal protection is another basic cause contributing to such 
failures, which is categorized into three categories: 1) No-protection, 2) Inhibitor application 
only, and 3) Inhibitor application plus applying dewatering cleaning or lining. Material and weld 
defect failures are affected by three basic causes, namely Specified Minimum Yield Strength 
(SMYS) of the pipes, inspection frequency, and seam types. All basic causes are clustered into 
three categories. The seam types include High Frequency-Electric Resistance Welded Pipes (HF-
ERW), Low Frequency-Electric Resistance Welded Pipes (LF-ERW), and other types.  
Mechanical damages are affected by six basic causes, Depth of Cover (DOC), location class, 
high-populated area, one call system, and being accurately marked. The depth of cover is 
categorized into four categories: 1) less than 6 centimeters, 2) between 6 and 36, 3) between 36 
and 66, and 4) over 66 centimeters. For the location class, there are two categories those pipes 
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that are in location class one and two, and those that are located in classes three and four. 
Being/not being in a high populated area, notifying/not notifying the one call system and 
being/not being marked accurately are the other affecting factors to measure the POF with 
respect to the mechanical damages for gas pipes.  The mechanical damages for oil pipes are 
affected by DOC, location condition, and being in a highly populated area. The changes of the 
basic causes are due to the unavailability of the data on location class, one call system 
notification, and being/not accurately marked. The depth of Cover is categorized into five 
categories the first four of which is similar to those of gas pipes plus one for the category of 
pipes with a cover of over 96 centimeters. Operator property and right of way (ROW) are the two 
categories of the location conditions. Being in a highly populated area or not is the last factor 
determining the POF with respect to the mechanical damages for oil pipes.  
For the incorrect operations, there are three basic causes to consider: 1) Computer Monitoring 
System (CMS) efficiency, 2) Qualification of Operator, 3) Qualification of Operator, and 4) 
location of pipe. CMS is measured from one to three in terms of efficiency. The qualification of 
the operator that is performing an operation on a site affects the POF as shown. A low operating 
pressure versus a high operating pressure is a determining factor in computing the POF. Finally, 
being buried underground or above-ground is another cause of the failures with respect to the 
incorrect operations. For natural force damages, there are three main basic causes that determine 
the POF. Precipitation causes high soil moisture that leads to the movement of the pipe and 
failure. Soil moisture is categorized into three categories including the pipes within the soils with 
less than 250 kg/m
2
, between 250 and 400 kg/m
2
, and over 400 kg/m2. Extreme temperatures, 
especially in the coldest months of the year (i.e. December to February), is considered in four 
categories, temperatures of less than -4 belongs to the first category.  
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Acidity 0-4 4-8 >8 - - 














Cathodic protection 1 2 3 4 - 
Internal Corrosion 
Product type Crude Oil HVL Non-HVL Gas - 
Inline Inspection No-inspection 1 year 2-5 years - - 









>65,000 - - 
Inspection 0-1 year 2-5 years >5 years - - 
Seam types HF-ERW LF-ERW Other - - 
Mechanical damages 
(Gas) 
Depth of cover <=6 6-36 36-66 >66   
Location class 1,2 3,4 - - - 
Computer-based 
inspection 
Yes No - - - 
Highly populated 
area 
Yes No - - - 
One call Yes No - - - 
Accurately marked Yes No - - - 
Mechanical damages (Oil) 







ROW - - - 
Highly populated 
area 
Yes No - - - 
Incorrect Operation 
CMS efficiency 1 2 3 - - 
Qualification of 
Operator 
Yes No - - - 
Operating pressure High Low - - - 
Location of Pipe Under-ground 
Above-
ground 




<=250 250-400 >=400 - - 
Extreme 
Temperature (˚C) 




Wind (m/s) Less than 4 4-5 Over 5 - - 
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A probability distribution function is assigned to each category of each variable that determines 
the contribution of the category of that variable to the failure of the pipes. Table 5-3 provides the 
parameters of the PDFs selected for the contribution of the identified basic causes to the EC 
failures. For each category, the function and its parameters are defined in the table. The 
distribution functions, as well as their parameters, are defined for each category of each basic 
cause.  
There are two parameters for the distribution functions of Normal, Lognorm, and Laplace, 
namely mean value, and the standard deviation. The two defined parameters of Gamma, 
ExtValue, ExtValueMin, Weibul, and Logistic functions are alpha and beta. The LogLogistic 
distribution function is defined by three parameters, gamma, alpha, and beta. The exponential 
distribution function is defined by its beta parameter, while the Uniform PDF is defined through 
the minimum and maximum of the boundary.   
There is a meaningful difference between the contributions of the various categories of each 
cause with respect to the mean values of the PDFs. Under the external corrosion failures for the 
soil resistivity, the highest contribution belongs to the first category that includes those pipes 
buried in soils with less than 967 ohm.cm of resistivity. The failure probability decreases 
considerably while the resistivity increases, and it is the lowest when the resistivity is larger than 
4,000.  
For the acidity of the soil, it is understood that the pipes within soils with pH lower than four 
have the highest probability of failure while the neutral soils deteriorate with the lowest rate. The 
POF with respect to external corrosion is the highest for those pipes buried in the soils with a 
redox potential of less than 50, and it is the lowest when the redox potential is over 150. There 
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are two basic causes under the protection measures, coating types, and cathodic protection. The 
first category of pipes with respect to the coating type, that are coated with coal tar, asphalt, or 
paint has highest probability of failure, while the pipes with a field applied epoxy, fusion bonded 
epoxy, or polyethylene have the lowest rate of failure probability. The POF with respect to the 
external corrosion failures decrease significantly when the cathodic protection efficiency 
increases. Similar tables are developed for all of the failure sources as are shown in Tables A-1, 
A-2 and A-3 from the Appendix A.  
Table 5- 3: Contribution of the identified basic causes to the EC failures 














Function lognorm  Gamma  Exponen  LogLogistic  Logistic 
parameter #1       0.047         7.358             0.006           (0.005)     0.00  
parameter #2       0.016         0.002             0.001               0.01      0.00  
parameter #3     (0.002)      (0.003)  -               6.31  - 
Acidity 
Function lognorm lognorm ExtValueMin NA NA 
parameter #1 0.020338 0.014815 0.025600 - - 
parameter #2 0.021296 0.009634 0.011000 - - 
parameter #3 0.013200 0.000357 - - - 
Redox 
potential 
Function Normal  Logistic  Logistic  NA  NA 
parameter #1       0.058         0.005             0.002   -   -  
parameter #2       0.018         0.003             0.002   -   -  














Function Normal  Lognorm  Normal  Lognorm  NA 
parameter #1       0.095         0.038             0.024             0.040   -  
parameter #2       0.063         0.017             0.019               0.06   -  
parameter #3  -       (0.008)                0.01  - 
Cathodic 
protection 
Function Logistic Normal ExtvalueMin Normal  
parameter #1 0.052934 0.030864 0.028509 0.0042735  
parameter #2 0.013759 0.01322 0.0048658 0.0032051  
parameter #3 - - - -  
 
Similarly, the contribution of the diameter categories of pipes with respect to each failure source 
is computed. Table 5-4 demonstrates the contribution of the pipe diameter categories to the EC, 
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IC and MW failure sources. Table A-4 in Appendix A shows the contribution of diameter classes 
to the MD, IO, and NF failure sources. Pipe diameter is categorized in five distinctive sizes 
including, pipes under 4”, between 4 and 10”, between 10 and 20”, between 20and 28” and 
larger than 28”. As shown, the smaller oil pipes are more susceptible to external corrosion 
failures, while the larger oil pipes are less likely to fail as a result of the external corrosion 
failures. However, there is not a considerable difference between the contributions of the 
diameter to the external corrosion for gas pipes. For internal corrosion failures, the contribution 
of the diameter category of less than 4” and between 20 and 28” is almost the same. The pipes 
between 4 and 10” are less likely to fail. However, the case is different for the gas pipes. These 
pipes are the most likely to fail as a result of an internal corrosion when their size is between 4 
and 10 inches. The rate of failure constantly decreases by increasing the size of the pipes while it 
is the lowest for the pipes of larger than 28 inches. The material and weld defect failures are the 
most common among the pipes larger than 20” and smaller than 28”, on the other hand the 
smallest category of oil pipes are the least likely to fail due to the material and weld defects.  
The available data on the Installation year of pipes were studied, and it is categorized into four 
technologically distinctive eras of installation. The categories of pipe installation years include 
those installed before 1950, between 1950 and 1970, between 1970 and 1990 and after 1990. 
Finally, contribution coefficients of the installation year categories for all failure sources are 
computed and shown in Table 5-5. In most of the failure sources, the older pipes show a larger 
contribution to the failure. However, in the oil pipes with respect to the internal corrosion 
failures there is not a significant difference between various categories of installation years in the 
POF. The material and weld defects for oil pipes between 1950 and 1970 is another exception, 
which shows a smaller coefficient compared to the pipes installed before 1950.  
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Table 5- 4: Contribution of the pipe diameter categories on EC, IC and MW failure sources 
















Function Extvalue Extvalue Expon Normal NA 
parameter #1 0.00090378 0.00010944 0.00005038 0.00007228 - 
parameter #2 0.00041641 0.00003680 0.00004868 0.00005193 - 
Gas 
Function Logistic Extvalue Weibull Lognorm Logistic 
parameter #1 0.00001572 0.00001211 1.70230000 0.00007314 0.00001170 
parameter #2 0.00001748 0.00001215 0.00004652 0.00003177 0.00001074 















Function Normal Lognorm Laplace Lognorm Normal 
parameter #1 0.00018736 0.00021320 0.00013712 0.00030310 0.00010740 
parameter #2 0.00011963 0.00004484 0.00004276 0.00018332 0.00010291 
parameter #3 - 
-
0.00012909 
- -0.00010834 - 
Gas 
Function Normal Logistic Normal Logistic Logistic 
parameter #1 0.00001007 0.00001994 0.00002885 0.00001379 0.00000822 















Function NA Extvalue Normal Normal Normal 
parameter #1 - 0.00004411 0.00008870 0.00014256 0.00007326 
parameter #2 - 0.00001730 0.00005287 0.00008560 0.00010340 
Gas 
Function Logistic Logistic Lognorm Normal Uniform 
parameter #1 0.00003525 0.00001007 0.00003993 0.00006610 
-
0.00000711 
parameter #2 0.00002077 0.00000685 0.00002761 0.00004397 0.00008533 
parameter #3 - - -0.00000947 - - 
Table 5- 5: Contribution coefficients of the installation year categories all failure sources 
Failure source Before 1950 1950-1970 1970-1990 1990-2013 
EC 
Oil                5.4577              2.8698              1.8178              1.0000  
Gas                9.6251              7.1401              2.1142              1.0000  
IC 
Oil                1.8603              1.0000              1.7547              1.8267  
Gas                6.6121              3.7375              3.8713              1.0000  
MW 
Oil                3.5380              6.3275              1.8464              1.0000  
Gas                2.6298              1.8082              1.1449              1.0000  
MD 
Oil                1.4747              1.7553              1.0234              1.0000  
Gas                3.0690              1.1025              1.0000              1.1685  
IO 
Oil                                         1.7935              1.0000              1.2916  
Gas                2.1250              1.5000              1.2500              1.0000  
NF 
Oil                8.1778              1.0000              1.3723              7.0405  
Gas                6.4697              1.2466              3.8755              1.0000  
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The adjustment factor for each category of diameter is computed as shown in Table 5-6. These 
factors convert the relative probability of failure to the absolute probability of failure for such 
pipes. The calculated factors of adjustment vary between approximately 20 and 180. The relative 
probability of failure that can be computed based on the contribution of the basic causes will be 
combined with the effect of the pipe diameter and installation year. Using Equations 3.8~3.11, 
the absolute probability of failure with respect to each failure source is calculated. The provided 
indices can be used for the calculation of the fault tree part of the model. Then, it is required to 
compute the probability of happening of each after-failure event to calculate the probability of 
happening of each failure scenario. 
Table 5- 6: Diameter-based adjustment factors for all failure sources 
Failure source <=4" 4"-10" 10"-20" 20"-28" Over 28" 
EC 
Oil 52.820 35.013 62.825 52.272 
Gas 117.898 63.874 60.163 60.325 143.380 
IC 
Oil 114.080 114.059 119.069 112.287 114.082 
Gas 103.808 77.979 22.950 84.664 76.165 
MW 
Oil 82.161 82.667 82.668 82.667 
Gas 94.462 111.118 74.094 62.968 55.923 
MD 
Oil 67.481 67.481 67.481 111.649 137.669 
Gas 186.530 100.114 114.958 129.009 252.126 
IO 
Oil 23.803 21.423 21.423 21.423 
Gas 46.695 
NF 
Oil 120.951 9.584 20.468 24.479 
Gas 19.315 
Phase 3: Data Analysis of the Event Tree 
The process that was explained in the research methodology is applied to develop two indices on 
the event tree part of the model. The index presents the probability of happening of each hole 
size including pinhole, puncture, and rupture, in case any of the failure sources happens. It also 
demonstrates the probability of happening of each ignition type, in case of happening of each 
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type of the hole size. Table 5-7 shows the indices for all failure sources that are developed based 
on the historical data on oil pipes. As shown, the probability of happening of only a leakage is 
much higher than the explosion or ignition for all failure sources and hole sizes. Overall, for oil 
pipes the likelihood of happening of a pinhole is greater than all other hole sizes.  
For external corrosion failures, the probability of happening of a puncture-size defect follows 
that of the pinhole-size one. The likelihood of happening of an ignition or explosion increases by 
growing the hole size. A similar result can be drawn for internal corrosion failures, with a higher 
probability of happening of a small hole size. For material and weld defects, the probability of 
happening of a pinhole is lower than a corrosion defect. Besides, the probability of happening of 
a rupture is higher than that of a puncture. Overall, around five to seven percent of the ruptures 
cause an ignition or explosion. For the mechanical damages, the probability of happening of 
puncture grows significantly while a pinhole is still the most likely hole size to happen. Also, 
such failures are more likely to cause an explosion or ignition. The probability of happening of a 
pinhole for incorrect operations is still much higher than a puncture and rupture. However, the 
punctures are more likely to happen in comparison with ruptures. Also, there is a small higher 
likelihood of ignition in such failures.  Natural forces are different from the other failure sources. 
The probability of happening of a rupture is higher than a pinhole for such failures. Punctures are 
the least likely hole sizes to happen in the failures stemming from the natural forces. Table A-5 
shows similar indices for gas pipes. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the developed 
indices for gas pipes. Overall, the probability of happening of an ignition or explosion is higher 
for gas pipes compared to oil pipes and the likelihood of growing a defect to a puncture or 
rupture is greater than those assigned to gas pipes. 
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Table 5- 7: Indices related to probability of after-failure events for oil pipes 
Failure source (S) Hole size (H) P(H│S ) Ignition type (Ign) P(Ign│H ) 
EC 
Pinhole            0.800633  
Leakage only 0.998814 
Ignition  0.000791 
Explosion 0.000395 
Puncture            0.129747  
Leakage only 0.951220 
Ignition  0.024390 
Explosion 0.024390 
Rupture            0.069620  
Leakage only 0.863636 
Ignition  0.090909 
Explosion 0.045455 
IC 
Pinhole            0.844869  
Leakage only 0.998870 
Ignition  0.000565 
Explosion 0.000565 
Puncture            0.109785  
Leakage only 0.991304 
Ignition  0.004348 
Explosion 0.004348 
Rupture            0.045346  
Leakage only 0.831579 
Ignition  0.110526 
Explosion 0.057895 
MW 
Pinhole            0.722561  
Leakage only 0.966245 
Ignition  0.025316 
Explosion 0.008439 
Puncture            0.106707  
Leakage only 0.988571 
Ignition  0.005714 
Explosion 0.005714 
Rupture            0.170732  
Leakage only 0.875000 
Ignition  0.071429 
Explosion 0.053571 
MD 
Pinhole            0.540230  
Leakage only 0.962234 
Ignition  0.026596 
Explosion 0.011170 
Puncture            0.321839  
Leakage only 0.928571 
Ignition  0.044643 
Explosion 0.026786 
Rupture            0.137931  
Leakage only 0.910417 
Ignition  0.085417 
Explosion 0.004167 
IO 
Pinhole            0.676471  
Leakage only 0.954348 
Ignition  0.044203 
Explosion 0.001449 
Puncture            0.245098  
Leakage only 0.898000 
Ignition  0.100000 
Explosion 0.002000 
Rupture            0.078431  
Leakage only 0.743750 
Ignition  0.187500 
Explosion 0.068750 
NF 
Pinhole            0.424460  
Leakage only 0.977966 
Ignition  0.018644 
Explosion 0.003390 
Puncture            0.143885  
Leakage only 0.890000 
Ignition  0.055000 
Explosion 0.055000 
Rupture            0.431655  
Leakage only 0.948333 
Ignition  0.033333 
Explosion 0.018333 
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The application of the developed indices to calculate the probability of failure would be through 
several steps: 1) To find out which category of each basic cause the pipe under study belongs to 
according to Table 5-2, 2) to locate the category of the basic causes and related distribution 
functions for EC failures from Table 5-3, for IC and MW failure from Table A-1, MD failures 
from Table A-2, and IO and NF failures from Table A-3; 3) to calculate the relative probability 
of failure of the pipe without the effect of the pipe diameter and installation year using Equations 
3.8 and 3.9; 4) to locate the PDF related to the contribution of pipe diameter category, 
installation year and adjustment factor from corresponding tables and compute the absolute 
probability of failure using Equations 3.10 and 3.11. The probability of happening of each failure 
scenario can be calculated through the following steps. To locate the likelihood of happening of 
various hole sizes and ignition, as well as the explosion from Table 5-7, and A-4. Compute the 
likelihood of after-failure events applying Equations 3.5~3.7. 
5.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is performed to study and verify the sensitivity of the probability of failure to 
the basic causes and properties of the pipes using developed indices. For this purpose, in each 
failure source, all except one of the variables are kept fixed, the value of one variable is changed, 
and this is repeated for all variables. For example, to conduct the study on external corrosion, a 
fixed category is assumed for each variable. Then, each variable’s category is changed one 
category each time, and the probability of failure is computed. The calculated values are plotted 
for each variable as shown in Figure 5-5. The changes of the output are studied versus the 
changes of the categories of the basic causes and the properties of pipes. For soil resistivity, the 
pipes buried in the soils with 0 to 967 ohm-cm are the most likely to fail, and the failure 
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probability decreases by increasing the value of this variable. The failure probability grows again 
when the soil resistivity is higher than 2,900.  
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The probability of external corrosion failure is not as sensitive to the changes of soil acidity 
compared to soil resistivity; nevertheless, the values are forecasted to be higher for acidic soils 
and lower for neutral soils. The amounts for Alcaic soils are lower than those of the acidic ones 
yet greater than neutral soil types. The estimated probability of failure for soils with lower than 
50 m-volt redox potential is the highest while it reduces by increasing the values of redox 
potential. The value of failure probability with respect to coating types is the lowest when the 
pipe is coated with Field Applied Epoxy, Fusion Bonded Epoxy, and Extruded Polyethylene; 
while it is the highest when coated with Coal Tar, Asphalt, and Paint. Similar values are 
calculated when the pipes are not coated. For Cathodic Protection efficiency, it is observed that 
the value of failure probability is higher with no/lower protection while it is lower with more 
efficient protections. The sensitivity of the probability of failure with respect to all causes in all 
of the failure sources proves the efficiency of the developed model and verifies the soundness of 
the model.  
5.2.3 Validation of the Developed Model 
The historical data on of 2014 and the first half of 2015 is collected to validate the developed 
model. The data includes the failure data and mileage reports. Due to the inexistence of a 
trackable ID for the pipes, the operators of the pipes that have reported pipe failure during this 
period are tracked. For each operator, the predicted probability of failure is calculated. Moreover, 
the actual probability of failure is calculated by dividing the number of failures of each operator 
by their reported mileage in this period. The predicted amounts are compared with the actual 
values, and the error measuring methods are used to calculate the accuracy indices. A smaller 
value of RMSE proves the efficiency of the developed model that is calculated to be 2.44E-5. A 
closer value to 100% with respect to the average validity percentage (AVP) is considered to 
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prove the prediction respectively. AVP is computed to be around 80.1% in this model that is 
satisfactory. For further analysis, the forecasted values of probability of failure are plotted 
against the actual values and as shown in Figure 5-6. The calculated actual and predicted 
amounts are very close, and the results are satisfactory. However, in the larger values of failure 
probability there is a larger discrepancy between the actual and forecasted values. Figure 5-7 is 
also plotted to show the correlation between the actual and predicted values of failure 
probability. As shown, there is a high correlation between the values with a coefficient of 
determination of 0.92 that proves the efficiency of the model. 
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Figure 5- 7: Actual versus Predicted POF in the testing dataset 
5.3 Consequences of Failure Prediction Model 
In this section, model implementation process and results are explained. The Bow-tie model that 
was developed in the previous model as shown in Figure 5-1 and 5-2 are used to identify the 
possible failure scenarios. Financial consequence of oil and gas pipelines includes so many 
parameters and is very complicated to be estimated. Consequently, the forecast of actual value 
would not be possible, while the estimation of its level in the scale of one to eleven will not be 
far from expectation. In this research, the financial damages of the failed pipelines are translated 
to the levels of the financial consequences as shown in Table 5-8. According to this table, if the 
consequence of a pipe is in the range of zero to 10,000 US dollars, its consequence level is 
considered as one. The highest level of the consequence is found for the pipes that have 
produced over ten million U.S. dollars, which is coded as the eleventh level.  
y = 0.9727x + 1E-08 






















Actual versus Predicted POF in the testing dataset 
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As explained before, several parameters should be determined, such as the training mode, which 
can be hybrid or back-propagation. The hybrid method of training combines the least squares 
method with back-propagation. The efficiency of the training is checked against the checking 
dataset in several data-points called epochs. As mentioned in the literature review, the error of 
the model trained by Neural Networks and Neuro-Fuzzy systems increases at some points as a 
result of over-fitting. The system checks the accuracy of the trained network in the checking 
dataset at each epoch and whenever the error starts increasing, the training process stops. 
Continuing the training may not help the learning task and generalization capability of the 
system. A sample entry data that is embedded in the Neuro-fuzzy learning machine is shown in 
Table 5-9. Location category and failure scenario is computed according to the instructions and 
the values of SMYS, diameter, operating pressure, and wall thickness of the pipe is inserted as 
their actual values.  










0 10 1 
10 25 2 
25 50 3 
50 100 4 
100 250 5 
250 500 6 
500 1,000 7 
1,000 2,500 8 
2,500 5,000 9 
5,000 10,000 10 
10,000 Infinity 11 
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Table 5- 9: Sample entry data 
LC FS SMYS DI MAOP WT 
Consequence 
level 
1,110 1,110 52,000 26 809 0.28 4 
1,110 1,130 45,000 14 1000 0.31 8 
2,010 1,110 60,000 12 1440 0.31 5 
3,110 1,130 60,000 24 900 0.25 6 
1,110 1,330 52,000 16 832 0.22 8 
4,110 1,110 42,000 12 780 0.31 3 
1,110 1,330 60,000 36 800 0.34 10 
1,310 1,110 24,000 8 400 0.19 5 
1,110 1,130 46,000 16 1002 0.25 3 
Due to the limitation of the number of data-points, a large number of membership functions 
could not be used for developing the model. Consequently, the number of modifiable parameters 
was calculated from Equation 3.3 that is explained in the research methodology section, for a 
combination of four input variables with a trapezoidal or triangular membership function type. 
There were 650 data-points in the whole database, which should have been larger than the 
number of modifiable parameters. Consequently, three is the maximum number of the 
membership functions for each variable. The number of membership functions (MF) in the 
optimum model can be changed within the range of three plus/minus one MF for the 
combination of the variables. As a result, if one variable uses four MFs, another variable might 
use two MFs.  
Various combinations of the input variables are tested in the system, and results are recorded. 
The number of membership functions, as well as their types, is changed in different trials, and 
the results are recorded as shown in Table 5-10. The triangular and trapezoidal MFs were the 
only ones in this research that led to acceptable outcomes. In each trial, the error in various 
datasets and surface view is checked. Surface view checking is a preliminary sensitivity analysis 
of the produced network.  
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No. of Membership Functions Error 
1 Trapezoidal 3 3 3 3 NA 3 1.61 1.74 1.80 1.66 Yes 
2 Trapezoidal 3 3 5 3 NA 3 1.55 6.08 1.71 2.25 No 
3 Trapezoidal 3 3 4 3 NA 3 1.61 1.74 1.72 1.65 Yes 
4 Trapezoidal 3 3 3 3 NA 4 1.59 1.78 1.75 1.64 No 
5 Triangular 3 3 3 3 NA 3 1.51 1.82 1.90 1.62 Yes 
6 Triangular 3 3 4 3 NA 3 1.51 1.82 1.94 1.62 Yes 
7 Triangular 3 4 3 3 NA 3 1.46 1.76 2.17 1.61 No 
8 Triangular 3 3 3 4 NA 3 1.47 1.83 1.94 1.59 No 
9 Triangular 3 3 3 3 NA 4 1.50 1.81 1.87 1.60 Yes 
10 Triangular 2 3 3 3 NA 3 1.53 1.82 1.73 1.60 Yes 
11 Trapezoidal 3 3 3 3 NA NA 1.69 1.75 1.74 1.71 No 
12 Trapezoidal 3 3 3 4 NA NA 1.69 1.73 1.74 1.70 Yes 
13 Trapezoidal 4 3 3 3 NA NA 1.69 1.73 1.75 1.71 No 
14 Trapezoidal 3 4 3 3 NA NA 1.67 1.83 1.76 1.71 No 
15 Trapezoidal 3 3 4 3 NA NA 1.69 1.75 1.80 1.72 No 
16 Trapezoidal 2 3 3 4 NA NA 1.70 1.80 1.74 1.72 Yes 
17 Triangular 3 3 3 3 NA NA 1.62 1.75 6.70 2.40 Yes 
18 Triangular 3 3 3 4 NA NA 1.62 1.75 6.80 2.42 Yes 
19 Triangular 3 3 4 3 NA NA 1.61 1.74 1.80 1.66 No 
20 Triangular 3 4 3 3 NA NA 1.60 1.86 1.75 1.66 No 
21 Triangular 4 3 3 3 NA NA 1.62 1.81 6.90 2.44 No 
22 Trapezoidal 3 3 3 NA 3 NA 1.55 1.58 2.01 1.62 Yes 
23 Trapezoidal 3 3 4 NA 3 NA 1.52 1.60 2.04 1.61 Yes 
24 Trapezoidal 3 4 3 NA 3 NA 1.54 1.63 3.60 1.86 No 
25 Trapezoidal 4 3 3 NA 3 NA 1.55 1.61 1.98 1.62 Yes 
26 Trapezoidal 2 3 4 NA 3 NA 1.52 1.54 2.01 1.60 Yes 
27 Triangular 3 3 3 NA 3 NA 1.56 2.00 2.20 1.72 No 
28 Triangular 3 3 4 NA 3 NA 1.51 1.63 1.96 1.60 No 
29 Triangular 2 3 4 NA 3 NA 1.56 1.62 1.90 1.62 No 
30 Triangular 3 3 3 NA 4 NA 1.52 4.00 4.10 2.28 No 
31 Triangular 3 3 3 NA 4 NA 1.72 1.70 1.80 1.73 No 
32 Trapezoidal 3 3 3 3 3 NA 1.64 1.97 1.71 1.70 No 
33 Trapezoidal 3 3 4 3 3 NA 1.63 1.97 1.71 1.69 Yes 
34 Trapezoidal 3 3 3 3 4 NA 1.61 1.79 1.68 1.65 No 
35 Triangular 3 3 3 3 3 NA 1.53 1.86 1.93 1.64 Yes 
36 Triangular 3 3 4 3 3 NA 1.53 1.87 1.93 1.64 Yes 
37 Triangular 3 3 3 3 4 NA 1.53 1.86 1.89 1.63 No 
38 Triangular 3 3 3 4 3 NA 1.46 2.01 2.08 1.64 Yes 
39 Triangular 2 3 4 3 3 NA 1.58 1.82 1.76 1.64 Yes 
40 Triangular 3 4 3 3 3 NA 1.49 2.10 1.64 1.60 Yes 
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The models that result in negative outcomes or outcomes that are not in the range of one to 
eleven that is the range of outcomes in this model, the surface view of that network is deemed 
not acceptable. Also, if the change of one or more of the variables does not affect the changes in 
the outcome of the project, the surface view is again deemed not acceptable. The performance of 
each network is compared with the others to select the best combination and optimize the 
variable selection. More than 200 various networks are tested and the ones that resulted in 
legitimate outcomes are reported. Finally, the neuro-fuzzy model with the lowest error is 
selected, which is numbered 26. The selected network produces the least average error, and its 
surface view is also acceptable. The model considers the location category, failure scenario, 
SMYS, and diameter of the pipe to forecast the failure consequence level of the pipes. The error 
of each network that is produced in this research is calculated by comparing the estimated 
outputs with the actual data. Mean square error (MSE) is computed using Equation 3.18. MSE is 
used to measure the mean squares of errors in each dataset. Comparing the MSE values leads to 
the identification of the models with the smallest error. The error is measured by embedding the 
testing dataset in the produced model. The architecture of the final model is presented in Figure 
5-8. The model includes four inputs, one output, and the final model includes 72 fuzzy if-then 
rules. The output will be in the range of one to eleven.  
 























If input.1 is 
mf2,… 
then output 
is mf.724 input 
variables + 
one output 72 
rules
72 MF.
    150 
The selected model uses two, three, four and three membership functions for the location 
category, failure scenario, SMYS and diameter of the pipe variables as shown in Figure 5-9. 
Location class is determined by two trapezoidal membership functions, which mainly indicate 
the onshore and offshore pipes. Three membership functions are allocated to the failure 
scenarios. Pipe diameter is presented with three membership functions entitled: small, medium to 
large, and very large. Finally, the SMYS of the pipes are fuzzified with four membership 
functions showing the strength of the pipes. The four membership functions are titled: very weak 
material, weak material, medium material and strong material. The location is clustered into low-
consequence and high consequence locations. The failure scenario is also categorized into Time 
dependent failure sources; Time independent failure sources; and Stable failure sources.  
 
Figure 5- 9: Membership function generated for input variables 
LC- locations: Low consequence locations; HC-locations: High consequence locations 
TD: Time-dependent failure sources; TID: Time-independent failure sources; ST: Stable failure sources 
S: Small pipes; M-L: Medium to large pipes; VL: Very large pipes 
VWM: Very weak material; WM: Weak material; MM: Medium material; SM: Strong material 
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A random selection of the generated outputs versus the input variables is presented in Table 5-
11. There is a low difference between the actual and predicted values especially in lower 
financial consequences.  
Table 5- 11: Sample of predicted data 





1 1,110 2,110 30 60,000 7 6.0 
2 1,110 4,130 4 42,000 3 4.5 
3 1,110 4,110 2 35,000 4 4.7 
4 2,010 2,320 16 52,000 7 5.4 
5 1,110 4,110 4 42,000 4 4.5 
6 2,010 2,110 10 46,000 5 4.8 
7 1,310 4,110 10 49,000 5 4.5 
8 1,210 1,110 13 52,000 7 4.9 
9 2,010 2,110 12 52,000 4 4.9 
10 2,010 4,130 10 42,000 9 7.0 
11 1,110 3,110 26 52,000 5 5.4 
12 2,010 2,110 2 35,000 5 5.5 
13 1,110 1,130 4 24,000 4 3.5 
14 1,310 6,130 10 35,000 6 4.1 
15 1,110 4,110 8 24,000 3 3.4 
Three-dimensional surface views present the sensitivity of the output variable based on the 
changes of two selected input variables according to the final model as shown in Figure 5-10. 
These surfaces help in understanding the changes of the output versus the input variables. As 
shown, the offshore pipes result in higher consequences of failure, while the onshore pipes 
produce a smaller level of the consequence of failure. It is also obvious that higher location 
classes and high consequence areas result in larger consequences. Input 2 is related to the failure 
scenario, and the graph proves that time-dependent failures result in lower consequence levels. 
Time independent failures such as Material and weld defects, as well as the mechanical damages, 
produce larger consequences. Stable failure sources, such as the damages as a result of natural 
forces, have caused more significant consequences than the mechanical damages. The fourth 
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graph investigates the changes of the consequence of failure with respect to the SMYS of the 
pipes. According to this figure, the smallest SMYS values resulted in the highest consequences, 
while it drops dramatically when the SMYS reaches to around 30,000. The failure consequences 
fluctuate around 5.5 to 6 when the SMYS values are between 30,000 to 60,000. It increases 
significantly when the SMYS of the pipes is increased to 70,000. Totally, graphs prove the 
higher importance of SMYS in the estimation of the consequence of failure.  
 
Figure 5- 10: Three dimensional sensitivity surfaces  
5.3.1 Consequences of Failure Model Validation 
The dataset was divided into training and testing dataset. The error in the testing dataset is 
measured to validate the produced model. The error is measured by comparing the estimated 
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results of the model against the actual data using Equations 3.19~3.23. The final model is tested 
by comparing the predicted and actual outputs to validate the produced model. RMSE, MAE, 
AIP, AVP and the Median Symmetric Absolute Percentage Error (i.e. MdsAPE) of the model are 
computed as shown in Table 5-12. The closer value of RMSE and MAE to zero proves the 
higher efficiency of the models. RMSE and MAE for the model in this research are calculated 
equal to 1.503 and 1.250 respectively that shows the effectiveness of the model is acceptable. 
The average validity of the model is estimated as 78 percent that is satisfactory. Finally, the 
MdsAPE index is calculated approximately 80 percent that proves the model is capable of 
predicting the consequence of failure with a high validity. 
Table 5- 12: Validation results of the final model 
Measure of error method RMSE MAE AIP AVP MdsAPE 
Calculated index 1.5032 1.2504 21.8588 78.1411 79.7752 
 
5.4 Integrated Fuzzy Risk Index  
In this model, the level of risk of failure is assessed with respect to each failure source that was 
identified in the Bow-tie model. The calculated amounts of the probability of failure and the 
corresponding consequences of failure are used to evaluate the risk index. A fuzzy inference 
system is defined in this model that assesses the risk of failure of such pipes. The membership 
functions that define the level of risk for the calculated logarithmic grade of the probability of 
failure are then assigned, the thresholds of which are extracted from the existing guidelines. 
Similarly, the membership functions that fuzzify the calculated consequences of failure are 
defined in a fuzzy expert system. Figure 5-11 shows the defined membership functions (MF) for 
the inputs and output of the system. Part “a” of the figure shows the MFs related to the 
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probability of failure and “b” demonstrates the membership functions related to the 
consequences of failure, while part “c” of the figure shows the Membership functions assigned to 
the output of the model. The rules of the fuzzy inference system are developed based on the 
human expertise and literature review. The rules are defined to map the inputs to the output of 
the system. This fuzzy inference system applies the Mamdani fuzzy model. Once aggregated the 
membership functions of the inputs and output according to the fuzzy rules, a fuzzy set is 





Figure 5- 11: Risk index model fuzzy rules 
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Figure 5-12 shows the risk index surface that is the demonstration of the relationship between the 
inputs and output of the fuzzy inference system. As shown, a higher risk index is assigned when 
the consequence of failure is higher while increasing the probability of failure with a low 
consequence of failure does not result in a high-risk level. Once the risk level is assessed for the 
pipe with respect to each failure source, the calculated risk scores can be used separately to 
present the level of risk with respect to each source. Also, they can be averaged or maximized to 
show the total risk of the pipe. 
 
Figure 5- 12: Risk Index surface demonstration  
5.5 Inspection Planning 
Inspection planning is performed after that the risk of failure is assessed using the models 
developed in the previous sections. This model has two main phases: 1) select the tools and 
determine the frequency and 2) rank the scenarios of inspection and propose the optimum plan. 
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For this purpose, a fuzzy inspection tool selection model is developed. The triangular MFs that 
were used in the fuzzy integrated risk index model to assess the probability of failure and 
consequence of failure are applied here to fuzzify the inputs. The outputs of the model are the 
frequency of inspection and selection of inspection tools. The probability of failure will be 
compared with the available risk scale to determine the running frequency. The inspection tool 
selection will be based on the consequences of failure.    
The comparison will be performed for all of the major failure sources that existed in the Bow-tie 
model. A table is developed in this model, which suggests the suitable inspection tools with their 
frequency ranges and cost of operating. Table 5-13 presents a proposed categorization of existing 
inspection tools. These inspection techniques can be divided into three main categories. The first 
category of inline inspection tools (ILI) includes those techniques that are used to perform an 
inline inspection such as MFL tools and Transverse flux and UT
2
 with different resolution levels. 
The other group is composed of direct assessment techniques that inspect the pipelines from the 
external surfaces. In this method, various places around the pipes are excavated to be inspected 
visually using tools from the exterior surface of the pipe. This method is categorized in terms of 
its cost based on the distances between digging points. There is another main type of inspection 
technique, namely hydrostatic testing, that is mainly applied at the beginning of the life of a 
pipeline, which is necessary for all pipes. This method inspects the newly constructed pipelines 
against the potential near critical flaws that can exist in the pipeline. It is not common to apply 
this technique frequently.  
 
                                                 
2
 This inspection tool is not applicable for gas pipelines but only oil pipelines. 
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Table 5- 13: Inspection methods applied for external corrosion failures 
Type Inspection tool 
Frequency 
range 
Ave. Cost of Running 
ILI 
MFL Standard Resolution 
7-12 years 
2,300 
MFL High Resolution 3,400 
Transverse Flux NA 
UT (Compression wave) 2,300 
UT (Shear wave) 4,700 
DA 
ECDA (Dig every 8 Kilometer of pipe) 
- 
2,200 
ECDA (Dig every 3 Kilometer of pipe) 6,700 
HD Hydrostatic Testing 





Another table is developed to demonstrate the frequency of operating the inspection techniques 
versus the failure probability level. A table is developed in this section as shown in Table 5-14, 
which shows the frequency of running of the identified inspection tools for external corrosion 
versus various failure probability levels. The table suggests inspecting the pipes that are more 
prone to failure with a higher frequency. 
Table 5- 14: Frequency range of Inline inspection application for oil and gas pipelines with 
respect to their level of failure probability 
PoF Level Mid-Point of Frequency MF (year) 
1 Very low 9 
2 Low 8 
3 Medium 7 
4 High 6 
5 Very high 5 
As mentioned in chapter 3, the primary selection of inspection technique is based on the failure 
consequence level that is computed with respect to the consequence model developed in the 
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previous section. For this purpose, a table is provided for each failure source that determines the 
appropriate type of inspection tool with respect to the failure consequence level. Table 5-15 
shows the proposed inspection tools selection versus the failure consequence levels. It suggests 
the application of direct assessment in longer digging distances and low-resolution inspection 
tools for those pipes with low and very low consequences of failure. It also proposes to apply 
direct assessment in smaller digging distances and high-resolution tools for the pipes with the 
high and very high consequence of failure. As seen in this table, the decisions regarding the 
inspection tool selection such as considering an inspection tool as a high resolution or low 
resolution is fuzzy. Similarly, the decision about distance for digging in the direct assessment 
method is also fuzzy. As a result, in this study a fuzzy expert system for the selection of the 
inspection tools and determining their frequency of running using these tables is offered.  
Table 5- 15: Inspection tool selection versus failure consequence level  
Consequence of failure Inspection tool selection 
1~4 Low and Very Low  Direct assessment in long digging distances 
 Low-resolution Inline inspection 
3~7 Low and Medium  Direct assessment in medium digging distances 
 Standard resolution Inline inspection 
7~10 High and Very High  Direct assessment in small digging distances 
 High-resolution Inline inspection 
The fuzzy membership functions assigned to the input and output variables are shown in Figure 
5-13. Triangular membership functions are used in this model. The fuzzy rules that map the 
inputs to output variables are defined based on pre-developed tables. Figure 5-14 shows the 
surface demonstrating the relationship between inputs and outputs. As shown, the frequency of 
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running the inspection tool increases when the POF grade grows. Similarly, a higher resolution 
tool is suggested when the financial consequence of the risk of failure increases. 
a b 
c d 
Figure 5- 13: Membership functions of Fuzzy Inspection Tool Selection Model 
a b 
Figure 5- 14: Surfaces demonstration of the Fuzzy Inspection Tool Selection Model 
After selecting the inspection techniques and the frequency of inspection through the inspection 
frequency index, the life cycle analysis of various scenarios of inspection is implemented. 
Different combinations of the selected inspection techniques with the corresponding frequency 
of application are used. The cumulative risk profile of the failed pipes is developed applying 
non-linear regression and obtaining the historical data in the US (PHMSAa 2014). Figure 5-15 
    160 
presents the cumulative risk growth profile versus the age of failure. As it is clear, the risk of 
failure increases during the service life of the pipelines with a third-degree equation. The R-
squared coefficient of the fitted model is 0.99 that proves the efficiency of the model.  
 
Figure 5- 15: Cumulative risk growth profile 
Figure 5-16 shows the membership functions that are defined to assess the capability of 
inspection tools. As seen, the membership functions are triangular, and the scale of assessment is 
an 11-grade granular fuzzy scale similar to that of Sadiq et al. (2004). After the calculation of 
risk reduction index, the risk profile after-inspection is developed for each scenario. Consider an 
example of a pipeline that is supposed to be inspected every ten years with an inspection tool that 
is calculated to reduce the risk of failure by 25% after the inspection. The risk profile of this 
scenario is presented in Figure 5-17. The risk of the pipeline is increased every year according to 
RGt = 6E-06˟t
3 - 0.0001˟t
2 + 0.0117˟t + 0.0651 




















Age of failure (year) 
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the cumulative risk profile. Once the inspection is performed, it is assumed that the risk is 
decreased by 25%. Then it continues to increase until the next inspection. This process is 
repeated for the whole life of the pipeline. In this example, it is assumed that the average life of 
such pipelines is equal to 50 years. The maximum risk of the pipeline, which happens in the last 
year of the service life is determined through this profile.   
 
Figure 5- 16: Fuzzy membership functions of the inspection tools’ detection capability  
Inspection cash flow of the pipeline is calculated after developing this profile embedding the cost 
of operating the inspection tools. After that, the equivalent economic value of each scenario is 
calculated. Economic equivalent values of the scenarios are computed using the Equations 3-22 
to 3-24. The probability distribution functions of the inspection cost are assumed triangular due 
to the limited rehabilitation cost data. The equivalent economic value of each scenario is 
calculated applying the Monte Carlo simulation in @Risk 6 software. Figure 5-18 presents the 
results of the Monte Carlo simulation for the EUAC calculation of the example case study. The 
average EUAC is computed as 8,284 US$. Then the Risk-Cost index of each scenario is 
computed applying Equation 3-25.  
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Figure 5- 17: Cumulative after inspection risk profile of an example pipeline  
 


















Age of pipeline 
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For the example scenario, the Risk-Cost index is calculated to be 4,639. This process is repeated 
for each scenario, and the result is compared. The best scenario is the scenario with lower Risk-
Cost index. Application of the Monte-Carlo simulation is due to the uncertainty that exists in the 
cost elements and interest rate.  
5.6 Rehabilitation Planning Model 
The size of defects affects the maintenance decision process of oil and gas pipelines, especially 
in the rehabilitation of underground and offshore pipelines. As mentioned before in the 
methodology section, a defect size scale is developed for each maintenance operation type (i.e., 
recoat, repair, and replacement) based on its nature. Table 5-16 lists the sizes of the maintenance 
operation types used herein. Seven defect sizes are used to predict the cost of operations required 
to perform on such pipes.  
Table 5- 16: Defects Size Scale for Various Rehabilitation Techniques (meters) 
Size No. Recoating Repair Replacement 
S1 1.0 0.1 1.5 
S2 2.0 0.2 2.0 
S3 4.0 0.4 4.0 
S4 5.0 0.8 5.0 
S5 6.0 1.5 6.0 
S6 8.0 2.0 8.0 
S7 10.0 4.0 10.0 
 
The overall pipeline condition changes from excellent (i.e., a score of “10”) to extremely poor 
(i.e., score of “0”). The condition increment of a recoated section is assumed equal to the 50% of 
the difference between the current and the maximum condition of a pipeline. The relative 
condition increment for repair and replacement is equal to 70% and 100% of the difference 
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between the current and the maximum conditions, respectively. The estimated condition 
increments are then multiplied by the size of the maintenance operation and divided by the 
segment’s length, which is assumed herein equal to ten meters.  
Table 5-17 summarizes the condition increase for every size of each maintenance operation in a 
segment of ten-meters based on current overall conditions. For example, let us consider the 
condition increment of the recoat operation “S1”, which consists of recoating one meter in a ten-
meter pipeline section. Let us also assume that the current condition of the pipeline at the time of 
recoating is equal to eight. Hence, the difference between the maximum pipeline condition and 
the current condition is two (i.e., “10 – 8”). Therefore, the condition increment would be 0.10 
(i.e. 0.50 ˟ 2 ˟ 0.10). In other words, if one meter of a ten-meter pipeline section is recoated then 
the condition increment would be equal to “0.1”. As a result, the condition of the pipeline section 
after recoating will be equal to 8.10. 




























S1 0.10 0.02 0.75 0.15 0.03 0.63 
S2 0.20 0.04 1.00 0.30 0.06 0.84 
S3 0.40 0.08 2.00 0.60 0.11 1.68 
S4 0.50 0.17 2.50 0.75 0.22 2.10 
S5 0.60 0.32 3.00 0.90 0.42 2.52 
S6 0.80 0.42 4.00 1.20 0.56 3.36 
S7 1.00 0.84 5.00 1.50 1.12 4.20 
 
Deterioration profile is developed based on the risk growth profile. There is a reverse 
relationship between the deterioration of the pipes and their risk growth. Equation 5.1 is 
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developed to forecast the condition of the pipes during their service life. The produced 
conditions from this equations show some limitations that are addressed in Equation 5.2 by some 
modifications, which changes the starting and ending condition of the profile. These limitations 
are: 1) the condition of a newly constructed pipe is calculated to be 9.35 and 2) the condition of 
the pipe end of its useful life would be less than zero. The modifications are applied to the factor 
that is multiplied by the risk growth index and constant value to fix these two problems. Figure 
5-19 shows the developed deterioration profile. The developed deterioration profile is drawn 
based on Equation 5.2. However, the developed deterioration profile is the before-intervention 
profile of the pipes based on an average behavior.  
Ct=10-10×RGt = 10- 10×(6E-6×t
3-0.0001×t2+0.0117×t+0.0651)       (5.1) 
𝑪𝒕 =  −𝟓𝑬 − 𝟓 × 𝒕
𝟑 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟗 × 𝒕𝟐 − 𝟎. 𝟏𝟎𝟑𝟏 × 𝒕 + 𝟏𝟎     (5.2) 
Where, Ct is the condition of the pipe at age « t », RGt is the risk growth index at age « t », t is 
the age of the pipe.  
 
Figure 5- 19: Risk-based deterioration profile 
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Once the deterioration of the pipe can be predicted before rehabilitation, there is a need for the 
development of the after rehabilitation deterioration profile. Figure 5-20 shows a conceptual 
profile that is used to analyze the scenarios of rehabilitation in this research. Any time that a 
rehabilitation action is performed, the condition is supposed to be increased. Also, the thresholds 
of the condition are used to decide about the actions that are required for the maintenance of the 
pipe. All defect sizes are repeated in ten-meter segments of the pipeline. A 10-centimeter size 
defect is repeated on all segments of the pipeline section under analysis. In a one-kilometre 
section, a ten-centimetre size defect is assumed to occur in each segment. The condition 
increment is proportional to the size of the maintenance action on the segment. As a result, the 
condition increment of small maintenance sizes is lower compared to those of larger 
maintenance sizes.  
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5.6.1 Overall Scenarios 
As mentioned in the Methodology section, conservative and regular plans were implemented for 
the maintenance of pipelines. Table 5-18 summarized the pipeline condition thresholds and their 
corresponding maintenance operation types in both plans. It is worth noting that higher pipeline 
condition thresholds are assigned for the conservative plans. For example, it shows that a 
recoating action must take place if the pipeline condition is less than or equal to 8 in the 
conservative plan. On the other hand, the recoating action can occur if the pipeline condition is 
less than or equal to 7 in the regular plan.  
Table 5- 18: Pipeline Condition Thresholds for Rehabilitation Techniques 
Rehabilitation Technique Conservative Plan Regular Plan 
Recoating 8 7 
Repair 7 6 
Replacement 6 5 
 
Several scenario groups are developed based on these thresholds using various types of 
operations as shown in Table 5-19. The first three groups (i.e., 1, 2, and 3) are based on the 
conservative plan while the second three groups (i.e., 4, 5, and 6) are based on the regular plan. 
Group 1 scenarios include the combination of remedial actions, repair, and replacement under 
conservative thresholds. The conservative plan specifies the use of recoating, repair, and 
replacement when the pipeline condition falls below 8, 7, and 6, respectively. In other words, the 
rules for Group 1 indicate that a one-time recoating is needed when the condition falls below 8. 
Repair is needed when the condition falls below seven, and it is repeated every year. When the 
condition drops below five, a replacement is required. In some of the scenarios, there is no need 
for replacement as the repair increases the condition more than the deterioration rate. As a result, 
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the condition never falls under six. The inspection is included in all of the scenarios since it is 
required according to the existing recommendations. Group 2 scenarios, which do not include 
remedial actions, contain repair and replacement with conservative thresholds. Accordingly, the 
rehabilitation starts with repair at a condition of seven while replacement begins when the 
condition falls below five. Group 3 refers to the alternatives with the repair as the major action. 
Finally, scenario groups 4-6 that are similar to their counterparts (i.e., Groups 1-3), are 
implemented under the regular plans (i.e., with lower condition thresholds). The conservative 
plans are proposed to be implemented for high and very high-risk pipes while the regular plans 
of rehabilitation are suggested for medium and lower risk pipes. 








Abbreviation of the 
Scenarios 
(“n” shows the size of the 
repair or replacement and 





14 Conservative Plan 
An (sleeve are used to repair) 






14 Conservative Plan 
Cn (sleeve are used to repair) 






14 Regular Plan 
Fn (sleeve are used to repair) 
Gn (Clamps are used to 
repair) 
4 
Inline Inspection+  
Repair+ 
Replacement 
14 Regular Plan 
Hn (sleeve are used to repair) 
In (Clamps are used to repair) 
5.5.2 Economic Parameters 
The scenario cash flow is determined using a model that is developed using Microsoft Excel 
(Microsoft 2010). It was computed using the cost data previously described in the Data 
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Collection chapter. The equivalent economic value of each scenario is computed using the Net 
Present Value (NPV). Monte Carlo simulation is used to address the uncertainties in the cost of 
operations and the interest rates. Equations 5.21~5.23 are used to calculate the probabilistic NPV 
values. The costs of the maintenance operations are used in constant 2013 dollars (i.e., without 
considering the effect of inflation) and are discounted with the forecasted interest rates. 
5.7 Model Implementation to a Case Study 
In this section, the developed models are applied to a case study of a 24-inch pipeline in North 
America. Table 5-20 shows the data regarding the pipe that is used to analyze the risk of failure 
and maintenance planning of the pipe. The pipe is composed of two diameter size parts 24” and 
30”. It is planned to be constructed with High-Strength material. It will be coated with Field 
Applied Epoxy (FBE). The pipe will be laid underground, and the depth of cover will be four 
feet. It is a high-pressure pipe, which spans over 323 miles and transfers crude oil. A highly 
accurate leak detection system will be installed on the pipeline.  
The models developed in the previous sections are applied to calculate the probability of failure. 
First, the categories related to each variable in the Bow-tie model are identified. Then, related 
PDF is located for each category with respect to each failure source. Finally, the developed 
equations are used to compute the probability of failure for each failure source of the pipes. 
Monte Carlo simulation is applied to calculate the mean value for the probability of failure with 
respect to each failure source, and determining attributed distribution function. Monte-Carlo 
simulation is applied to fit the calculated data with the best distribution function. Figure 5-21 
shows the result of the calculated probabilities of failure with respect to each failure source. The 
mean value of the POF with respect to external corrosion is computed to be equal to 2.9E-5. The 
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overall POF of the pipe that is the summation of the POF with respect to all sources is computed 
equal to 4.9E-4 failures/mile.year. Considering the whole length of the pipe, the POF comes up 
to around 0.16 failures per year.  
Table 5- 20: Primary data of case study  
Variable Value 
Location Texas 
Diameter 24inch and 30 inch 
Material High Strength 
Coating type FBE 
Depth of Cover 4 feet 
MAOP 1,440 psig 
Location Belowground 
Length 323 miles 
SMYS 70,000 and 80,000 
Product transported Crude oil 
Leak detection system 
Highly accurate: Capable of detecting a 5% leak in 90 min; and a 
53% leak in 5 min 
Pipe wall thickness 0.343 inches, and 0.375 inches 
 
 
Figure 5- 21: Calculated mean values of POF with respect to all  
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For the consequences of failure, the developed neuro-fuzzy model is used to forecast the 
consequence values. For the location of the pipe, two different class locations and existence of 
HPA and non-HPA is considered. Then the failure consequences are computed for both of the 
states. Figure 5-22 shows the calculated amounts for the consequences of failures of the pipe. 
The estimated values for a higher class location and high populated area are ten that is a Very 
High consequence. While the external corrosion and internal corrosion for a high-class location 
is considered to be very high, the consequences of failure for material and weld damages and 
mechanical damages are estimated to be at medium level, around five. The consequences are 
forecasted to be higher for class location 1 for material and weld defects, mechanical damages, 
and incorrect operations. That could be because of the accessibility limitations of the operators 
and the lack of inspection. A potential failure due to the external and internal corrosion in a low 
class location produces lower consequences. A failure stemming from natural forces in a low 
class location is expected to result in the lowest consequence level. The calculated consequences 
of failure levels are used in the integrated fuzzy risk index evaluation model to assess the risk of 
failure of pipe with respect to all failure sources.  
 


















Estimated consequences of different failure scenarios  
Class Location 4, HCA
Class Location 1, Non-HCA
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After the computation of the POF and COF for each failure source, the risk index is calculated 
with respect to the failure sources using the Integrated Fuzzy Risk Model. The scores of POF and 
COF are inserted to the MATLAB FIS and the risk indices are calculated. Table 5-21 shows the 
risk parameters and risk indices for the case study with respect to all of the failure sources. As 
shown, the maximum risk index for the pipe belongs to internal corrosion followed by external 
corrosion. Minimum risk index belongs to the failures with natural force damages. 









IC 1.75E-04 4.24 7.71 10 3.71 4.54 
EC 2.89E-05 3.46 7.15 10 3.38 4.50 
MW 7.33E-05 3.86 5.25 4.5 3.43 3.32 
MD 6.66E-05 3.82 5.25 4.5 3.37 3.31 
IO 9.54E-05 3.98 4.94 4.52 3.62 3.35 
NF 5.45E-05 3.74 3.2 4.59 2.71 3.24 
Once the risk indices are calculated, the result is used to select the inspection tools and their 
frequency of running. The calculations are performed for all failure sources as shown in Table 5-
22. The frequency of running the inspection tools for all sources hover around 6 and 7. The 
inspection tools are selected with respect to the highest COF or internal corrosion to be more 
conservative,. As a result, in this case, all of the selected inline inspection tools are high 
resolution. Data on inline inspection tools are gathered from ROSEN (2015). Rosen is a provider 
of inspection operations to the operators of oil and gas companies in North America. Table 5-23 
shows the collected data on four selected inspection tools. The selected tools use MFL and UT 
technologies. Expert opinion is used to obtain data on the detection capability of each inspection 
tool with respect to the sources of failure.  
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Table 5- 22: Frequency determination and Inspection tool selection for case study 
Source POF Level COF1 COF2 Frequency  
Inspection 
tool 
IC 4.24 7.71 10.00 5.51 3.66 
EC 3.46 7.15 10.00 6.18 3.64 
MW 3.86 5.25 4.50 6.76 2.57 
MD 3.82 5.25 4.50 6.82 2.57 
IO 3.98 4.94 4.52 6.54 2.49 
NF 3.74 3.20 4.59 6.95 2.38 
Table 5- 23: Detection capability level for the selected inspection tools 
                 
                       Inspection 











EC 5 6 7 4 
IC 5 6 7 4 
MW 6 2 6 3 
MD 6 2 6 3 
The risk reduction index, as well as accuracy percentage index, is computed for each tool as 
shown in Table 5-24. These values are then used to develop the risk growth profile of the pipe 
using each inspection tool every six years. The maximum risk is computed for each profile as 
obtained at the end of the service life. The highest risk reduction index belongs to ROGEO XT 
inspection tool. Figure 5-23 shows the risk growth profile for one of the selected inspection tools 
in which the maximum risk is computed to be 0.58 that happens at the end of the life cycle. After 
developing the risk growth profile and computing the maximum risk for each scenario, the 
Equivalent Uniform Annual Cost (EUAC) is calculated for each scenario applying Monte Carlo 
simulation.  
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Table 5- 24: Calculated indices for each inspection tool 
                                       Inspection 











DC 7.5 6.5 8.5 5.5 
Ac 0.65 0.58 0.47 0.61 
ACp 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.90 
RRi 0.67 0.59 0.79 0.50 
The risk cost index is computed as shown in Table 5-25. As shown, the ROGEO XT inspection 
tool has the lowest risk-cost index, although it has a higher life cycle cost. Consequently, this 
inspection is ranked first in the preference of the selected inspection tools. 
Table 5- 25: Maximum risk, EUAC and Risk-Cost indices of the inspection scenarios 
                 
                       Inspection 











Max. Risk 0.58 0.73 0.31 0.86 
EUAC 1,203 1,133 1,593 1,062 
RISK-COST 698 827 489 913 
The developed models on rehabilitation planning are implemented on the 24” part of the 
pipeline. The selection of the 24” pipeline is due to the availability of the rehabilitation cost data. 
To identify the required yearly rehabilitation actions, the overall condition before intervention is 
computed every year for the whole service life of the pipeline. The calculated amounts represent 
the risk-based deterioration profile of the pipeline before intervention operations. Then, the 
calculated condition is checked against the condition thresholds in each scenario’s group to 
forecast the required maintenance work over the service life of the pipeline. 
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Figure 5- 23: Risk growth Profile for ROCOMBO MFL-A/XT 
If any action is necessary, the condition after-intervention is computed according to the 
increment tables that are calculated proportionally to the size of the rehabilitation work as 
previously explained. The deterioration profiles of the scenarios are then determined. Finally, the 
required actions are planned, and related cash flows are calculated by summing up the estimated 
costs of the planned maintenance works. In each scenario group, the seven sizes of defects are 
used to develop several possible scenarios. Due to the high-risk indices, only conservative 
rehabilitation plans are selected for this case study. As a result, 21 scenarios are built based on 
the conservative plans. The scenarios’ cash flows are calculated based on the estimated costs of 
each maintenance operation type for each size. Sample deterioration profiles of Group C of 
















Risk Growth Profile (ROCOMBO MFL-A/XT) 
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the pipelines never falls below six for Group C of scenarios.  
 
Figure 5- 24: Sample Deterioration Profiles 














































Deterioration Profile Scenario C7 
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inline inspection, recoating, repair, and replacement. The condition thresholds that determine the 
required maintenance actions were obtained from Table 5-24. The table shows that recoating, 
repair and replacement are needed when the condition falls below 8, 7, and 5, respectively. The 
condition of the pipeline before interventions during a 50-year service life is computed with the 
pre-mentioned assumptions. It is clear that the recoating would be the first action to be 
performed on this type of scenarios. Let us consider “S1” that refers to the smallest sizes of the 
maintenance actions. The first required action according to the thresholds and condition of the 
pipeline is identified as recoating in year twenty when the condition starts to fall below 8. 
Consequently, it is decided to recoat the pipeline with “S1” type in year fourteen. The condition 
of the pipeline is calculated after this intervention using Table 5-23. As a result, the condition of 
the pipeline is increased by 0.1. The deterioration continued until the condition falls below 7 at 
year 23. As a result, repair starts in year 23.  
The condition after repair is calculated to be 7.02. Considering the deterioration rate and the 
repair thresholds, this operation is required for this scenario every year starting from year 23. 
The condition is then calculated after each repair for the following years. Finally, a replacement 
is required at age 38 because the condition falls below 5. Repair continues between years 38 and 
45. In year 45, the replacement is again required because the condition of the pipeline falls below 
5. However, the condition does not increase above the threshold of repair. Consequently, repair 
continues until the end of the service life of the pipeline (i.e., 50 years). Different scenarios of 
repair and replacement are generated to be used in the life cycle cost analysis. After the 
development of the maintenance scenarios, the probability distributions of the rehabilitation 
action costs are defined to calculate the probabilistic cash flow of each alternative. Table 4-2 
shows the estimated minimum, average, and maximum costs for the different maintenance 
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operation types and sizes. In each scenario, the probability distribution functions of the 
maintenance operation cost and interest rate were defined.  
The required functions for the calculation of the NPV are then built. Consequently, the model is 
used to simulate each scenario for 1,000 iterations, and the obtained results are recorded. The 
@Risk 6 application (PALISADE 2013) is used for the Monte Carlo simulation. The software 
calculates the NPV amounts for the specified iterations. Then, it fits the best distribution function 
to the calculated amounts and estimates the mean, minimum, and maximum of the distribution 
function. After running the simulation for all of the scenarios, they are sorted in ascending order 
with respect to their NPV values. Table 5-26 summarizes the simulation-based net present value 
calculated amounts of all scenarios. As shown in the table, the lower values are mostly generated 
by the scenarios that combine various operation types including recoating, repair, and 
replacement.  
Plan C3 that proposes the combination of recoat, repair and replacement with an “S3” size is 
ranked first. Figure 5-25 summarizes the mean values of each scenario’s NPV. There is a 
significant difference between the highest and the lowest scenarios’ NPV. Figure 5-26 shows the 
amounts of NPV for each scenario including the most likely, minimum and maximum NPV 
values. The medium size rehabilitations produce lower cost during the service life of the pipes. 
This finding supports the idea of maintaining several defects of the pipeline at the same time, 
however not leaving it to grow and become vast. It is tried to develop the model as flexible and 
general as possible so the users can change the input data and adjust it based on their asset’s 
properties. 
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Table 5- 26: Scenarios Sorted Based on Simulation-Based NPV (US $) 
No. Title Rehabilitation Types Size Minimum  Maximum Most Likely 
1 C3 Recoat+Repair+Replace S3      1,140,439.82       2,004,766.73       1,743,275.42  
2 C6 Recoat+Repair+Replace S6      1,187,726.54       2,070,699.01       1,800,607.84  
3 C2 Recoat+Repair+Replace S2      1,143,664.40       2,072,874.04       1,802,499.17  
4 C4 Recoat+Repair+Replace S4      1,216,413.97       2,158,030.22       1,876,548.02  
5 C1 Recoat+Repair+Replace S1      1,215,241.39       2,220,380.43       1,930,765.59  
6 C5 Recoat+Repair+Replace S5      1,267,745.43       2,263,181.87       1,967,984.23  
7 B2 Repair+Replace S2      1,460,293.32       2,721,771.46       2,366,757.80  
8 B1 Repair+Replace S1      1,454,896.15       2,729,629.82       2,373,591.15  
9 C7 Recoat+Repair+Replace S7      1,581,911.37       2,814,484.00       2,447,377.39  
10 B7 Repair+Replace S7      1,520,628.43       2,927,407.04       2,545,571.34  
11 B6 Repair+Replace S6      1,591,622.43       3,065,704.12       2,665,829.67  
12 A5 Recoat+Repair+Replace S5      1,708,717.64       3,114,144.70       2,707,951.91  
13 A7 Recoat+Repair+Replace S7      1,722,404.02       3,127,558.06       2,719,615.71  
14 A4 Recoat+Repair+Replace S4      1,735,152.72       3,172,982.90       2,759,115.57  
15 A6 Recoat+Repair+Replace S6      1,796,620.76       3,238,856.74       2,816,397.16  
16 A2 Recoat+Repair+Replace S2      1,916,426.42       3,283,492.51       2,855,210.88  
17 A1 Recoat+Repair+Replace S1      1,938,594.49       3,316,532.47       2,883,941.28  
18 B5 Repair+Replace S5      1,726,976.52       3,348,156.45       2,911,440.39  
19 A3 Recoat+Repair+Replace S3      1,930,719.07       3,573,037.51       3,106,989.14  
20 B4 Repair+Replace S4      1,898,800.63       3,664,624.85       3,186,630.30  
21 B3 Repair+Replace S3      1,968,215.68       3,765,274.77       3,274,151.98  
 
 




























Simulation Based Rehabilitation Scenarios' LCC  
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Figure 5- 26: Simulation- Based NPV Amounts 
The scenario with the lowest LCC is titled C3 that uses a combination of recoat, repair, and 
replacement and is inspected every seven years. This scenario is intended to be rehabilitated with 
S3 sizes of rehabilitation types. Its NPV is calculated to be around 1.7 million USD (2013 
constant dollars).  In this scenario, the pipe is recoated at year 20 when the condition is below 8. 
Then, it is not maintained until the condition falls below 7 while the repair of the pipe starts. 
Three repair actions are perfumed until the pipe condition reaches below 6. At that time, part of 
the pipe is replaced with an S3 size of replacement. Regular maintenance operations are repeated 
in the whole life cycle of the pipe. The maintenance scenario of C3 is proposed as the optimum 
rehabilitation plan of the pipe, and the actions that are required to be performed are listed in 
Table 5-27. As shown, the regular maintenance will be performed every year, while the repair 
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proposed to be performed instead of repair, which will happen at years 35 and 43. Inspection 
with a high-resolution tool is planned to be run every 6 years, which happens at years 6, 12, 18, 
24, 30, 36, 42, and 48. Direct assessment of the pipe is planned to be performed between the 
Inline inspections with medium distances of digging. While the suggested plan is the ideal 
rehabilitation plan, there will be a need to inspect the pipe regularly and perform the emergency 
repair actions if necessary.  
Table 5- 27: Case Study Maintenance Plan 
Year Actions to be performed Year Actions to be performed 
1 Regular Maintenance 
  
26 Regular Maintenance 
  
2 Regular Maintenance 
  
27 Regular Maintenance 
 
DA (Medium), Repair S3 
3 Regular Maintenance DA (Medium) 
 
28 Regular Maintenance 
  
4 Regular Maintenance 
  
29 Regular Maintenance 
  
5 Regular Maintenance 
  
30 Regular Maintenance 
 
ILI (ROGEO XT), Repair S3 
6 Regular Maintenance ILI (ROGEO XT) 
 
31 Regular Maintenance 
 
Repair S3 
7 Regular Maintenance 
  
32 Regular Maintenance 
  
8 Regular Maintenance 
  
33 Regular Maintenance DA (Medium) 
 
9 Regular Maintenance DA (Medium) 
 
34 Regular Maintenance 
  
10 Regular Maintenance 
  
35 Regular Maintenance Replace S3 
 
11 Regular Maintenance 
  
36 Regular Maintenance ILI (ROGEO XT) 
 
12 Regular Maintenance ILI (ROGEO XT) 
 
37 Regular Maintenance 
  
13 Regular Maintenance 
  
38 Regular Maintenance 
  
14 Regular Maintenance 
  
39 Regular Maintenance DA (Medium) 
 
15 Regular Maintenance DA (Medium) 
 
40 Regular Maintenance 
  
16 Regular Maintenance 
  
41 Regular Maintenance 
  
17 Regular Maintenance 
  
42 Regular Maintenance ILI (ROGEO XT) 
 
18 Regular Maintenance ILI (ROGEO XT) 
 
43 Regular Maintenance 
 
Replace S3 
19 Regular Maintenance 
  
44 Regular Maintenance 
  
20 Regular Maintenance 
 
DA (Medium), Recoat S3 
45 Regular Maintenance DA (Medium) 
 
21 Regular Maintenance 
  
46 Regular Maintenance 
  
22 Regular Maintenance 
  
47 Regular Maintenance 
  
23 Regular Maintenance 
  
48 Regular Maintenance ILI (ROGEO XT) 
 
24 Regular Maintenance ILI (ROGEO XT) 
 
49 Regular Maintenance   
25 Regular Maintenance 
  
50 Regular Maintenance   
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5.8 Automation of the developed model 
The developed risk assessment and maintenance planning model is semi-automated. The first 
part of the model that belongs to the probability of failure is automated in Excel 2010.  All of the 
required probability distribution functions and required equations for each failure source are 
defined in the semi-automated program. Figure 5-27 demonstrates a sample excel sheet that is 
developed to automate the computation of the POF with respect to internal corrosion of a sample 
pipe. To use the model, it is only required to select the category of each variable according to the 
properties the pipe and the probability of failure will be computed. The @Risk software is used 
to apply the Monte Carlo simulation, and the shown result is the mean value estimated to be the 
POF of the pipe.  
 
Figure 5- 27: Sample Excel sheet calculation for Internal Corrosion Failures 
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Once the calculation for the probability of failure is performed, it is required to compute the 
consequences of failure. The fuzzy inference system for this model is defined in MATLAB 
R2010b. Figure 5-28 shows a sample calculation sheet as demonstrated in MATLAB. It only 
needs the values of four inputs to calculate the consequence of failure. The four variables include 
the event tree class, location category, and diameter and Specified minimum yield strength of the 
pipe. The value for the location category, diameter, and SMYS might be fixed if it does not 
change the length of the pipe. However, for the event tree there will be more than one value. All 
of the possible scenarios of failure including the failure source, the hole size and ignition 
possibility can be analyzed, and related COF can be calculated. 
  
Figure 5- 28: Sample COF calculation sheet  
The risk index can be computed based on the estimated probability of failure and consequence of 
failure. Once the absolute probability of failure is calculated, and the grade of the related 
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probability of failure is computed, the risk index is forecasted. A fuzzy inference system (FIS) is 
defined in MATLAB based on the developed model in the previous sections as shown in Figure 
5-29. For the defined FIS, all of the membership functions of the inputs, output, and the fuzzy 
rules are defined, and the FIS is developed. The FIS only needs the grade of the probability of 
failure and consequence of failure to calculate the risk index. The index can be computed with 
respect to each failure source. The overall risk index can be the maximum of the computed 
values. In the sample shown in the figure, the probability of failure and the consequence of 
failure values are inserted as 3.86 and 4.15 and the risk index is calculated 3.32.  
 
Figure 5- 29: Sample risk score calculation of the case study 
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Another FIS is developed for the fuzzy inspection tool selection model. A sample calculation 
sheet as demonstrated in MATLAB as shown in Figure 5-30. In this model, it is required to 
insert the value for the probability of failure and consequence of failure. The frequency of 
running the inspection tools and the tools resolution and cost level can be selected based on the 
tool selection variable.  
 
Figure 5- 30: Fuzzy inspection tool selection model demonstration  
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Figure 5-31 shows a sample calculation sheet in Excel 2010 software that computes the life cycle 
cost of rehabilitation scenarios. Once the action to be performed and the years in which the 
rehabilitation actions should be executed are determined, the calculations of the net present value 
(NPV) of the defined scenario can be completed. The developed model estimates the minimum, 
maximum, and most likely amounts of the NPV during the service life of the pipe. The 
deterioration profile determines the times of performing the rehabilitation techniques. Figure 5-
32 shows a sample demonstration of the deterioration profile development and determination of 
the years of rehabilitation actions. The condition of the pipe before and after rehabilitation is 
computed, and the condition increment is determined based on the rules developed in the model. 
The condition increment is defined based on the type of the rehabilitation technique and its size.  
 
Figure 5- 31: Sample calculation sheet for life cycle cost analysis of rehabilitation scenarios 
    187 
 
Figure 5- 32: Deterioration profile development based on the rehabilitation action 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Summary and Conclusions 
The aging infrastructure and the considerable number of failures of oil and gas pipelines, 
as well as the significant consequences of their failures, have been a motivation for many 
researchers to study pipeline failure. A comprehensive study of these research efforts 
revealed the lack of a comprehensive objective model of failure assessment of oil and gas 
pipes. Some studies focused on corrosion or third-party failures and could not assess the 
probability of other failure sources. Most studies that consider multiple or even all  
failure sources are either subjective or they develop physical models that are very 
expensive to implement. The subjective models are usually qualitative and rely on expert 
opinion that is difficult if not impossible to obtain due to the location of most pipelines, 
which are buried underground. Apart from the expenses that can be imposed on the 
operators, the shortage of inspection data on unpiggable pipelines and in the early stages 
of pipeline operation has been a limitation. The existing maintenance planning models 
either do not use failure or risk assessment models to plan for pipeline life cycles, or they 
are not structured. 
The lack of effective models motivates this research to develop a comprehensive risk-
based maintenance planning model for the life cycle of pipelines. The model developed 
in this research provides an overall image throughout the service life of pipelines. This 
model is able to predict the probability and the level of financial consequences of pipeline 
failures. Failure probability is calculated through a Bow-tie-based quantitative prediction 
model. The model predicts the probability of failure for six main sources of oil and gas 
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pipeline failure  using the probability theory. The comparison of the actual and predicted 
probability of failure in a sample of more than one year period throughout the US proves 
the model’s efficiency and its accuracy with an average validity percentage of over 80%.  
A Neuro-Fuzzy consequence of failure prediction model is developed to forecast the 
financial consequences of possible failure scenarios. The model uses the location 
category, failure scenario, pipe diameter and the Specified Minimum Yield Strength data 
to forecast the failure consequences. The average validity percentage of the model is 
computed as being approximately 78%, proving the accuracy of the model. An integrated 
fuzzy risk assessment model is developed that evaluates the risk of failure of pipes 
considering the calculated probability and consequences of failure.  
Using the results of the risk assessment model, a risk-based inspection planning model is 
developed to produce pipe inspection plans. A fuzzy expert system selects the appropriate 
inspection tools and determines the frequency of running these tools. Various  inspection 
scenarios are developed. The maximum risk of failure is calculated through a regression-
based deterioration profile considering the effect of inspection tools in reducing the risk 
of failure. The life cycle of the pipelines for each scenario is computed applying Monte-
Carlo simulation. An index is introduced, the Risk-Cost index, which is the multiplication 
of the maximum risk by the LCC. The risk-cost index is used to rank the inspection 
scenarios. The rehabilitation planning model applies a risk–based deterioration profile 
that is used to predict the required rehabilitation actions. The combinations of the pre-
defined maintenance operation types and possible defects’ sizes are applied to develop 
rehabilitation scenarios over a pipelines’ service life. Monte Carlo simulation is applied 
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to analyze the life cycle cost of the scenarios due to the uncertainties of the economic 
factors and the maintenance operation costs.  
The results of the sensitivity analysis show that soils with a low resistivity, acidic 
environment, and low redox potential have a higher contribution to the corrosivity of the 
soil around pipes. The results also proved that pipes with coal tar, asphalt, or paint 
coatings are more likely to fail as a result of an external corrosion failure. For internal 
corrosion failures, the product type effect is major, while inspection efficiency has a 
considerable impact on such failures. Mechanical damages are affected mainly by the 
pipes’ depth of cover. Most of the failure sources are affected significantly by the 
diameter of the pipes and their installation date.  
The results proved the importance of the location category and the specified minimum 
yield strength of the pipes on the level of financial consequences.  This research can be 
used by the oil and gas pipeline operators to predict the risk of failure of such pipes. The 
results are specific to the location and environment of the pipelines, as well as their 
geometric properties and installation year. The computed values can quantitatively 
forecast the probability of pipe failure and the level of monetary consequences.  
Risk evaluation is a crucial aid in the decision-making process of infrastructure systems. 
This model also helps in planning the inspection and maintenance of the pipes as 
mandated by Canadian and American regulators of the petroleum industry, while the 
required tools were not existed. In addition, this model will be useful in assisting the 
operators of such facilities in the maintenance and inspection planning. The model can 
rank the selected tools based on their risk growth and life cycle cost. The maintenance 
planning model can also plan for the maintenance of pipeliness based on their predicted 
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deterioration and can propose the least expensive maintenance alternative for a pipeline’s  
service life.  
This research develops a novel framework for the development of risk assessment models 
completely based on the historical failure data. The methodology is applied on the 
infrastructure of oil and gas pipelines. However, it can be expanded to be used in other 
infrastructure types. The main value of such models is that they reduce the cost of failure 
prediction with or without inspection data. These models can produce indices of the 
probability assessment and consequences of failure that can be used to assess the failure 
risk  of different infrastructure types and to plan accordingly for the life cycle of such 
infrastructures.  
6.2 Research Contributions 
The main contributions of this research include the following: 
 A framework to develop risk assessment models for different infrastructure types 
using historical data; 
 A probabilistic Bow-tie-based model to predict the probability of failure in oil and 
gas pipelines; 
 A consequences of failure model to forecast the financial consequences of failure, 
using  a Neuro-Fuzzy technique;  
 An integrated fuzzy risk assessment model to evaluate the risk level of a pipeline; 
 A fuzzy expert system for selecting the most appropriate inspection tools and to 
determine the frequency at which to run those tools;  
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 An inspection planning model to develop various inspection scenarios versus a 
pipeline’s risk growth and to rank them based on their Risk-cost indices; and 
 A rehabilitation planning model to develop different intervention scenarios and 
rank them based on the LCC. 
6.3 Research Limitations 
The research has some limitations, which can be summarized as follows: 
1) The probability of failure prediction model does not consider the interdependency 
of basic events.  
2) The event-tree does not consider the effect of safety barriers that can reduce the 
probability of ignition or explosion. 
3) The consequence of failure prediction model is only capable of forecasting the 
overall financial consequences of potential failures. 
4) The inspection planning model only proposes a fixed scale for selecting the 
inspection tools based on the failure consequences. 
5) The developed automated tool still requires the user to enter the times of 
rehabilitation and replacement for each scenario type, based on the calculation of 
the deterioration profile. 
6) In the absence of required data on the identified variables, the model could only 
be developed for onshore pipes. 
6.4 Future Work and Recommendations 
The developed model was able to achieve the proposed objectives of the research, but 
certain areas are recommended for enhancement in the future. 
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6.4.1 Enhancement Areas  
 Develop a Bayesian network to consider the variables that were not available 
through the historical data and develop a network of the identified basic events. 
The development of the probability of failure assessment model was limited to the 
availability of historical data, while in the Bayesian network expert opinion can 
be fused with other variables’ contribution to pipe failure.  
 Consider the requirements of offshore pipelines for maintenance planning, such as 
the extra cost of renting an offshore vessel and the estimated time required for 
each rehabilitation activity. 
 Collect more data in order to consider the interdependency of the failure sources 
among each other, especially the effect of thinning the wall thickness on time-
independent failure sources. The enhancement can help in extending the model to 
consider the effect of corrosion on other failure probabilities. 
 Develop a consequence of failure prediction model on non-financial types of 
consequences, for example the amount of product released to the environment 
based on a failure scenario. The prediction of the environmental effects of pipe 
failure needs more data, including the discharge rate, the hole size, and the 
estimation of the time the leakage might happen.  
 Consider the possible defect types in developing rehabilitation scenarios. This 
model might be able to predict the types of defects that can cause the failure of a 
pipeline and thus make it possible to plan for the maintenance accordingly.  
 Develop a dynamic age of failure prediction model and consider it in the 
rehabilitation planning model. Considering the actual metal loss can help in 
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estimating the age at failure, which in turn can estimate the short-term 
requirements of rehabilitation. 
6.4.2 Extension Areas 
 Although inspection data is expensive, it is required to inspect pipelines every few 
years after a pipeline’s start of operation. Consequently, it is recommended to 
extend the application of this model to infuse the extracted historical data on 
pipeline failures with data gathered from the inline inspection tools. 
 The developed model applies the historical data on the failures of oil and gas 
pipelines in the US. While this database is very comprehensive, and many 
operators worldwide use this database to forecast the failure probability of their 
pipes, there is a need to compare the forecasted rates with those of other countries. 
This might lead to some adjustment factors for various locations to consider the 
differences in their regulations and construction conditions. 
 The developed model could be extended if enough data can be collected to map 
the forecasted amounts of failure probability with the actual condition of the pipes 
under evaluation. This extension will lead to a dynamic model that can forecast 
the probability of failure at different stages of operation based on the availability 
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Appendix (A): Developed indices to calculate the POF of pipes 
 
Table A-1 shows the parameters of the selected functions for internal corrosion and 
material and weld damages. As shown, for internal corrosion the index is not separated 
for oil and gas pipes, however, the product type can be among the four pre-defined 
categories. First category belongs to crude oil, and the fourth category determines the gas 
pipes. While the probability of failure with respect to internal corrosion for oil pipes is 
the highest, the contribution of gas pipes to such failures is around half in terms of the 
mean values of the defined PDFs. Also, it is clear from comparing the mean values that 
the pipes with frequent inspections have been at least 3 times less prone to internal 
corrosion failures.  
Then, Table A-2 shows the parameters of the selected functions for mechanical damages 
for oil and gas pipes. The mean contribution of depth of cover to mechanical damage 
sources of failure increases when the depth of cover decreases. In lower location classes 
where there is a less density of the building and as a result the operators’ control over the 
pipeline decreases, the probability of failure with mechanical damages increases. The 
existence of a computer-based inspection system decreases the probability of a 
mechanical damage failure for gas pipes. Being located in a highly populated are 
decreases the probability of happening of a mechanical damage. Notifying the One-call 
system decreases the POF considerably with respect to mechanical failures. Being 
marked accurately is the other factors of mitigating the risk of failures with respect to the 
mechanical damages.  
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Table A- 1: Contribution of basic causes to IC and MW failures 
















Function Lognorm Normal Lognorm LogLogistic 
parameter #1 0.02093 0.00118 0.00863 -0.03172 
parameter #2 0.02341 0.00098 0.00657 0.06011 
parameter #3 0.02593   -0.00175 8.83810 
Inline 
Inspection 
Function Lognorm Logistic Logistic NA 
parameter #1 0.02821 0.00283 0.00265 - 
parameter #2 0.02799 0.00154 0.00148 - 
parameter #3 0.04951 - - - 
Internal 
protection 
Function Eponen Eponen Normal NA 
parameter #1 0.01673 0.01320 0.03697 - 
parameter #2 -0.13171 -0.04765 0.01470 - 






















Function Normal Lognorm Normal NA 
parameter #1 0.01058 0.02611 0.05159 - 
parameter #2 0.00704 0.02087 0.02405 - 
parameter #3 - -0.00483 - - 
SMYS 
Function ExtValue ExtValueMin Logistic NA 
parameter #1 0.02183 0.04849 0.01152 - 
parameter #2 0.01291 0.01222 0.00350 - 
parameter #3 - - - - 
Inspection 
Function Logistic ExtValueMin Logistic NA 
parameter #1 0.00558 0.00566 0.07343 - 
parameter #2 0.00472 0.00559 0.01360 - 




















Function Lognorm LogLogistic LogLogistic NA 
parameter #1 0.02089 -0.00832 -0.02418 - 
parameter #2 0.01509 0.04333 0.05027 - 
parameter #3 -0.00569 3.58460 8.14210 - 
SMYS 
Function ExtValue LogLogistic Normal NA 
parameter #1 0.03421 0.00797 0.00309 - 
parameter #2 0.01382 0.02533 0.00587 - 
parameter #3 - 2.72760 - - 
Inspection 
Function ExtValueMin Exponen Logistic NA 
parameter #1 0.04793 0.04255 0.15336 - 
parameter #2 0.01768 -0.00532 0.04918 - 
parameter #3 - - - - 
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Table A- 2: Contribution of the identified basic causes to the MD failures 






















Function Normal Lognorm Normal Logistic NA 
parameter #1 0.03451 0.01957 0.02148 0.00404 - 
parameter #2 0.01112 0.01458 0.00978 0.00215 - 
parameter #3 - -0.00352 - - - 
Location 
class 
Function Lognrom Normal NA NA NA 
parameter #1 0.05723 0.01837 - - - 
parameter #2 0.03230 0.00845 - - - 




Function Normal Normal NA NA NA 
parameter #1 0.09524 0.15476 - - - 
parameter #2 0.04647 0.03259 - - - 




Function Normal Loglogistic NA NA NA 
parameter #1 0.00926 -0.04628 - - - 
parameter #2 0.00345 0.11790 - - - 
parameter #3 - 8.36350 - - - 
One call 
Function Normal Loglogistic NA NA NA 
parameter #1 0.01580 -0.27835 - - - 
parameter #2 0.00645 0.34480 - - - 
parameter #3 - 23.92600 - - - 
Accurately 
marked 
Function Normal Weibul NA NA NA 
parameter #1 0.02842 4.52720 - - - 
parameter #2 0.01419 0.07413 - - - 





















Function Normal Normal Normal Logistic Logistic 
parameter #1 0.02189 0.03241 0.02104 0.00505 0.0022234 
parameter #2 0.01418 0.01282 0.01029 0.00255 0.002207 
parameter #3 - - - - - 
Location  
Function Exponen Loglogistic NA NA NA 
parameter #1 0.01557 0.01872 - - - 
parameter #2 -0.00130 0.04390 - - - 




Function Laplace Lognorm Loglogistic NA NA 
parameter #1 0.02250 0.01602 0.00669 - - 
parameter #2 0.01768 0.00401 0.03546 - - 
parameter #3 - -0.00518 3.69830 - - 
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Table A-3 continues the demonstration of the parameters of the functions for incorrect 
operations and natural forces. The existence of an efficient SCADA or CPM decreases 
the POF with respect to incorrect operations, while the unqualified operators can grow 
the probability of such failures. Also, the aboveground parts of pipes are more vulnerable 
to the incorrect operation failures.  
Table A- 3: Contribution of the identified basic causes to IO and NF 
















Function Normal Normal Normal NA 
parameter #1 0.16766 0.06448 0.02021 - 
parameter #2 0.03598 0.01848 0.00375 - 
parameter #3 - - - - 
Qualification 
of Operator 
Function Exponen Uniform NA NA 
parameter #1 0.01054 0.10843 - - 
parameter #2 0.05211 0.25301 - - 
parameter #3 - - - - 
Operating 
pressure 
Function Laplace Normal NA NA 
parameter #1 0.18519 0.06482 - - 
parameter #2 0.05587 0.02371 - - 
parameter #3 - - - - 
Location of 
Pipe 
Function Laplace Normal NA NA 
parameter #1 0.18519 0.06482 - - 
parameter #2 0.05587 0.02371 - - 












Function Logistic Extvalue Lognorm NA 
parameter #1 0.01131 0.01166 0.05161 - 
parameter #2 0.00846 0.01598 0.06824 - 
parameter #3 - - -0.00374 - 
Extreme 
Temperature 
Function ExtvalueMin Extvalue Lognorm Logistic 
parameter #1 0.02015 0.01582 0.05238 0.0068216 
parameter #2 0.01246 0.01455 0.02540 0.00918 
parameter #3 - - -0.02212 - 
Wind 
Function ExtvalueMin Logistic Extvalue NA 
parameter #1 0.03004 0.01412 0.01668 - 
parameter #2 0.03203 0.02453 0.03206 - 
parameter #3 - - - - 
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For natural force damages, an extreme cold temperature during winter, a high 
precipitation, and wind-speed are the main drivers of such failures. Table A-4 presents 
the contribution of the pipe diameter categories with respect to the mechanical damage, 
incorrect operation, and natural force failures. Large oil pipes are more likely to fail 
compared to their small counterparts. However, it is the opposite for gas pipes. For the 
incorrect operation failures of oil pipes, the probability of happening of a failure is higher 
for small pipes, while it is less likely for the pipes of above 10” to fail from such sources. 
For gas pipes, there is not enough observation to make a difference between various 
categories of diameter; consequently only one probability distribution function is 
calculated to compute the absolute POF with respect to such failures. For natural force 
damages, there is a significant difference between the contribution of the smallest 
diameter category of oil pipes and the larger pipes. The former is the most likely to fail 
from such failure sources. For those gas pipes that failed due to the natural force 
damages, there is not enough data on the diameter of the pipes. As a result, only one 
probability distribution function is introduced as the contribution of these pipes to 
calculate the absolute probability of failure. 
Table A-5 presents the indices to compute the after-failure events for gas pipes. Overall, 
the probability of a leakage is higher than larger hole sizes. However, this is not the case 
for incorrect operations, where it is less likely that a hole does not grow into a puncture or 
rupture. The probability of happening of ignition and explosion is higher than those of the 
oil pipes as was expected. The probability of growing a hole to a rupture is the highest for 
external corrosion while it stands second for the natural force damages.  
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The probability of ignition or explosion of such pipes in case of happening of a larger 
defect is overall higher than that of a smaller defect. The highest probability of 
occurrence of an ignition or explosion is related to the incorrect operations. The ignition 
or explosion is also more likely to happen in the case of a rupture due to the material and 
weld defects. 
Table A- 4: Contribution of the pipe diameter categories to MD, IO and NF failure 
sources 

















Function Normal Normal Gamma  Logistic Logistic 
parameter #1 0.00008569 0.00008978 0.00003659 0.00003253 0.00001192 
parameter #2 0.00010044 0.00003203 -0.00002403 0.00004662 0.00002383 
parameter #3 - - - - - 
Gas 
Function Exponen Normal Normal Normal Logistic 
parameter #1 0.00011862 0.00007637 0.00008559 0.00003285 0.00001165 
parameter #2 0.00002838 0.00002659 0.00003248 0.00002080 0.00000790 















Function - Logistic Logistic Logistic - 
parameter #1 - 0.00052941 0.00020767 0.00025724 - 
parameter #2 - 0.00048980 0.00009503 0.00015701 - 
parameter #3   - - -   
Gas 
Function Extvalue 
parameter #1 0.00001039 
parameter #2 0.00000491 












Function Logistic Normal Normal Logistic - 
parameter #1 0.00052941 0.00011497 0.00021210 0.00025724 - 
parameter #2 0.00048980 0.00007349 0.00016840 0.00015701 - 
parameter #3 - - - - - 
Gas 
Function Lognorm 
parameter #1 0.00005441 
parameter #2 0.00002931 
parameter #3 -0.00001529 
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Table A- 5: Indices related to probability of after-failure events for gas pipes 
Failure source (S) Hole size (H) P(H│S ) Ignition type (Ign) P(Ign│H ) 
EC 
Pinhole 
           
0.553846  
Leakage only 0.983333 
Ignition  0.001389 
Explosion 0.015278 
Puncture 
           
0.007692  
Leakage only 0.800000 
Ignition  0.100000 
Explosion 0.100000 
Rupture 
           
0.438462  
Leakage only 0.578947 




           
0.691589  
Leakage only 0.878378 
Ignition  0.054054 
Explosion 0.067568 
Puncture 
           
0.065421  
Leakage only 0.585714 
Ignition  0.400000 
Explosion 0.014286 
Rupture 
           
0.242991  
Leakage only 0.461538 




           
0.548182  
Leakage only 0.986316 
Ignition  0.011579 
Explosion 0.002105 
Puncture 
           
0.209463  
Leakage only 0.936639 
Ignition  0.005510 
Explosion 0.057851 
Rupture 
           
0.242354  
Leakage only 0.666667 




           
0.358779  
Leakage only 0.934043 
Ignition  0.054255 
Explosion 0.011702 
Puncture 
           
0.358779  
Leakage only 0.881915 
Ignition  0.085106 
Explosion 0.032979 
Rupture 
           
0.282443  
Leakage only 0.877027 




           
0.200000  
Leakage only 0.633333 
Ignition  0.183333 
Explosion 0.183333 
Puncture 
           
0.733333  
Leakage only 0.586364 
Ignition  0.227273 
Explosion 0.186364 
Rupture 
           
0.066667  
Leakage only 0.800000 




           
0.112583  
Leakage only 0.864706 
Ignition  0.123529 
Explosion 0.011765 
Puncture 
           
0.516556  
Leakage only 0.946154 
Ignition  0.051282 
Explosion 0.002564 
Rupture 
           
0.370861  
Leakage only 0.892857 
Ignition  0.053571 
Explosion 0.053571 
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Appendix (B): Sample probability distribution functions for POF model 
Table B- 1: Distribution functions associated with soil corrosion 
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POF (failures/ mile. year) 
D1 4" or Less 
 
D2 Over 4" thru 10" 
 
D3 Over 10" thru 20" 
 
D4 Over 20" thru 28" 
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Appendix (C): Fields of historical data  
of gas transmission and gathering pipes’ failures (2010-2015) 
Table C- 1: Data fields on Gas transmission and Gathering Pipes (2010-2015) 
Field Name Description 
Data as of date 
Identify if record meets the significant criteria or not: If there was fatality, injury, or total property 
damage is $50K or more in 1984 dollars, then SIGNIFICANT=’YES’, else SIGNIFICANT=’NO’. 
Identify if record meets the SERIOUS criteria or not: If there was fatality or injury then SERIOUS = ‘YES’ 
else SERIOUS = ’NO’. 
PHMSA DOT assigned unique identifier for report 
PHMSA DOT assigned unique identifier for report submission 
Date when Original Report submitted 
Report Type (Original, Supplemental, Final) 
Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification number 
Operator Name 
Operator Address - Street 
Operator Address - City 
Operator Address - State 
Operator Address - Zip 
Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Incident 
Year incident occurred, derived from incident date 
Incident Location Latitude 
Incident Location Longitude 
National Response Center Report Number 
National Response Center time and date of initial telephonic report 
Incident resulted from (Unintentional release of gas, or intentional release of gas, or reasons other than 
release of gas) 
Type of Gas released (Natural, Propane, Synthetic, Hydrogen, or Other gas) 
Other Commodity Name 
Estimated volume of gas released unintentionally in Thousand Cubic Feet (MCF) 
Estimated volume of intentional and controlled release/blowdown in Thousand Cubic Feet (MCF) 
Estimated volume of accompanying liquid released in Barrels 
Fatalities (Yes, No) 
Number of Fatalities of Operator Employees 
Number of Fatalities of Contractor Employees working for the Operator 
Number of Fatalities of Non-Operator emergency responders 
Number of Fatalities of Workers working on the right-of-way, but not associated with this Operator 
Number of Fatalities of General Public 
Total number of Fatalities 
Injuries (Yes, No) 
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Number of Injuries of Operator Employees 
Number of Injuries of Contractor Employees working for the Operator 
Number of Injuries of Non-Operator emergency responders 
Number of Injuries of Workers working on the right-of-way, but not associated with this Operator 
Number of Injuries of General Public 
Total number of Injuries 
The pipeline/facility shutdown due to the Incident (Yes, No, Null) 
if PART A.14 is "No" - The pipeline/facility shutdown due to the Incident - Explain No shutdown 
The pipeline/facility shutdown due to the Incident - Local time and date of shutdown 
The pipeline/facility shutdown due to the Incident - Local time pipeline/facility restarted 
Elapsed Time Until Area Was Made Safe / Hours 
The pipeline/facility shutdown due to the Incident - Still shut down (Yes, Null) 
Commodity ignite (Yes, No) 
Commodity explode (Yes, No) 
Number of general public evacuated 
Time sequence - Local time operator identified Incident 
Time sequence - Local time operator resources arrived on site 
Origin of Incident Onshore or Offshore 
Onshore - State 
Onshore - Zip Code 
Onshore - City 
Onshore - County or Parish 
Onshore - Operator-designated location 
Onshore - Operator-designated location name 
Onshore - Pipeline/facility name 
Onshore - Segment Name 
Onshore - Federal land (Yes, No, Null) 
Onshore - Location of Incident 
Onshore - Area of Incident 
Onshore - Area of Incident Sub-type 
Onshore - Describe Other Area of Incident 
Onshore Underground - Depth-of-Cover (in) 
Onshore - Incident occurred in a crossing (Yes, No, Null) 
Onshore - Bridge Crossing (Yes, Null) 
Onshore - Bridge Type 
Onshore - Railroad Crossing (Yes, Null) 
Onshore - Railroad Type 
Onshore - Road Crossing (Yes, Null) 
Onshore - Road Type 
Onshore - Water Crossing (Yes, Null) 
Onshore - Water Type 
Onshore - Name of body of water, if commonly known 
Onshore - Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Incident 
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Onshore - Water Crossing Sub-type 
Offshore - Approximate water depth (ft.) 
Offshore - Origin of Incident (State, Outer Continental Shelf=OCS) 
Offshore State waters - State 
Offshore State waters - Area 
Offshore State waters - Block/Tract 
Offshore State waters - Nearest County/Parish 
Offshore OCS - Area 
Offshore OCS - Block 
Offshore - Area of Incident 
Pipeline/facility Interstate or Intrastate 
Part of system involved in Incident 
Item involved in Incident 
Part of Pipe (Pipe Body, Pipe Seam) 
Nominal diameter of Pipe (in) 
Wall thickness (in) 
SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi) 
Pipe specification 
Type of Pipe Seam 
Type of Pipe Seam - Pipe Seam Other Details 
Type of Pipe Seam - Pipe manufacturer 
Year of manufacture of Pipe 
Pipeline coating type at point of Incident 
Pipeline coating - Other pipeline coating type 
Weld Sub-type 
Other Weld Sub-type Details 
Type of Valve 
Type of Valve - Type of Mainline Valve 
Type of Valve - Other Mainline Valve Details 
Type of Valve - Mainline valve manufacturer 
Type of Valve - Year of manufacture of Mainline valve 
Other Item Involved Details 
Year item installed that involved in Incident 
Material involved in Incident 
Material involved - Other Material than Carbon Steel Details 
Type of Incident involved 
Mechanical Puncture - Approx. size - Axial (in.) 
Mechanical Puncture - Approx. size - Circumferential (in.) 
Leak Type 
Leak Type Other Details 
Rupture Orientation (Circumferential, Longitudinal, Other) 
Rupture Orientation Other Details 
Rupture - Approx. size (in.) (length circumferentially or axially) 
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Rupture - Approx. size (in.) (widest opening) 
Type of Incident Other Details 
Type of class location for incident 
Incident occurred in High Consequence Area (HCA) (Yes, No) 
Specific method used to identify the High Consequence Area (HCA) 
What is the PIR (Potential Impact Radius) for the location of this Incident - Approx. size (feet) 
Were any structures outside the PIR impacted or otherwise damaged by heat/fire resulting from the 
Incident (Yes, No) 
Were any structures outside the PIR impacted or otherwise damaged NOT by heat/fire resulting from the 
Incident (Yes, No) 
Were any of the fatalities or injuries reported for persons located outside the PIR (Yes, No) 
Estimated Property Damage - Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property damage 
paid/reimbursed by the Operator 
Converted Property Damage to Current Year dollars 
Cost of Gas Released - Estimated cost of gas released during intentional and controlled blowdown 
Converted Property Damage to Current Year dollars 
Cost of Gas Released - Estimated cost of gas released unintentionally 
Converted Property Damage to Current Year dollars 
Estimated Property Damage - Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs 
Converted Property Damage to Current Year dollars 
Estimated Property Damage - Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response 
Converted Property Damage to Current Year dollars 
Estimated Property Damage - Estimated other costs 
Converted Property Damage to Current Year dollars 
Estimated Property Damage - Estimated other costs details 
Total of all costs (Sum of 
EST_COST_OPER_PAID,EST_COST_GAS_RELEASED,EST_COST_INTENT_REL,EST_COST_PROP_DAMAGE,EST
_COST_EMERGENC,EST_COST_OTHER) 
Converted Property Damage to Current Year dollars 
Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Incident (psig) 
Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the Incident (psig) 
Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) established by 49 CFR section 
Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) established by 49 CFR section other details 
Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the Incident (exceed MOP or not) 
System or facility relating to the Incident operating under an established pressure restriction with 
pressure limits below those normally allowed by the MOP (Yes, No, Null) 
Pressure exceed established pressure restriction (Yes, No, Null) 
Mandated by (PHMSA, State, Not mandated) 
Part of system is "Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites” or “Offshore Pipeline, Including Riser and Riser 
Bend" (Yes, No) 
Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release source 
Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source 
Length of segment initially isolated between valves (ft) 
Pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools (Yes, No, Null) 
Physical features which limit tool accommodation - Changes in line pipe diameter (Yes, Null) 
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Physical features which limit tool accommodation - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves (Yes, Null) 
Physical features which limit tool accommodation - Tight or mitered pipe bends (Yes, Null) 
Physical features which limit tool accommodation - Other passage restrictions (Yes, Null) 
Physical features which limit tool accommodation - Extra thick pipe wall (Yes, Null) 
Physical features which limit tool accommodation - Other (Yes, Null) 
Physical features which limit tool accommodation - Other physical features Details 
Operational factors which significantly complicate the execution of an internal inspection tool run (Yes, 
No, Null) 
Operational factors complicate execution - Excessive debris or scale (Yes, Null) 
Operational factors complicate execution - Low operating pressure(s) (Yes, Null) 
Operational factors complicate execution - Low flow or absence of flow (Yes, Null) 
Operational factors complicate execution - Incompatible commodity (Yes, Null) 
Operational factors complicate execution - Other Complications (Yes, Null) 
Operational factors complicate execution - Other Operational factors Details 
Function of pipeline system 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based system in place on the pipeline or facility 
involved in the Incident (Yes, No, Null) 
SCADA operating at the time of the Incident (Yes, No, Null) 
SCADA fully functional at the time of the Incident (Yes, No, Null) 
SCADA -based information (such as alarm (s), event(s), and/or volume or pack calculations) assist with the 
detection of the Incident (Yes, No, Null) 
SCADA -based information (such as alarm (s), event(s), and/or volume or pack calculations) assist with the 
confirmation of the Incident (Yes, No, Null) 
How Incident was identified for the Operator 
How Incident was identified for the Operator - Other Details 
Specify Type of Operator 
Investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or control room issues were the cause of or a 
contributing factor to the Incident (Yes, No, Not necessary) 
Operator did not find that an investigation of the controller(s) actions or control room issues was 
necessary due to 
Investigation reviewed schedule rotations, continuous hours of service and other factors associated with 
fatigue (Yes, Null) 
Investigation did NOT reviewed schedule rotations, continuous hours of service and other factors 
associated with fatigue (Yes, Null) 
Details of Investigation did NOT reviewed schedule rotations, continuous hours of service and other 
factors associated with fatigue 
Investigation initiated - No control room issues (Yes, Null) 
Investigation initiated - No controller issues (Yes, Null) 
Investigation initiated - Incorrect controller action or controller error (Yes, Null) 
Investigation initiated - That fatigue may have affected the controller(s) involved or impacted the involved 
controller(s) response (Yes, Null) 
Investigation initiated - Incorrect procedures (Yes, Null) 
Investigation initiated - Incorrect control room equipment operation (Yes, Null) 
Investigation initiated - Maintenance activities that affected control room operations, procedures, and/or 
controller response (Yes, Null) 
Investigation initiated - Other areas (Yes, Null) 
Investigation initiated - Other areas Details 
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Operator employees tested under the post-Incident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT’s Drug 
& Alcohol Testing regulations (Yes, No) 
Number of employees tested 
Number of employees failed 
Operator contractor employees tested under the post-Incident drug and alcohol testing requirements of 
DOT’s Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations (Yes, No) 
Number of contractors tested 
Number of contractors failed 
Apparent Cause of the Incident 
Detailed Cause of the Incident 
Cause by PHMSA for 20 year incident trending 
SubCause by PHMSA for 20 year incident trending 
Corrosion Failure Sub-Cause (Internal, External) 
External Corrosion - Visual Examination 
External Corrosion - Other Visual Examination Details 
External Corrosion Type - Galvanic 
External Corrosion Type - Atmosphere 
External Corrosion Type - Stray Current 
External Corrosion Type - Microbiological 
External Corrosion Type - Selective Seam 
External Corrosion Type - Other 
External Corrosion Type - Other Details 
External Corrosion Type Based on - Field Examination 
External Corrosion Type Based on - Metallurgical Analysis 
External Corrosion Type Based on - Other Analysis 
External Corrosion Type Based on - Other Analysis Details 
External Corrosion - Failed item buried under the ground (Yes, No, Null) 
Under Cathodic Protection (Yes, No, Null) 
Year Cathodic Protection Started 
Shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at the point of Incident (Yes, No, Null) 
Cathodic Survey Type 
Cathodic Protection Annual Survey 
Close Interval Survey 
Other Cathodic Protection Survey 
Cathodic Protection Annual Survey Year 
Close Interval Survey Year 
Other Cathodic Protection Survey Year 
Failed item externally coated or painted 
External Corrosion - Observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of the corrosion 
Internal Corrosion - Visual Examination Results 
Internal Corrosion - Other Visual Examination Results Details 
Internal Corrosion Cause - Corrosive Commodity 
Internal Corrosion Cause - Water Acid 
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Internal Corrosion Cause - Microbiological 
Internal Corrosion Cause - Erosion 
Internal Corrosion Cause - Other 
Internal Corrosion Cause - Other Details 
Internal Corrosion Cause Based on - Field Examination 
Internal Corrosion Cause Based on - Metallurgical Analysis 
Internal Corrosion Cause Based on - Other Analysis 
Internal Corrosion Cause Based on - Other Analysis Details 
Internal Corrosion Location - Low point in pipe 
Internal Corrosion Location - Elbow 
Internal Corrosion Location - Drop out 
Internal Corrosion Location - Other 
Internal Corrosion Location - Other Details 
Internal Corrosion - Commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides (Yes, No, Null) 
Internal Corrosion - Interior coated or lined with protective coating (Yes, No, Null) 
Internal Corrosion - Cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely utilized (Yes, No, Not 
applicable) 
Internal Corrosion - Corrosion coupons routinely utilized (Yes, No, Not applicable) 
Internal Corrosion - One or more internal inspection tool collected data at incident (Yes, No) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool (Yes, Null) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Year 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Ultrasonic (Yes, Null) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Ultrasonic Year 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Geometry (Yes, Null) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Geometry Year 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Caliper (Yes, Null) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Caliper Year 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Crack (Yes, Null) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Crack Year 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Hard Spot (Yes, Null) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Hard Spot Year 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Combination Tool (Yes, Null) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Combination Tool Year 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Transverse Field/Triaxial (Yes, Null) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Transverse Field/Triaxial Year 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Other Internal Inspection Tool (Yes, Null) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Other Internal Inspection Tool Details 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Other Internal Inspection Tool Year 
Corrosion - One or more Hydrotest or other pressure test conducted since original construction (Yes, No, 
Null) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Pressure test conducted year 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Test pressure (psig) 
Corrosion - One or more Direct Assessment inspection(s) conducted (Yes, No, Null) 
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Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Year Direct Assessment dig 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld - Year Direct Assessment no dig 
Corrosion - One or more Non-destructive examination been conducted since January 1, 2002 (Yes, No, 
Null) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld Non-destructive examination Type - Radiography (Yes, Null) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld Non-destructive examination - Radiography Year 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld Non-destructive examination Type - Guided Wave Ultrasonic (Yes, Null) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld Non-destructive examination - Guided Wave Ultrasonic Year 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld Non-destructive examination Type - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool (Yes, Null) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld Non-destructive examination - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool Year 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld Non-destructive examination Type - Wet Magnetic Particle Test (Yes, Null) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld Non-destructive examination - Wet Magnetic Particle Year 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld Non-destructive examination Type - Dry Magnetic Particle Test (Yes, Null) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld Non-destructive examination - Dry Magnetic Particle Year 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld Non-destructive examination Type - Other (Yes, Null) 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld Non-destructive examination - Other Year 
Corrosion Pipe/Weld Non-destructive examination - Other Type Details 
Natural Force Damage Sub-Cause 
Natural Force Damage - Sub-type of Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods 
Natural Force Damage - Sub-type of Heavy Rains/Floods 
Natural Force Damage - Sub-type of Lightning 
Natural Force Damage - Sub-type of Temperature 
Natural Force Damage - Other Natural Force Damage or Sub-type Details 
Natural Force Damage - Natural forces causing incident generated in conjunction with an extreme 
weather event (Yes, No, Null) 
Extreme weather - Hurricane (Yes, Null) 
Extreme weather - Tropical Storm (Yes, Null) 
Extreme weather - Tornado (Yes, Null) 
Extreme weather - Other type (Yes, Null) 
Extreme weather - Other type Details 
Excavation Damage Sub-Cause 
Excavation Damage Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity - One or more Internal Inspection tool 
collected data (Yes, No, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Ultrasonic (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Ultrasonic Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Geometry (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Geometry Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Caliper (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Caliper Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Crack (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Crack Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Hard Spot (Yes, Null) 
    223 
Internal Inspection Tool - Hard Spot Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Combination Tool (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Combination Tool Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Transverse Field/Triaxial (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Transverse Field/Triaxial Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Other Internal Inspection Tool (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Other Internal Inspection Tool Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Other Internal Inspection Tool Details 
Excavation Damage Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity - Internal inspection was completed 
before damage was sustained (Yes, No, Null) 
Excavation Damage Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity - One or more Hydrotest or other 
pressure test conducted since original construction (Yes, No, Null) 
Pressure test conducted year 
Test pressure (psig) 
Excavation Damage Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity - Type of Direct Assessment 
Direct Assessment and Investigative dig conducted - Year 
Direct Assessment conducted but point of Incident was not identified as dig site - Year 
Excavation Damage Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity - One or more Non-destructive 
examination been conducted since January 1, 2002 (Yes, No, Null) 
Non-destructive examination Type - Radiography (Yes, Null) 
Non-destructive examination Type - Radiography Year 
Non-destructive examination Type - Guided Wave Ultrasonic (Yes, Null) 
Non-destructive examination Type - Guided Wave Ultrasonic Year 
Non-destructive examination Type - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool (Yes, Null) 
Non-destructive examination Type - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool Year 
Non-destructive examination Type - Wet Magnetic Particle Test (Yes, Null) 
Non-destructive examination Type - Wet Magnetic Particle Year 
Non-destructive examination Type - Dry Magnetic Particle Test (Yes, Null) 
Non-destructive examination Type - Dry Magnetic Particle Year 
Non-destructive examination Type - Other (Yes, Null) 
Non-destructive examination Type - Other Year 
Non-destructive examination Type - Other Type Details 
Excavation Damage Third Party - Operator got prior notification of the excavation activity (Yes, No, Null) 
Notification received from One-Call System (Yes, Null) 
Notification received from Excavator (Yes, Null) 
Notification received from Contractor (Yes, Null) 
Notification received from Landowner (Yes, Null) 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions - Do you want PHMSA to upload CGA-DIRT Program 
questions to CGA-DIRT.com (Yes, No, Null) 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions Right-of-Way (RoW) - Public (Yes, Null) 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions Right-of-Way (RoW) - Public Sub-type 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions Right-of-Way (RoW) - Private (Yes, Null) 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions Right-of-Way (RoW) - Private Sub-type 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions Right-of-Way (RoW) - Pipeline Property/Easement (Yes, 
Null) 
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Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions Right-of-Way (RoW) - Power/Transmission Line (Yes, 
Null) 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions Right-of-Way (RoW) - Railroad (Yes, Null) 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions Right-of-Way (RoW) - Dedicated Public Utility Easement 
(Yes, Null) 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions Right-of-Way (RoW) - Federal Land (Yes, Null) 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions Right-of-Way (RoW) - Data not collected (Yes, Null) 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions Right-of-Way (RoW) - Unknown/Other Row (Yes, Null) 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions - Type of Excavator 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions - Type of Excavation Equipment 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions - Type of Work Performed 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions - One-Call Center notified (Yes, No, Null) 
Ticket Number of One-Call Center 
State where more than a single One-Call Center exists, list name of One-Call Center notified 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions - Type of Locator 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions - Facilities marks visible 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions - Facilities marked correctly 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions - Damage cause interruption in service 
Duration of the interruption in service (hrs) 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions - Root cause 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions - One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient Sub-type 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions - Locating Practices Not Sufficient Sub-type 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions - Excavation Practices Not Sufficient Sub-type 
Excavation Damage CGA-DIRT Program questions - Other Root Cause Details 
Other Outside Force Damage Sub-Cause 
Other Outside Force Damage - Vehicle Sub-type 
Other Outside Force Damage Extreme weather - Hurricane (Yes, Null) 
Other Outside Force Damage Extreme weather - Tropical Storm (Yes, Null) 
Other Outside Force Damage Extreme weather - Tornado (Yes, Null) 
Other Outside Force Damage Extreme weather - Heavy Rains/Flood (Yes, Null) 
Other Outside Force Damage Extreme weather - Other type (Yes, Null) 
Other Outside Force Damage Extreme weather - Other type Details 
Other Outside Force Damage Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity Pipe/Weld - One or more 
Internal Inspection tool collected data (Yes, No, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Ultrasonic (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Ultrasonic Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Geometry (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Geometry Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Caliper (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Caliper Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Crack (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Crack Year 
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Internal Inspection Tool - Hard Spot (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Hard Spot Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Combination Tool (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Combination Tool Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Transverse Field/Triaxial (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Transverse Field/Triaxial Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Other Internal Inspection Tool (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Other Internal Inspection Tool Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Other Internal Inspection Tool Details 
Other Outside Force Damage Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity Pipe/Weld - Internal inspection 
was completed before damage was sustained (Yes, No, Null) 
One or more Hydrotest or other pressure test conducted since original construction (Yes, No, Null) 
Pressure test conducted year 
Test pressure (psig) 
Other Outside Force Damage Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity Pipe/Weld - Type of Direct 
Assessment 
Direct Assessment and Investigative dig conducted - Year 
Direct Assessment conducted but point of Incident was not identified as dig site - Year 
One or more Non-destructive examination been conducted since January 1, 2002 (Yes, No, Null) 
Non-destructive Examination - Radiography (Yes, Null) 
Non-destructive Examination - Radiography Year 
Non-destructive Examination - Guided Wave Ultrasonic (Yes, Null) 
Non-destructive Examination - Guided Wave Ultrasonic Year 
Non-destructive Examination - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool (Yes, Null) 
Non-destructive Examination - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool Year 
Non-destructive Examination - Wet Magnetic Particle Test (Yes, Null) 
Non-destructive Examination - Wet Magnetic Particle Year 
Non-destructive Examination - Dry Magnetic Particle Test (Yes, Null) 
Non-destructive Examination - Dry Magnetic Particle Year 
Non-destructive Examination - Other Internal Inspection Tool (Yes, Null) 
Non-destructive Examination - Other Internal Inspection Tool Year 
Non-destructive Examination - Other Internal Inspection Tool details 
Other Outside Force Damage - Intentional Damage Sub-type 
Other Outside Force Damage - Intentional Damage Other Details 
Other Outside Force Damage - Other Details 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld Sub-Cause 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld sub-cause Based on - Field Examination (Yes, Null) 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld sub-cause Based on - Metallurgical Analysis (Yes, Null) 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld sub-cause Based on - Other Analysis (Yes, Null) 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld sub-cause Based on - Other Analysis Details 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - Sub-cause is Tentative or Suspected; Still Under Investigation (Yes, Null) 
Construction/Installation/Fabrication related - Contributing factors 
Construction/Installation/Fabrication related - Contributing factors related to Fatigue/Vibration 
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Construction/Installation/Fabrication related - Contributing factors related to Fatigue/Vibration Other 
Details 
Construction/Installation/Fabrication related - Contributing factors related to Mechanical Stress 
Construction/Installation/Fabrication related - Contributing factors related to Other factors 
Construction/Installation/Fabrication related - Contributing factors related to Other factors Details 
Original Manufacturing related (NOT girth weld or other welds formed in the field) - Contributing factors 
Original Manufacturing related (NOT girth weld or other welds formed in the field) - Contributing factors 
related to Fatigue/Vibration 
Original Manufacturing related (NOT girth weld or other welds formed in the field) - Contributing factors 
related to Fatigue/Vibration Other Details 
Original Manufacturing related (NOT girth weld or other welds formed in the field) - Contributing factors 
related to Mechanical Stress 
Original Manufacturing related (NOT girth weld or other welds formed in the field) - Contributing factors 
related to Other factors 
Original Manufacturing related (NOT girth weld or other welds formed in the field) - Contributing factors 
related to Other factors Details 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld related to Environmental Cracking - Stress Sub-type 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld related to Environmental Cracking - Stress Sub-type Other Details 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld Additional factor - Dent 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld Additional factor - Gouge 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld Additional factor - Pipe Bend 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld Additional factor - Arc Burn 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld Additional factor - Crack 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld Additional factor - Lack of Fusion 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld Additional factor - Lamination 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld Additional factor - Buckle 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld Additional factor - Wrinkle 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld Additional factor - Misalignment 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld Additional factor - Burnt Steel 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld Additional factor - Other 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld Additional factor - Other details 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - One or more Internal Inspection tool collected data (Yes, No, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Ultrasonic (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Ultrasonic Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Geometry (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Geometry Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Caliper (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Caliper Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Crack (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Crack Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Hard Spot (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Hard Spot Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Combination Tool (Yes, Null) 
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Internal Inspection Tool - Combination Tool Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Transverse Field/Triaxial (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Transverse Field/Triaxial Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Other Internal Inspection Tool (Yes, Null) 
Internal Inspection Tool - Other Internal Inspection Tool Year 
Internal Inspection Tool - Other Internal Inspection Tool Details 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - Hydrotest or other pressure test conducted (Yes, No, Null) 
Pressure test conducted year 
Test pressure (psig) 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - Type of Direct Assessment Inspection 
Year Direct Assessment dig 
Year Direct Assessment no dig 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - Non-destructive examination (Yes, No, Null) 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - Radiography (Yes, Null) 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - Radiography Year 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - Guided Wave Ultrasonic (Yes, Null) 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - Guided Wave Ultrasonic Year 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool (Yes, Null) 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool Year 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - Wet Magnetic Particle Test (Yes, Null) 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - Wet Magnetic Particle Year 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - Dry Magnetic Particle Test (Yes, Null) 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - Dry Magnetic Particle Year 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - Other non-destructive examination (Yes, Null) 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - Other non-destructive examination year 
Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - Other non-destructive examination details 
Equipment Failure Sub-Cause 
Equipment Failure Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment - Control Valve (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment - Instrumentation (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment - SCADA (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment - Communications (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment - Block Valve (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment - Check Valve (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment - Relief Valve (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment - Power Failure (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment - Stopple/Control Fitting (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment - Pressure Regulator (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment - ESD System Failure (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment -Other (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment - Other details 
Equipment Failure Pump or Pump-related Equipment - Other Pump (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Pump or Pump-related Equipment - Other Pump Details 
Equipment Failure Threaded Connection/Coupling Failure - Other Stripped (Yes, Null) 
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Equipment Failure Threaded Connection/Coupling Failure - Other Stripped Details 
Equipment Failure Non-threaded Connection Failure - Other Non-threaded Connection (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Non-threaded Connection Failure - Other Non-threaded Connection Details 
Other Equipment Failure - Details 
Equipment Failure Additional factor - Excessive vibration (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Additional factor - Overpressurization (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Additional factor - No support or loss of support (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Additional factor - Manufacturing defect (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Additional factor - Loss of electricity (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Additional factor - Improper installation (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Additional factor - Mismatched items (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Additional factor - Dissimilar metals (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Additional factor - Breakdown of soft goods (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Additional factor - Valve vault (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Additional factor - Alarm/status failure (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Additional factor - Misalignment (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Additional factor - Thermal stress (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Additional factor - Other failure (Yes, Null) 
Equipment Failure Additional factor - Other failure Details 
Incorrect Operation Sub-Cause 
Incorrect Operation - Specify Underground Gas Storage, Pressure Vessel, or Cavern Allowed or Caused to 
Overpressure 
Incorrect Operation - Other reason of overflow Details 
Incorrect Operation - Other Sub-cause Details 
Incorrect Operation Incident related to - Inadequate procedure (Yes, Null) 
Incorrect Operation Incident related to - No procedure established (Yes, Null) 
Incorrect Operation Incident related to - Failure to follow procedure (Yes, Null) 
Incorrect Operation Incident related to - Other (Yes, Null) 
Incorrect Operation Incident related to - Other Details 
Incorrect Operation - Category type that caused Incident 
Incorrect Operation - Was the task(s) that led to the Incident identified as a covered task in your Operator 
Qualification Program (Yes, No, Null) 
Individuals performing the task(s) qualified for the task(s) 
Other Incident Cause Sub-Cause 
Other Incident Cause - Miscellaneous Details 
Other Incident Cause - Unknown Sub-type 
Name of Operator's preparer 
Title of Operator's preparer 
Telephone number of Operator's preparer 
 
